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Democratisation and Financial Governance:  
The Politics of Financial Reform in Taiwan (1988-2008)  
Abstract 
The global financial meltdown in 2008-2009 and its lasting negative impacts on most 
national economies have driven many to contemplate the importance of financial 
governance of the state. The fresh focus on the state‟s role in regulating the free 
financial market is in a big contrast to what many East Asian countries experienced in 
the wake of the regional financial debacle of 1997-1998. At that time, many of them 
were forced to deregulate their financial markets and the states were blamed for the 
crisis. The so-called East Asian model, in which the state played a leading role in 
delivering economic growth and strategically controlled the financial market, was 
heavily questioned. Now as the opinion pendulum swings back, can we reconfirm the 
model‟s relevance in the current global political economy?  
In fact, the question is far from new. It had been hotly debated among policy makers 
and scholars for years even before the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. Also, it 
has caught more attention with the rise of China and the relatively better economic 
performance of other East Asian countries over the past decade. During those debates, 
Taiwan, as one of the paragons of the East Asian model, has been frequently 
mentioned. But, oddly, it has been cited as evidence for two opposite views: The 
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model is in decline or demise; the model is resilient in adaption. The mixed picture 
leads to this thesis to clarify the reality of the model‟s application in Taiwan over the 
recent two decades by examining how the state addressed financial governance and 
reform from 1988 to 2008.  
The Taiwanese state has followed the global trend of financial liberalisation by 
actively pushing for financial reform since the late 1980s. It has been hoping to 
establish a new financial sector which is efficient and competitive. While certain 
progress has been made, two puzzles emerge. First, why did financial turmoil (i.e. run 
on banks, collapse of financial institutions and mounting bad loans) surge after the 
mid-1990s? Second, why did it become so hard for the state to pass and implement its 
new financial reforms? Through examining four key issues of financial reform from 
the late 1980s to 2008, I argue that rapid political democratisation since the end of 
martial law rule in 1987 was the key to these puzzles.  
In a democratic era, the state‟s capacity in delivering effective financial governance 
was so significantly squeezed and challenged by newly rising forces and players that 
its typical state-dominant and top-down approach for financial reform often ran into 
difficulties. While this is closer to the “decline or demise” view of the East Asian 
model, the study in fact also finds that the Taiwanese state has been efficient in 
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quelling financial turbulences in recent years. It is because, in face of crises, the 
state‟s capacity is often recharged to a higher level than usual by a strong reform 
mandate from the public. Hence, while it is true that the East Asian model has been 
under enormous pressure to change or even crash, it might be too early to announce 
its end in Taiwan. Nevertheless, it is likely that a regulatory state or something in 
between is rising there. 
In contrast to many existing works concentrating on how globalisation has shaped or 
constrained the East Asian model, this study highlights the importance of domestic 
politics in grasping the changing course of the model. Without denying the impacts of 
globalisation, it underlines how domestic politics during the periods of democratic 
transition and consolidation has affected economic governance in general and 
financial governance in particular of the state in Taiwan. Though it is risky to 
generalize too much from a single case, the study‟s findings provide a base for further 
comparative studies with other East Asian countries.    
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, the call to increase 
government intervention in the financial system is gaining strong support around the 
world. For the East Asian nations, however, they have more mixed feelings about the 
issue than their counterparts in the West. It is quite ironic for them to see the resurged 
emphasis on the importance of the state‟s role in regulating and controlling the 
financial system. Just around 12 years ago, when most of them suffered in the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98, they were asked to do exactly the opposite – undertaking 
aggressive financial liberalisation and deregulation – under the enormous pressure of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), an international body for financial rescue 
dominated by the Western powers. Only by doing so, the IMF insisted, could they 
gain the rescue funds from it to save their economies from complete collapse. But 
now after more than a decade of aggressive financial liberalisation and deregulation, 
the East Asian countries are only startled to find that the supposedly much safer and 
more advanced financial sectors in the West have experienced earlier and bigger 
crashes in the latest global financial crisis than the rest of the world. As the given 
model of national financial governance is melting down, the East Asian model, where 
the state has been generally more active in interventions of the financial system, 
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seems to deserve a reassessment.  
The East Asian model has been widely denounced by many as being in decline or 
demise since the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s. Prior to the recent global 
financial crisis of 2008-2009, the model had been under heavy criticism. It had been 
blamed by some as the root cause behind the last regional financial meltdown. They 
argued that too much state intervention in the financial markets in East Asia had made 
their financial systems too rigid, weak, inefficient and uncompetitive. As a result, their 
economies were vulnerable to financial crises. To improve the health of their 
economies and financial sectors, the role of the state in the financial markets was 
required to be reduced to a less significant level so that “the invisible hand” could 
wield its magic to make financial markets and broader economies more efficient and 
robust. Now that “the invisible hand” has failed its job in the latest global financial 
crisis, does this imply a resurgence of the East Asian model as a way of economic 
governance in the global economy?  Especially, over the past decade, the rise of 
China and the relatively better economic performance of other East Asian countries 
have seemed to provide more support for the claim.  
1. Origins of the study  
To do a study particularly focusing on Taiwan is a response to the debate on the 
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relevance and outlook of the East Asian model in the world economy. The debate has 
been undertaken between two main camps with two completely opposite views: the 
decline/demise view and the resilience/adaption view. While the former argues that 
the model‟s decline or demise is inevitable in the global economy, the latter contends 
that the model is resilient enough to adjust itself to the new challenges it confronting. 
What puzzles me most is the role that Taiwan has played in the debate. As one of the 
paragons of the East Asian model, Taiwan has often been both cited to support the 
model‟s decline/demise and resilience/adaption. How could the same country become 
the evidence to make two completely different views sustain at the same time? 
A brief answer is: it has something to do with the mixed reputation that the Taiwanese 
state has in handling financial governance and crises. Following the global trend of 
economic deregulation and liberalisation, triggered by Reagan-Thatcher‟s aggressive 
push for reforms based on the doctrines of free market economy in the 1980s, the state 
in Taiwan has conducted large-scale financial reform since the late 1980s. Indeed, 
financial liberalisation or reform has been one of the buzzwords for financial policy 
makers in Taiwan over the past two decades. Over the recent decade, the Taiwanese 
state, however, has shown very different faces to the world in terms of its reputation 
on financial governance in different financial crises. It impressed the world when 
Taiwan was relatively unscathed amid the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98. But soon 
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it was under heavy criticisms as a non-performing loan (NPL)
1
 crisis was looming 
between 1999 and 2002. Then to the great surprise of the observers, it efficiently 
defused the NPL crisis in 2004. Nonetheless, it soon failed again in its attempt to 
consolidate the banking industry from 2005 to 2007. In short, the mixed performances 
that the Taiwanese state has demonstrated have further raised my interest on how it 
has addressed financial reform since the genesis of its large-scale financial 
liberalisation.   
Another drive to do the study stemmed from my initial attention to the issue of 
financial liberalisation among the East Asian countries after the outbreak of the 
regional financial meltdown in 1997-98. As many critics have attributed the crisis in a 
significant part to the mishandling of financial liberalisation prior to the crisis by the 
governments in the region for years, I was curious about the process of how and why 
the governments failed to handle the issue. Especially, as many of the governments 
were credited with their capacity and performance in controlling financial markets 
and delivering remarkable and sustained economic growth in the 1980s and early 
1990s, why did they suddenly lose their competence?      
                                                 
1 NPLs indicate those loans that are in default or close to being in default. Normally, when loans are in 
default for three months, they become non-performing. But this can depend on the contract terms.  
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2. The questions in the context of Taiwan 
When I started to work on how the Taiwanese state has handled financial reform since 
the late 1980s, two questions regarding its financial governance occurred to me. 
Firstly, why has there been a surge of incidents of financial disorder since the early 
1990s? To be more specific, the sudden increase of bank runs and financial crises over 
the past two decades are unprecedented. On the one hand, the frequency of runs on 
banks is the highest in Taiwan‟s financial history. Studies have shown that between 
1991 and 2001, 83 bank-runs occurred in Taiwan and most of them emerged in the 
second half of the 1990s.
2
 On the other hand, the occurrence of financial crises over 
the past years also reached record highs. In just 10 years, three alarming financial 
crises hit Taiwan. The first one came as Taiwan was dragged into the regional 
financial meltdown in East Asia in 1997-98. The second emerged in late 1998 as a 
series of incidents of financial difficulty broke out among a large number of listed 
companies, resulting in a panic in financial markets. The third, the NPL crisis, began 
to take shape right after the previous one. As the government did not really address 
the earlier crisis, NPLs accumulated fast in the banking sector and thus threatened to 
cripple Taiwan‟s financial system and economy from 2001 to 2003. Given that the 
state has consciously pushed for large-scale financial reform for several years since 
                                                 
2
 Lin, “Taiwan Jiuling Niandai De Jinrong Jidui Hebing Yu Jinrong Zhixu” [bank-runs, bank mergers 
and financial order on Taiwan in the 1990s]. 
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the late 1980s, the surge of financial disorders is not only ironic but also difficult to 
understand.  
Secondly, why have most of the main measures of financial reform initiated by the 
government either been seriously delayed, altered, or sometimes even forced to 
terminate halfway? Various measures of financial reform, based on the proclaimed 
principle of “internationalisation” and “liberalisation,” have been taken since the late 
1980s. Among them, “privatise state-owned banks,” “build Taiwan as a regional 
financial centre,” “allow new private banks to be established,” “encourage merger and 
acquisition among financial institutions,” “strengthen financial oversight” are all 
well-known examples. Unfortunately, not many of them were fully realized. Delays, 
alterations or even terminations of reform projects have become more common than 
before the 1990s. As the Taiwanese state had traditionally had a reputation for being 
powerful and conservative in managing the financial system with its regular 
interventions and significant shareholdings in major financial institutions, its recent 
inability to carry out measures of financial reform creates another puzzle.  
Thus, I contend that the key to making sense of how the state in Taiwan has handled 
financial reform is to offer vital answers to the two questions above. To put it in 
another way, if one could explain what has accounted for the surge of financial 
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turmoil in Taiwan and what has contributed to the slowness or ineffectiveness of 
financial reform in Taiwan since the early 1990s, then one would have a better 
assessment of the East Asian model in Taiwan, and consequently make a more 
substantial contribution to the debate on the future of the model. 
3. The argument 
The surge of financial turmoil and the constant failure of reaching planned targets of 
financial reform are all signs of an obvious fact --- the Taiwanese government‟s 
mission to engineer a new financial sector which is both efficient and competitive 
since the late 1980s has failed. On top of that, behind the failed mission is an 
inconvenient truth about the Taiwanese state: its capacity in delivering sound 
governance over the financial sector has simply been in decline over the past two 
decades. But, a further question would be: What has accounted for the shrinking 
capacity of the state in bringing a more stable, efficient and competitive financial 
sector? That is, what has happened to the state in just a few years after Taiwan‟s 
financial Big Bang
3
 beginning in the late 1980s, especially considering the relatively 
strong financial governance of the state in the past? 
                                                 
3
 The term was initially referred to the liberalization in 1986 of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 
its following financial liberalisation measures adopted by the Conservative government in the UK in 
the 1980s. Later, when Japan pursed its financial reform in large scale in 1998, Japan applied the same 
term to the reform. Since Taiwan conducted a large-scale financial reform in 1989, I use the same term 
to describe it. See also Lee, “The development of Banking in Taiwan: the historical impact on future 
challenges.” 
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It has no doubt that the causes behind the shrinking capacity of the state on financial 
governance are compound. For example, the shrinking might be because of the impact 
of financial globalisation which erodes the barriers of capital movement and thus 
makes state controls and interventions more difficult. It might be also due to the shift 
of geopolitics that initially was favourable to the existence of the developmental state. 
But in terms of impacts on the content and pace of financial reform, domestic politics, 
I argue, is much more dominant. 
The state in Taiwan has been under growing constraints imposed by rapid political 
democratisation since its outset in the late 1980s. Since then, the old state-centred 
approach for policy making and implementation, a key feature of the East Asian 
model, has been so constantly and gravely challenged by newly rising political 
players and forces that it is not able to work as effectively as before. Consequently, 
the effectiveness of its economic governance including financial governance is 
seriously undermined. 
The argument is built upon an important observation that Taiwan‟s financial 
liberalisation has been undertaken in a rapidly changing political context which has 
been greatly shaped by rapid democratisation. From 1988 to 2000, the first 12 years of 
large-scale financial liberalisation, we saw the rise in the influence of the opposition 
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parties, legislators, elected politicians, business groups, local governments and civil 
organizations on Taiwan‟s political stage. Though, in appearance, the KMT was still 
dominant in power, policies or measures for financial liberalisation were much less 
likely to be approved without the support of those new political forces in a new 
democratic era. From 2000 to 2008, as the first change of ruling parties since the end 
of the Second World War marked a new milestone of Taiwan‟s democratisation, 
divided government and polarized politics brought additional challenges for the state 
to undertake financial reform. In sum, as the political context underpinning the state 
has been significantly changed by democratisation, the state‟s autonomy and capacity 
are also under growing squeeze. Under such circumstances, it is no surprise that the 
state has run into difficulty in pushing through its agenda and plan for financial 
reform in a new democratic era. 
4. Location of the thesis in the related studies 
Certainly, such an argument does not come from nowhere. Firstly, at a fundamental 
level, the argument is inspired by the existing literature on the East Asian model. It is 
only from this literature that I could have a clear picture about how the model has 
worked, why it could make a difference in achieving remarkable economic growth in 
the past, what the favourable conditions are for its existence, and what its latest 
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challenges are. Applying these existing insights to the case of Taiwan is like to borrow 
a sophisticated and sharp lens to help examine the conditions of the model in Taiwan. 
In fact, this thesis is dedicated to enriching the given research in this field.  
Secondly, at a broader level, the argument is related to a lasting discussion on whether 
a democratic developmental state is possible in East Asia in today‟s global economy. 
As many successful cases of the developmental state were all connected with 
authoritarian regimes in the past, some researchers ask whether these cases could still 
be sustained under democratic regimes. To put it in another way, they are asking: is 
the developmental state compatible with democracy?
4
 For a significant number of 
developmental states, democratisation is a critical test to their survival. Since Taiwan 
has been in similar situation since the late 1980s, this line of studies inspires me to 
make my argument in which democratisation is regarded as the key variable.  
Finally, at a narrower level, my argument is also related to an ongoing discussion on 
how crony capitalism damaged the financial governance of those crisis-hit states in 
East Asia before they tumbled in the regional financial meltdown of 1997-98. 
According to this line of literature, its focus is on how the previous iron triangle 
                                                 
4
 White, “Constructing a Democratic Developmental State.” Edigheji, Constructing a Democratic 
Developmental State in South Africa: Potentials and Challenges. Kim, “Limits of the authoritarian 
developmental state of South Korea.” Evans, “Constructing the 21st century developmental state: 
potentialities and pitfalls.” Chang, “How to „do‟ a developmental state: political, organisational and 
human resource requirements for the developmental state.” Huang, “Contested State and Competitive 
State: Managing the Economy in a Democratic Taiwan?” 
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among the state, business and banks slipped into an alliance which increased moral 
hazard and thus encouraged reckless lending and borrowing and jeopardised the 
soundness of financial oversight. Similarly, my emphasis on the negative impact of 
democratisation on the state‟s financial governance is to single out a twisted 
dimension in the process of Taiwan‟s moving into a consolidated democracy. I assert 
that democratisation has made crony capitalism less constrained in Taiwan and thus 
jeopardised the quality of financial governance of the state.            
5. Plan of the thesis  
To justify the argument and make my case, the rest of the thesis is arranged as follows. 
The next chapter will begin with a literature review on related studies in the fields just 
mentioned. It aims to locate my study in the given researches in detail and, most of all, 
build my own argument against this backdrop. It finally will be ended with a brief 
discussion of my methodology and research approach. Then, since the thesis is a case 
study about the politics of financial reform in Taiwan, there is a need to have a context 
chapter about Taiwan‟s general history, political development and financial evolution.  
With this chapter as a base, from Chapter Four to Seven are four individual case 
studies on the four most important policies or measures regarding financial reform or 
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governance over the past two decades in Taiwan.
5
 Chapter Four is about the reform to 
privatise and deregulate the state-owned banks. It analyzes why the reform was either 
seriously delayed or even simply halted. Chapter Five examines how the reform to lift 
the ban on the establishment of new private commercial banks led to financial chaos 
in the end. In other words, it traces the roots of financial turmoil resulting from the 
entry of new private commercial banks into the banking system. Together, Chapter 
Four and Five are cases to prove the decline of Taiwanese state on financial 
governance in terms of its inability to engineer the kind of new financial sector it had 
hoped to create. Furthermore, through these two chapters, we will see the clear 
impacts of political democratisation on the economic governance of the state. As the 
state is significantly penetrated by new political forces and players in a new 
democratic era, its autonomy has struggled to be maintained, thus undermining its 
capacity to carry out financial reform.  
The same argument applies to how the looming NPL crisis was formed from the late 
1990s to the early 2000s in Chapter Six and how the health of grassroots financial 
institutions deteriorated in Chapter Seven over the same period of time. However, two 
additional points are added into these two chapters. First, greater emphasis is laid on 
                                                 
5
 The four cases are chosen due to either their relatively larger scale and scope of reform or their 
critical impacts on the financial, economic and social stability. In some of them, it could be because of 
both. Also, as indirect financing is still dominant in Taiwan, I only focus on issues of the banking 
sector.           
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the performance of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government than in the 
two previous chapters as these two financial reform issues are mainly addressed by 
the DPP during its years in power for the first term from 2000 to 2004. Second, 
deliberate contrast is made between the two chapters as the DPP government 
succeeded in defusing the NPL crisis but failed to push through its reform on the 
grassroots financial institutions at the same time. This contrast is aimed to 
demonstrate two more claims. Firstly, it shows the conditions for the state to restore 
its efficiency and effectiveness of financial governance after 2000. The case of 
defusing the bad debt bomb in Chapter Six demonstrates that an overwhelming 
financial crisis is of great help to boost the mandate of the state to implement 
necessary reforms even if the state was constrained by divided government. Secondly, 
it attempts to make clear that the effects of the change of ruling parties on enhancing 
financial governance of the state are limited. The case of policy U-turn on reforming 
the grassroots financial institutions in Chapter Seven reveals more subtle aspects of 
the influence of domestic politics on the outcome of financial reform after 2000. 
Finally, Chapter Eight is the conclusion of the thesis. It not only summarizes the main 
findings and their implications of the previous chapters but also offers policy 
suggestions to revamp the developmental state in Taiwan in a democratic era. 
Moreover, it also identifies possible scenarios about the prospects of the 
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developmental state in Taiwan and East Asia. Then judging from the progress of this 
thesis and its limitations, I call for further comparative studies in the future. A brief 
discussion on what could be done to expand the research is addressed. 
6. Expected contributions  
While there are scores of studies on the effects of political democratisation on the 
state‟s economic governance or financial governance in Taiwan, the thesis, however, 
is the most comprehensive study so far on the politics of financial reform in Taiwan. 
Unlike other studies which only focus on one particular issue at one particular period 
of time, the thesis covers the most important four issues regarding financial reform or 
governance since Taiwan‟s financial Big Bang in the late 1980s. By doing so, it will 
not only help us pay special attention to the long-term course of development 
regarding the developmental state in Taiwan, but also prevents us from jumping to the 
conclusion based on relatively insufficient material and evidence. Thus, the thesis is 
expected to provide a more accurate assessment of Taiwan‟s developmental state in 
terms of its financial governance.     
Moreover, while the main argument of the thesis is obviously more in line with the 
demise view about the East Asian model, the study does not totally deny the 
possibility for the model to restore its effectiveness on financial governance. It notices 
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the importance of conditions which are favourable to the continuing function of the 
model. Therefore, the study is hoping to transfer the focus of the debate on the East 
Asian model from “the demise view vs. the adaption view” to “under what conditions 
the model could function effectively” in the current and future global economy.              
Finally, it seeks to enrich the debate on the prospect of the East Asian model in the 
global economy by adding more observations and experiences from Taiwan. As 
Taiwan is one of the three core developmental states in East Asia, in addition to Japan 
and South Korea, a case study on its financial reform since the weakening of its 
previous authoritarian regime about 20 years ago will provide a more solid empirical 
base for further comparison and study with other countries of similar nature in the 
same region at the same period of time.     
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Chapter Two 
The East Asian Model and the Taiwan Case 
Since the thesis is aimed at addressing the relevancy of the East Asian model in the 
global economy through a case study on Taiwan‟s financial reform from 1988 to 2008, 
this chapter is intended to review six key questions about the academic background 
behind the thesis: 
1. What is the East Asian model? 
2. How has the model been assessed before and after the Asian financial crisis of  
  1997-1998? 
3. What has happened to the East Asian model over the past two decades and what 
will it become? 
4. What is the relationship between democracy and development in East Asia? Is a 
democratic developmental state possible in the region? 
5. What is the special role of Taiwan in the debate of assessing the East Asian   
model? 
6. How was the research conducted and built upon existing literature?  
Accordingly, the rest of the chapter will be divided into six parts to elaborate the 
questions above. 
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1. What is the East Asian model? 
The East Asian model, or the East Asian developmental state, is a state-led regime for 
economic governance and national development. But unlike a socialist state in which 
state control and central-planning are central to the economy, the regime embraces the 
market economy and actively engages in international trade. While the state actively 
gets involved in economic development through a variety of industrial policies in an 
attempt to help home industries outperform their rivals from other countries, it allows 
the market, “the invisible hand,” to play its role. The state only intervenes in those 
“target industries” which are regarded as strategically important for national 
competitiveness in the global economy. The state is strongly committed to fostering 
comparative advantages of home industries in particular and economic development 
in general. Its policy tools range from direct investment, transferring technology, 
providing cheap credit or credit guarantee to tax breaks for exports and imposing high 
tariffs and other trade or non-trade barriers for protecting emerging industries with 
competitive potential. As a result, the whole national economy can improve and grow 
fast, transforming a late comer in the world economy into a competitive player in just 
a few decades.  
The state-led regime, or the developmental state as it has been widely referred to, has 
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been particularly popular in East Asia since the end of the Second World War. Its 
origin, actually, is from the West. According to the studies of Alexander Hamilton, 
Friedrich List and Alexander Gerschenkron, strategic interventions into the market by 
the state, aiming to facilitate industrial transformation and economic development, 
was quite common in backward economies in the West in the past.
6
 The strategy was 
adopted in those economies to protect infant industries at home with an eye on 
catching up with the advanced economies in the near future. George Washington‟s US, 
Bismarck‟s Germany, Meiji era Japan and the young Soviet Union are all typical 
cases.  
But it was the remarkable economic growth of a number of East Asian economies 
over the decades after the Second World War that made practices of the state-led 
regime noticed worldwide and a more systematic research on the regime emerged. 
The first such case was Japan. To overcome its economic backwardness and catch up 
with the Western powers, Japan actively used a state-centred approach to engineer its 
rapid industrialisation since the Meiji Restoration in the late 19th century. The 
approach was reinstalled and reinforced shortly after the Second World War. In just 
three decades, Japan not only soon recovered from its ruin and defeat in the war but 
                                                 
6
 See Hamilton, "Report on Manufactures.” List, National System of Political Economy, Book II, The 
Theory. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Chang, Kicking away the 
Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. 
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also became the second largest economy in the world.
7
 By effectively exploiting the 
Cold War context in which the US opened its market to sustain its alliances, the 
Japanese state successfully fostered its strategic industries and used its booming 
exports to significantly strengthen its economic power. Through the late 1970s to the 
early 1990s, Japan was widely regarded as the most successful story of economic 
development among the advanced economies. “Japan as number one”8 was once the 
most worrying trend to many people in the US, the biggest economy in the world.  
The economic success of Japan attracted much scholarly attention. Among a large 
number of scholars, Chalmers Johnson‟s study on the role of the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) in contributing to the Japanese Miracle is the 
most renowned.
9
 In Johnson‟s view, the MITI was the pilot agency which directed the 
development of Japan‟s economy. Equipped with highly capable technocrats and 
strong autonomy, the MITI could deliberate plans and strategies for economic 
development with an eye on the long term national interest. "The politicians reign and 
the bureaucrats rule" was a snapshot of how the MITI functioned in Japan‟s political 
and economic system. Johnson coined the term “developmental state” to entail the 
economic growth mechanism in Japan and its particularly historical context.  
                                                 
7
 China has replaced Japan as the second largest economy in 2010. Japan's economy was worth 
US$5.474 trillion at the end of 2010 and China's economy was closer to US$5.8 trillion in the same 
period. 
8
 Vogel, Japan as number one: lessons for America. It is believed that China has adopted similar 
state-led approach for its rapid rise over the past three decades. 
9
 Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. 
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After Johnson‟s book was published in 1982, the rapid economic growth in other 
newly industrial countries (NICs) in East Asia also began to attract global attention.
10
 
Due to similar patterns of economic development and historical connection as well as 
geographic proximity, some researchers began to apply Johnson‟s research to those 
East Asian NICs. Among which, Taiwan and South Korea were most frequently 
studied and compared to Japan.
11
 For example, Amsden‟s analysis on South Korea‟s 
industrial development strategy by deliberately “getting prices wrong” stressed the 
role of the state in making the strategy work.
12
 Similarly, Wade‟s study on Taiwan‟s 
industrial transformation also highlighted the commanding position of the 
authoritarian KMT regime in engineering the process of economic take-off through a 
range of industrial policies.
13
 In short, the developmental state gradually emerged as 
a paradigm, both in practice and theory, for understanding and explaining “the East 
Asian Miracle”14 from the 1980s to the mid-1990s.15  
In fact, the emergence of the new paradigm could be also seen as a counter critique of 
                                                 
10
 These East Asian economies grew at an average rate of almost 10% per year.  
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 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy. 
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the neoclassical paradigm. It sought to refute the neo-liberal vision of East Asian 
growth in terms of the economic benefits of trade liberalization, private enterprise, 
and a restricted role for the state.
16
 The adherents of the new paradigm were 
dedicated to demonstrating not only the causal linkage between the economic 
performance and the politically institutional arrangements
17
 but also the historical, 
geopolitical and international context for the rise of developmental states in East Asia. 
Wong has well summarized these points:    
“At the policy level, the postwar developmental state was characterized by its use of 
market-intervening policies. These policies were tolerated by the rest of the world 
because of the imperatives of postwar economic reconstruction and the need to 
contain the spread of communism during the Cold War. The developmental state was 
also understood in terms of its internal institutional configuration, for example, the 
hierarchical organization of the bureaucracy and the state‟s meritocratic recruiting 
procedures. Last, the developmental state was defined by its ability to balance 
strategic linkages with, and relative autonomy from, different societal forces.”18  
In other words, in a broader term, a successful developmental state involves not only 
certain critical institutional arrangements but also some historical and international 
preconditions. But, this also implies that it will be difficult for other countries from 
other regions at a different time to completely emulate this particular state-led regime 
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 Onis, “The Logic of the Developmental State,” 109-110. 
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 Chu, “State Structure and economic Adjustment of the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries.” 
18
 Wong, “The Adaptive Developmental State in East Asia,” 352. 
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as “the East Asian developmental state was the product of a certain time and space.”19  
2. How the East Asian model has been assessed before and after the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998? 
The East Asian model was confronted with its first challenge as Japan slipped into its 
“lost decade” of economic recession after its bubble economy burst in the early 
1990s.
20
 However, as East Asian tiger economies like South Korea and Taiwan which 
adopted the same model were still thriving, Japan‟s economic misfortune did not 
immediately amount to a fatal setback for the model. A more essential blow to the 
model came later after a regional financial crisis broke out over 1997-98. As many 
countries in the region such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Korea were 
all heavily hit by the crisis, the criticism of the East Asian model behind the crisis-hit 
economies reached such a level that many predicted the model‟s doom in the near 
future.
21
 Indeed, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 is a critical juncture for the East 
Asian model. Before the crisis, the model was widely praised as an alternative to a 
neoclassical approach for economic development where market forces were regarded 
as the main drives for economic improvement and upgrading. Then, soon after the 
crisis, the model was seriously discredited and even seen by some as the root cause 
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behind the crisis.
22
 Since then, the literature on what caused the financial disaster and 
the debates on the value of “Asian model” have surged.23  
There have been two main approaches to assess the crisis: the financial-panic view 
and the weak-fundamental view. The financial-panic view focuses on what turned the 
original event into a crisis. One of the best examples of this view could be represented 
by Radelet and Saches.
24
 According to them, those crisis-hit countries were 
vulnerable to panic as they all had large-scale foreign capital inflows into their 
financial systems before the crisis broke out. As the abrupt reverse of foreign capital 
triggered the crisis, policy mistakes of the governments and poorly designed rescue 
programmes by the IMF turned the capital outflows into a full-fledged financial panic, 
and deepened the crisis more than was either necessary or inevitable. For them, the 
underlying weak economic fundamentals of the crisis-hit countries were not severe 
enough to warrant a financial crisis of that magnitude which occurred in the latter part 
of 1997. In other words, this view largely does not blame the East Asian model itself 
for causing the crisis. Thus, while it provides little help in assessing the value of the 
model in the aftermath of the regional financial crisis, it indirectly keeps the model 
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from attack. Also, the view does remind us of the impacts of capital movement in 
affecting financial stability and governance of individual nations in East Asia.       
In contrast, the weak-fundamental view, which argues that weak economic 
fundamentals are the keys to the crisis, points the finger at the East Asian model itself. 
The view contends that some common economic problems existed in those affected 
countries. Externally, they all had large short-term foreign borrowing used to finance 
current account deficits, leaving their economies vulnerable to capital flow reversals. 
Domestically, inadequately supervised and capitalized banks made excessively risky 
loans to poorly governed firms. Widespread moral hazard existed because financial 
institutions were poorly regulated and companies had little accountability to 
shareholders. As a result, corporations borrowed heavily to invest in risky projects, 
financed by loans from banks that, in turn, borrowed heavily (and unhedged) from 
abroad. At the same time, foreign creditors were willing to lend large amounts to 
banks and corporations in these economies --- for the region had a strong track record 
for economic performance, and the borrowers were often state-owned banks and 
corporations which the lenders thought, had implicit or explicit sovereign 
guarantees.
25
 In short, the East Asian model itself is treated as the root cause of the 
regional financial meltdown.  
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In fact, behind the moral hazard account for the Asian financial crisis is a broader 
accusation against the East Asian model: crony capitalism. After 1997, crony 
capitalism has been wildly drawn as a systemic flaw in the “Asian model” of 
development.
26
 It means close linkages among the domestic banking sector, target 
industries, and the government. As the government is encouraging the development of 
the target industries by asking the domestic banks to provide cheap credit, the banks 
have no incentive to assess the creditworthiness of their borrowers or the quality of 
the investments their loans are financing. For they know that no matter how risky and 
overextended their lending is, they will always be bailed out by the government. 
Gradually, it leads to a mountain of bad papers and the de facto insolvency of a major 
part of the banking system, not to mention the corruption involved among the close 
linkages.
27
 Since there is a systemic flaw in the “Asian model” of development, the 
model‟s demise becomes inevitable if the structural problem is not fixed.  
But as Meredith Woo-Cumings asks, “How can one era represent a developmental 
miracle and the next a mere mirage, when nothing fundamental has changed?”28 
Adherents of the East Asian model often raise such a question to the criticisms of the 
model after the Asian financial crisis. They argue that all the criticisms, based on the 
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argument of moral hazard, of the “Asian model” are misleading and partial.29 For 
example, in response to the claimed major origin of moral hazard behind industrial 
policies in East Asia --- scholars such as Chang contend that “the point is not that such 
socialization of risk does not generate any moral hazard, but that the benefits that it 
brings about (higher productivity, better-coordinated investments, prevention of the 
“wastes” from duplicative investments) can more than offset the costs from the moral 
hazard that it may generate. The success of industrial policy in various East Asian 
countries in the past is good proof of this.”30 Likewise, responding to the allegations 
of cronyism in contributing to the financial crisis, they argue that cronyism was a 
feature in all the crisis-stricken Asian countries throughout their high-growth periods 
in various forms and degrees. Why did it not cause similar crises before?
31
    
To counter, they further argue that the demise or weakening of the model itself in the 
crisis–stricken countries over the years before the crisis was largely responsible for 
their crash in the regional financial meltdown. Wade and Veneroso, for example, 
contend that a significant level of government capacity and monitoring on financial 
regulation was the key to the endurance of the East Asian model. Once the level was 
reduced, the likelihood of the crash of the model increased.
32
 Accordingly, for Wade 
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and Veneroso, financial deregulation undertaken by East Asian governments before 
the crisis was strongly related to the occurrence of the crisis:  
“…removed or loosened controls on companies‟ foreign borrowing, abandoned 
coordination of borrowing and investments, and failed to strengthen bank supervision. 
By doing so, they violated one of the stability conditions of the Asian high debt model, 
helping to set the crisis in train.”33   
South Korea was such a case in this argument. The financial regulation since the late 
1980s and the official end of the planning practice in 1993 were all seen as the root 
causes for South Korea‟s vulnerability in facing a financial crisis. Because they had 
all significantly reduced the scope for state influence in resource allocation and 
removed the restraints on unnecessary investments in some industries, inflows of 
foreign capital and massive foreign borrowing over 1993-97.
34
  
Thus, what is needed to be blamed is not the model, but those forces that led to the 
dismantling of the model. Mostly, the list of those forces entails the measures of 
economic liberalisation advocated by neo-liberals at home and abroad,
35
 and the 
pressures of economic globalisation as well as the domestic factors like a major 
demographic shift, unproductive rent-seeking and democratisation that made the 
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developmental state unsustainable.
36
 In other words, if an East Asian country could 
keep its developmental state regime free from erosion by those forces, it should have 
been able to weather the financial storm.  
3. From the developmental to the regulatory state? --- Impacts of 
economic liberalisation and political democratisation 
But this “decline of monitoring capacity” argument, in the words of Jayasuriya, fails 
to answer the following question --- “Why did East Asian governments liberalise 
financial markets when the results were obviously so deleterious?”37 Wade and 
Veneroso argue that it was because the policy-makers of those governments were so 
misled by international financial organizations that they made irrational decisions.
38
 
But then how do we explain that “policy mistakes were made not just in one country, 
but across the entire region” as Jayasuriya has rightly questioned?39 Alternatively, 
Jayasuriya suggests that a structural explanation is needed to better explain the 
disruption and instability of the East Asian model of economic governance. He further 
advocates that “it is useful to locate the dynamic of some these changes in the gradual 
shift of power from technocratic elites to business group. … this shift is reflected in 
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the increasingly polycentric distribution of power within the state.” --- the process of 
democratisation in those East Asian countries.
40
 Meanwhile, he also notices the 
importance of international context or factors in sustaining the East Asian model of 
economic governance. He argues that the model was nested within certain structures 
of international economic governance in the post-war era --- “embedded liberalism”41 
in Ruggie‟s terms.42 Against this backdrop, the East Asian developmental states had 
the room and capacity to control the movement of capital. But as the structures of 
international economic governance shifted to be in favour of the free flows of capital, 
inevitably, the East Asian developmental states gradually felt the difficulty to regulate 
the movement of capital. As a result, the existing way of economic governance 
collapsed or was forced to shift.  
Overall, from the late 1980s to the whole 1990s, we witness that almost all East Asian 
countries encountered a double transition: economic liberalisation and political 
democratisation. What the consequence of this double transition will be has raised 
strong interest and hot debate among media and political and academic circles. For a 
handful of scholars, they see that “the regulatory state” or even “the post-regulatory 
state” is emerging in East Asia.43 In the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 
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1997-1998, Gillespie and Peerenboom have observed that:  
“…administrative guidance lost prestige in East Asian countries such as Japan and 
South Korea. Japan and South Korea responded to their economic problems by 
re-regulating. They not only enacted a raft of new commercial laws, but also sought to 
judicialize administrative processes by shifting discretionary power from bureaucrats 
to judges and citizens, a process that was occurring globally and in other East Asian 
states as well.”44 
This period of re-regulation, they noted, coincided with, and was influenced by, what 
has been termed the rise of the “regulatory state” in the West.45 They found that: 
“States that had moved to privatize companies, reduce red tape, and use market-like 
incentives, were not really deregulating, but rather finding new ways to regulate the 
economy. Neoliberal deregulation moved in tandem with regulatory reforms that have 
spread new institutions, technologies, and regulatory instruments around the globe. 
For example, the World Bank advocates neoliberal reforms, but also promotes 
re-regulation throughout Asia as a method of stabilizing private markets through a 
range of measures bundled together as „good governance‟.”46 
The main implications and consequences of this double transition of deregulation and 
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reregulation in Asia are:  
“…the regulatory state challenges the convention that norms must be imposed by the 
public sphere on the private sphere. It developed new forms of „responsive‟ regulation 
that involve privatization, market competition, and increased state reliance on 
self-regulating organizations and regimes. In short, it reengineers the way state and 
non-state actors think about who is permitted within the regulatory space and who is 
excluded from exercising regulatory power.”47 
As for the “the post-regulatory state,” it is a new governance based on a flexible array 
of regulatory techniques. “It unshackles regulation from state-based processes and 
opens the regulatory space to complex forms of private or non-state mechanisms.” It 
implies that “the notion of the state withdrawing from some regulatory functions and 
supporting non-state actors to engage with global laws and principles. States are 
described as performing a „steering‟ function, leaving the „rowing‟ function to 
others.”48 “In practice this means that states not only provide policy guidelines and 
criteria to assess regulatory objectives, they also design regulatory structures and 
processes that stimulate and respond to non-state regulation. In post-regulatory states 
one task of state regulators is to regulate self-regulation by non-state actors.”49 
The emerging governance regimes demonstrate an obvious direction of change for the 
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old East Asian developmental states --- removal or reduction of the regulatory burden 
imposed by the state on industry. This confirms the strong effects of neoliberalism, 
which advocates a smaller state, emphasizes deregulation, privatization, and 
decentralization to combat the perceived “inefficiencies” caused by state interference 
in market regulation. But, does this mean that the emerging governance regimes in 
East Asia are totally departed from the old developmental states? Are they similar in 
nature as their counterparts in the U.S. and Europe? These are popular questions for 
debate on the state and prospect of the East Asian model.  
The thesis will address these questions by examining the Taiwan case in the following 
chapters. But here we need to clarify the attempt of thesis by asking following 
questions: If the pressure of implementing neoliberal reform measures is irresistible to 
all East Asian countries, have they all experienced similar trajectories in their reform 
process and had similar results? If not, what has contributed to the difference among 
them? Can we now assert that the East Asian model is the past?          
In other words, the thesis will not challenge or deny the massive influence of external 
pressure
50
 on shaping the transformation of the East Asian model. But, it will 
concentrate on the study of the process and result of national response in undertaking 
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economic liberalisation while facing a political environment of rapid democratic 
transition and consolidation. From this perspective, the thesis is turning the research 
focus to the relationship between democracy and development in the East Asian 
developmental states against the background of the heydays of neoliberal values 
pervasive both at home and abroad in the recent two decades. 
4. Democracy and development in East Asia 
In the era of “The East Asian Miracle”51 in the 1980s and early 1990s, the most 
successful cases of the East Asian model, except for Japan, were all under 
authoritarian rule. This fact leads many writers to associate the model with political 
authoritarianism. Now that some of these countries have become democracies or are 
in a process of democratic transition and consolidation, can they still have the same 
remarkable economic performance under democratic rule? Can democracy bring 
economic prosperity as usual? 
Before going to review the details of related literature on the question, it is better to 
define first what “democracy,” “democratisation” and “democratic consolidation” 
mean in the thesis as these are all central and mutually-connected variables for my 
argument and explanation. To begin with the usage of “democracy,” there are several 
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frequently mentioned definitions in the existing literature. Schumpeter, for example, 
argued that “Democracy means only that people have the opportunity of accepting or 
refusing the man who are to rule them.”52 Huntington added more concrete elements 
in his definition of democracy: “the most powerful collective decision makers are 
selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely 
compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote.”53 
Dahl clearly listed the key institutional requirements of democracy: election of 
government officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, right to stand for 
election, freedom of expression, free access to alternative sources of information and 
associational freedom.
54
 Another relatively concise but comprehensive definition 
which I prefer is made by Centeno. He defined democracy as “requires the provision 
for participation of all adult members of a community, freedom to formulate and 
advocate political alternatives, and the credible possibility of turnover in power.”55 To 
a large extent, this definition could seem to catch all the essential points of the 
definitions mentioned above. Accordingly, “democratisation” or “democratic 
transition” can be “defined as the transformation from a non-democracy to 
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representative and accountable government.”56 
As for democratic consolidation, Huntington‟s well-known criteria --- two turnover 
test --- still worth our attention. He argued that a democracy can be considered 
consolidated if it can survive two changes in ruling parties through post transition 
elections.
57
 Another famous definition is Przeworski‟s “the only game in town.” For 
him, “Democracy is consolidated when under given political and economic conditions 
a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in town and when no-one 
can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions.” 58  I tend to use both 
definitions together in the thesis as they are complementary to each other.  
Now I return to the theme of this section --- the relationship of democracy and 
development in East Asia. In a sense, the experience of democratic breakthroughs in 
East Asia over the 1980s fits the argument and prediction of modernization theory. 
Martin Seymour Lipset, a master of the theory, has argued that democracy is a product 
of modern capitalism. Due to modernization, a wealthier and better educated 
population and large middle class are created. This demographic and class structure 
change, in the meantime, triggers a cultural change favourable to democracy such as 
secularism and erosion of traditional hierarchal values. In short, once a country 
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achieves certain pre-conditions of economic wealth, democratisation should be 
expected to take place.
59
 
Nevertheless, even though modernization theory is right about how democratisation 
began in some East Asian countries,
60
 it is unable to answer whether democracy can 
maintain or create higher economic growth in these new democratic countries of the 
region. Indeed, so far strong empirical evidence in supporting that democracy 
promotes development is still in short supply. In fact, as Benjamin M. Friedman has 
reminded us that, “Even within the Western world … where electoral democracy and 
a market-oriented economy are mostly taken for granted --- parallel movement does 
not automatically imply a causal linkage.”61 Furthermore, in recent years, due to the 
dramatic rise of China‟s economic power, the so-called “Beijing Consensus,”62 which 
promotes economic development without democratisation, is gaining prestige within 
Asia and beyond and challenging the status of the neoliberal doctrine “Washington 
Consensus.”63 As a result, China up to now has become a strong case for rejecting the 
notion that democracy is necessary for economic development.  
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In sum, as some East Asian developmental states enter their democratic eras, what 
democracy can deliver for economic development to them is by no means certain. 
Actually, as the experience of the states in East Europe and former Soviet Union had 
shown in the 1990s, young democratic regimes were often very fragile when they 
failed to deliver sound economic growth as expected. Likewise, for those young East 
Asian democracies which are still in the process of democratic transition and 
consolidation, there is no way to rule out the possibility of the return of authoritarian 
rule. 
However, two things seem apparent in East Asia. One is that: “The regulatory space is 
clearly now more crowded than in the past, whether in authoritarian states such as 
China or Vietnam, or in post-developmental states such as Japan or South Korea, 
where the influence of the technocratic elite has waned in the wake of the Asian 
financial crisis and economic stagnation.”64 The other one is that “In general, civil 
society plays a more active role in policymaking in democratic Asian states.”65 How 
the “more crowded regulatory space” and “more active civil society” are shaping the 
East Asian model is the core subject of the thesis.  
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5. What is the special role of Taiwan? 
Taiwan is a special case in the debate of assessing the East Asian model over the past 
decade after the Asian financial crisis. Firstly, right after the crisis, it emerged as a 
strong case to prove the strength of the model. The main reason behind this was that 
Taiwan appeared relatively unscathed at a time when many of its neighbours fell apart 
in the powerful financial storm.
66
 As a result, Taiwan has been frequently compared 
with those East Asian countries which failed to weather the storm. Among those 
comparison studies, “Taiwan vs. South Korea” during the regional financial meltdown 
is the most mentioned theme, as they are the two core developmental states in 
Northeast Asia. The main argument behind Taiwan‟s success and South Korea‟s 
failure was that the developmental state in South Korea was dismantled in the 1990s 
before the regional storm as Taiwan kept its intact.
67
 Meanwhile, Taiwan is also been 
used to rebut the claim that crony capitalism was the main cause behind the regional 
financial crisis. For example, Godement notes that Taiwan survived despite the fact 
that Taiwan's politics and public economy are riddled with the special relationships, 
shady dealings and complete opacity now universally ascribed as the main reason for 
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Asia's fall from grace.
68
       
But as Taiwan began to suffer from its domestic financial troubles from late 1998 to 
2003,
69
 the strength of its developmental state was gradually challenged by other 
researchers. Kuo, for example, notices that an emerging “distorted democracy” in 
Taiwan has gradually jeopardised its state‟s capacity of economic governance.70 Kuo 
and other scholars in different papers also particularly highlight the impact of 
democratisation on Taiwan‟s financial sector. 71  With similar arguments, some 
researchers take an even more pessimistic view on Taiwan‟s developmental state. 
Take Lee Pei-shan‟s research as an example. The title of her work, “Democratization 
and the Demise of the Developmental State,” has clearly indicated her main argument 
that “the demise of the developmental state has its domestic sources.” 72  By 
examining the case of Taiwan, she shows how democratization since the mid-1980s 
has incrementally undermined the institutional foundations for effective functioning 
of the developmental state. She finds that “electoral competition ended the KMT's 
one-party dominance which, like it or not, had provided a stable, predictable and 
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institutionalized environment for economic governance. The delivery of particularistic 
goods to win votes and reward followers corrupted the process of economic 
policymaking. Distribution coalitions sprang up and the economic bureaucracy often 
stood at the sideline.”73  
A more recent example is the work of Wu Yu-shan. Though he does not use “demise” 
to describe the status of the developmental state in Taiwan, his argument is similar. He 
contends that “It is clear that democratization in the 1990s softened Taiwan‟s 
erstwhile authoritarian regime and dampened the power of the economic 
bureaucracy – the engine of the capitalist developmental state.”74 He argues that the 
Asian financial crisis and the two political shocks
75
 before and after the crisis have 
seriously undermined Taiwan's developmental state structure due to political 
reasons.
76
 After examining four key industrial cases that he chooses, he finds that 
“interest politics replacing regime autonomy, electoral competition leading politicians 
away from developmentalism, economic dynamism blunting state penetration, and 
bureaucrats making risky forward designating under great pressure.”77 Although 
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admitting that the old structure of the developmental state in Taiwan is not completely 
dismantled by democratisation, he emphasizes that the challenge ahead for Taiwan 
will be “to combine those elements from their old developmental model that are 
conductive to growth and the requirements of democratic governance.”78 
This, however, is not the end of the debate. Some of those who are arguing for the 
resilience of the East Asian model prefer to use “adaption” rather than “obsolescence” 
to indicate the reconfiguration of the model. For instance, Wong has argued that “The 
developmentally oriented state continue to play important roles in East Asia‟s 
economic, social, and political development.”79 He warns that “One should not 
equate liberalization, globalization, transnational harmonization, or economic policy 
convergence with the retreat of the state from the tasks of promoting national 
development.”80 He cites Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China to show that the 
developmental states “continue to experiment with industrial policies, R&D policies, 
social welfare reforms, and economic policy more generally in creative ways, albeit 
under many more constraints.”81  
Dent also has similar observation by examining the recent development in technical 
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aspects of Taiwan‟s foreign economic policy.82 He argues that “smart approaches to 
economic liberalization do not necessarily require a weakening of state capacity but 
rather its upgrading.” 83  According to his research, Taiwan has adopted a 
“liberalisation plus” approach --- synchronous liberalisation with re-regulation --- in 
dealing with the pressure of economic liberalisation, “revealing the adaptive nature of 
the Taiwanese developmental state.”84 “As trade liberalization is intended to open up 
Taiwan's firms to greater international competition, so Taiwan's industrial policy is 
simultaneously designed to enhance the economy's export competitiveness and 
techno-industrial advancement --- the tools may have changed but the underlying 
objectives of industrial policy have not.”85 Hence, he concludes that “the Taiwanese 
experience demonstrates that liberalisation can be most effectively implemented in an 
environment where comparatively high degrees of state capacity and institutionalized 
market order are evident.”86 
As for the future of the East Asian model, however, Wong adds a cautious tone. It 
“will be shaped by how the developmentally oriented state adapts to the politics of 
democracy.”87 Still, overall, it will be unwise to assert the doom of the model in 
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Taiwan and other East Asian countries at this early stage.
88
 
All these existing researches on the developmental state related to Taiwan in recent 
years recall an important issue about the East Asian model: the relationship of 
democracy and development in East Asia in the present day. But the verdicts are quite 
different. On the one hand, Taiwan appears to be struggling of making a balance 
between democratic rule and governance for effective economic development. On the 
other hand, Taiwan also has been adapting to the changing global economy well in 
many other ways. This double face regarding Taiwan‟s developmental state makes 
Taiwan a perfect case for study on the political challenges that the East Asian model is 
facing.    
To sum up, from the brief review above, it seems that Taiwan has a strong potential as 
a subject for a case study approach to examine the status of the East Asian 
developmental states. That is, if we could clarify what has happened to the 
developmental state in Taiwan before and after the Asian financial crisis, it would 
help us figure out whether the special mode of development in East Asia could still 
survive in the changing global economy.     
  
                                                 
88
 Chen I-ru‟s study on financial liberalisation in Taiwan particularly demonstrates the capability of the 
developmental state in implementing an orderly financial liberalisation in Taiwan during the 1990s. See 
Chen, State Autonomy and Financial Liberalization in Taiwan.      
  44 
6. How the research was conducted and built upon existing 
literature? 
Against such a backdrop, a study on the process of financial reform initiated by the 
state in Taiwan from 1988 to 2008 is aimed at responding to those mixed views on 
Taiwan. By addressing the issue, it is hoped to shed some light on the status of the 
developmental state in Taiwan and thus on the prospects for the East Asian model.  
6.1 The connections and differences  
Inspired by the given literature mentioned above, there are two main reasons to 
specifically focus on the politics of Taiwan‟s financial reform. First, as the whole 
debate concerning the East Asian model has escalated to a peak level over the past 
decade after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, how the Taiwanese state handled 
financial reforms and crises before and after the regional financial crash is 
undoubtedly highly relevant. Second, since its commencement in the late 1980s, 
large-scale financial liberalisation has been undertaken by the state in Taiwan for 
more than two decades. Through examining the long process of financial engineering 
launched by the Taiwanese state, we can get a more complete picture about the status 
of the developmental state in Taiwan.  
In my study, I stress the importance of the impacts of rapid political democratisation 
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on the financial governance of the state. Overall, I argue that the developmental state 
in Taiwan has been under increasing constraints imposed by the new political forces 
and structures as a result of Taiwan‟s rapid democratisation since the late 1980s. This 
line of argument is following the existing researches of Kuo, Chen, Sato, Lee and Wu, 
who have singled out the negative impacts of democratisation on economic 
governance of the state in Taiwan as just mentioned. What distinguishes my study, 
however, is the scope of research. While the above authors only focus on very limited 
cases since the late 1990s, my study covers the most important cases of financial 
reform since the launch of financial liberalisation by the state in the late 1980s.    
My argument is also inspired by the given literature which examines the weakness of 
the East Asian model, particularly those on the crony capitalism in East Asia. The 
most relevant part of this kind of research is about the moral hazard behaviour of 
poorly regulated banks and firms in particular, and crony capitalism in general. 
However, I agree with the criticism that one should explain why moral hazard and 
crony capitalism were not detrimental to the banking sector and wider economy prior 
to 1997 in East Asian developmental states. Therefore, it is important to make clear 
why moral hazard and crony capitalism only seriously damage the function of the 
developmental state in a democratic era in Taiwan. In my view, both of them are 
embedded in some contexts of a political economy. Instead of making judgments from 
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a normative perspective and dismissing it immediately, we have to examine them in a 
positivist way within historical contexts.  
6.2 A comparative historical study  
My research basically is a comparative historical study. With a holistic view of 
methodology, a comparative historical study emphasizes history, relationship, 
interaction, structure and context. If we look back at the development of social 
science in the past three decades, we can discern a number of scholars who advocate 
similar concepts or perspectives.
89
 Most of them come from the school of 
neo-Weberian historical sociology.
90
 The neo-Weberians emphasize taking the state 
seriously and put it in a broader context in their analysis. They not only ask us to 
“bring the state back in”91 but also stress that the state is embedded in domestic and 
international society. Besides, in adopting comparative historical analysis in their 
studies, they have to go back to the history of a specific country to find the answers. 
Meanwhile, by comparing different cases or times, they can acquire additional 
knowledge about similar patterns of dynamic and enrich their concepts for further 
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research.  
In addition, the methodology of the thesis is also inspired by Przeworski‟s views on 
social relations. He argues that: 
“Social relations are treated here as structures of choices available to the historical 
actors, individual and collective, at each moment of history, and in turn as the 
outcomes of strategies adopted earlier by some political forces. Behavior is thus 
analyzed as strategic action, oriented toward goals, based on deliberations, responding 
to perceived alternatives, resulting from decisions.”92 
“If we are to draw lessons from historical experience, we can assume neither that the 
practice of political movements is uniquely determined by any objective conditions 
nor that such movements are free to act at will, independently of the conditions they 
see to transform. These conditions constitute at each moment the structure of choice: 
the structure within which actors deliberate upon goals, perceive alternatives, evaluate 
them, choose courses of action, and pursue them to create new conditions.”93  
To be more specific, the thesis tends to see the relationship between (political, 
economic, social and historical) structures and actors in a mutually-dependent way 
similar to Przeworski‟s views on “the structure of choice” and “actors.” I contend that 
as structures constrain and shape the behaviour and decision of actors, the actors‟ 
response will also alter structures in return. Since the thesis focuses on 
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democratisation and transformation of the developmental state, this structure/actor 
view will be helpful in examining the complicated process involved. This is also 
indispensible to a holistic view of methodology mentioned above.   
As a matter of fact, my holistic view of methodology is also echoing Polanyi‟s views 
to see “the market as part of the broader economy, and the broader economy as part of 
a still broader society”94 In my view, a country is an organic entity, in which economy, 
society and the state are closely linked to each other in a complex way. With this in 
mind, Polanyi‟s insight about “the complex intertwining of politics and economics”95 
should be taken seriously to any researcher in the field of political economy. 
6.3 The research 
However, unlike most predecessors who used more than two cases (countries) to 
determine similarity or difference in their comparative historical analysis,
96
 I use one 
case (country) to do cross-time comparison. Since my concern is the process of the 
financial liberalization in Taiwan, I explore and compare the performance of the state 
in terms of its financial governance at different stages in different issues related to 
financial reform.  
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Moreover, a comparative historical analysis involved a great deal of reading and 
hinged heavily on the researcher‟s subjective selection. In order to prevent the 
research result from becoming just a personal judgment, repeated cross-checks from 
different sources such as interviews, official reports and other related findings from 
some academic agencies were necessary and helpful. I have employed the following 
sources: 
1. Books 
the secondary literature, in English and Chinese, on developmental states, financial 
reform (or liberalization) and international political economy.  
2. Journals  
Comparative Politics, Comparative Study, World Politics, Review of International 
Political Economy, New Political Economy, Review of International Studies, Journal 
of East Asian Studies, China Quarterly, the Pacific Review, Comparative Political 
Studies, Pacific Affairs.  
3. Newspapers:  
The Economist, Financial Times, Taipei Times, Tzuyou shihpao [自由時報, Liberty 
Times], Chungkuo shihpao [中國時報, China Times], Lienhepao [聯合報, United 
Daily], Chingchi jihpao [經濟日報, Economic Daily News], Kungshang shihpao [工
商時報, Commercial Times].  
4. Magazines:  
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the most popular magazines focusing on finance and politics are Shangyeh choukan 
[商業週刊, Business Weekly], Tsaihsun [財訊, Wealth Magazine], Hsinhsinwen [新
新聞, The Journalist].  
5. Official publications:  
involving question time minutes, policy announcements and regulations made by the 
Legislative Yuan and other key government branches, departments or agencies.  
6. Internet:  
financial statistics, electronic journal or papers, reports of international   
organization, think tanks and government agencies could be found in the following 
websites:  
IMF: http://www.imf.org,  
National Bureau of Economic Research: http://www.nber.org/ , 
The Central Bank of Taiwan: http://www.cbc.gov.tw ,  
The Ministry of Finance: http://www.mof.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=1,  
Financial Supervisory Commission: http://www.fscey.gov.tw/,  
Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics: 
http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/mp.asp?mp=1. 
7. Informal field interviews with policy insiders and senior bankers in Taiwan‟s 
banking sector.  
The main purpose of my field interview was not to directly quote what my 
interviewees say but to provide me with a critical source for double-checking my 
observations or correcting my research direction. Nevertheless, in order to get more 
systematic and complete information from the interviewees, my interview 
questions focused on the general issue areas of: 
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Where did the financial disorder come from in recent decades?  
Why did the government push for financial liberalization?  
What were the main government policies in dealing with financial liberalisation? 
The method, goal and difficulty of managing financial liberalization  
The comparison of the banking market between and after financial liberalization 
The banks‟ strategy for competition in the new banking market 
 
Appendix A is a list of interviews I conducted over 2003 to 2005. 
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Chapter Three  
The Taiwanese Context 
This chapter is aimed at setting the scene for the following case chapters on the four 
major issues of financial reform in Taiwan from 1988 to 2008. It addresses the general 
context against which the four issues were initiated and handled. Since Taiwan is the 
focus of the study, this chapter begins with a general introduction about Taiwan and 
its history before 1945. Then the next section goes further to a broad review on the 
political and financial development in Taiwan from 1945 to the late 1980s. It is 
outlined to present the big picture of how the KMT authoritarian regime maintained 
its rule and legitimacy and how the financial sector evolved against such a political 
backdrop during the period. Then the focus shifts to the dramatic years of Taiwan‟s 
rapid democratisation from the late 1980s to 2000. While the KMT seemed to deal 
with the impacts of democratisation well, its autonomy was in decline. Against such a 
background, the state‟s launch of financial liberalisation, the main theme of financial 
development during the 1990s, encountered various delays and failures. At last, the 
final section introduces the new development of politics and financial reform amid the 
DPP years from 2000 to 2008. It highlights the characteristics of the new political 
landscape and how these affected financial reform under the DPP rule.  
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Together, these reviews will present a general background for bridging to the next 
four case chapters in which how political democratisation had significantly affected 
the state‟s financial governance in Taiwan over the recent two decades are examined.   
1. Taiwan before 1945  
At first glance, Taiwan is one of Asia's few functioning democracies with strong 
economic performance. Its achievement in pursuing democracy and economic 
development could be easily demonstrated by the following statistics and surveys. 
First, according to the Freedom House, a US non-governmental organization which 
conducts annual survey on the freedom of the press around the globe, Taiwan was 
listed as a "free county" and its ranking was the highest in Asia in 2007.
97
 In the 
individual country report of the survey, the organization specifically said: 
 “Taiwan is known for having one of the freest media environments in East Asia 
because of its firm commitment to judicial independence and economic freedom. The 
constitution provides for freedom of speech and of the press, and the government 
generally respects these rights in practice.”98  
Considering that Taiwan was still under authoritarian rule before the early 1990s, the 
ranking and comment are particularly significant.  
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 Of all the 195 countries included in the rankings, Taiwan was listed in the 33rd spot, ahead of Japan 
at 39th, South Korea and Hong Kong at 66th, and Singapore at 154th. Please see Freedom House, 
Freedom of the Press 2007: A Global Survey of Media Independence. 
98
 It is cited from the report at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=251&country=7283&year=2007 
(accessed June 27, 2008). 
  54 
Second, on the economic side, according to a report by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), Taiwan was the world's 16th-largest exporting nation of merchandise trade in 
2007 with exports valued at US$246 billion.
99
 On top of that, Taiwan‟s gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita was US$17,252 in 2007 and it was the world's 
24th-largest economy in terms of GDP in the same year. For a small country
100
 
lacking ample natural resources for its development and still regarded as a less 
developed country in the 1950s, these statistics mark Taiwan‟s remarkable 
achievement in economic growth over the past decades as a newly industrialised 
economy. 
Behind these recent achievements, however, Taiwan‟s history is full of struggle and 
pain in fighting for controlling its own destiny. Located in the Western Pacific Ocean, 
Taiwan is an island between Japan and the Philippines off the southeast coast of China, 
from which it is separated by the Taiwan Strait. Before the 17th century, Taiwan was a 
wild land inhabited by aboriginals who were a part of the Austronesian people and it 
was visited mainly by pirates and fishermen around the region. It only began to draw 
significant attention from the outside world when some European powers such as 
Portugal, Spain and the Netherlands sailed to Southeast Asia from the mid-1500s to 
the early 1600s. With an eye on expanding trade in East Asia, both the Spanish and 
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 World Trade Organisation, WORLD TRADE 2007, PROSPECTS FOR 2008. 
100
 With a total area of about 36,179 square kilometres, Taiwan is 394 kilometres long and 144 
kilometres wide at its widest point. Its size is approximately equal to that of Wales. 
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the Dutch established their forces in Taiwan. But their stay was short and their 
influence was small compared to the rule of the two Chinese Empires (Ming and Qing) 
over Taiwan from 1662 to 1895. 
The Han Chinese‟s settlement in Taiwan began in the late years of the Ming Empire 
after Cheng Cheng-kung (also known as Koxinga) and the Ming loyalists drove the 
Dutch from Taiwan.
101
 Cheng and his followers used Taiwan as a base to fight against 
the Manchu who invaded the Ming Empire and established the Qing Empire. But soon 
the Qing Empire took over Taiwan and began its rule over the island until 1895. While 
the Han Chinese immigrants surged during this period and soon became the majority 
of residents on the island, the Qing Empire was not active in its rule over Taiwan until 
the late 19
th
 century before its war with Japan. The change of the attitude, however, 
was too late and Taiwan was finally ceded to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki after 
Japan won the Sino-Japanese war in 1895. Subsequently, Taiwan was a colony of 
Japan for 50 years until 1945. 
The Japanese colonial rule significantly transformed Taiwan and left a strong legacy. 
Firstly, Taiwan was forced to be rapidly modernized and industrialized in five decades. 
During its rule, Japan not only imposed Western systems of administration, law, 
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 The Dutch only stayed in Taiwan from 1622 to 1661.  
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finance, public health and education on Taiwan but also built or upgraded
102
 Taiwan‟s 
modern infrastructure such as railway networks, irrigation systems, ports, power 
plants and telecommunication networks. Though mainly out of its ambition to 
establish an empire in Asia --- by using Taiwan as a bridge and base to provide 
necessary resources that could help its expansion and colonial rule in Southeast Asia, 
Japan‟s contribution to Taiwan‟s modernisation in the early 20th century cannot be 
denied. In a nutshell, Japan set the institutional grounds and basic infrastructural 
frameworks for Taiwan‟s development after 1945.  
Secondly, the Japanese colonial rule raised a vast barrier between the Han Chinese in 
Taiwan and their counterparts in China, sowing the seeds of conflict in the future after 
China regained Taiwan in 1945. The barrier was multiple. It was involved living 
standards, ways of life, culture, historical memory and identity and so forth, due to 
Taiwan‟s nearly total insulation from what happened in China during the 50-year 
colonial rule of Japan. For the Han Chinese in Taiwan, relatively, they had lived a 
more modernized life than their counterparts in China. In addition, they had been 
forced to identify themselves with Japan as the colonial regime ruthlessly 
implemented its assimilation policy after 1936
103
 --- at a time when their motherland 
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 In its late years in Taiwan, the Qing Empire had begun to build some modern infrastructure.   
103
 The policy was so effective that most Taiwanese had Japanese names and some were even willing 
to fight for Japan during the Second World War 
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was in a war with Japan for eight years until 1945.
104
   
2. Political and financial developments in the KMT era  
 (Part 1: from 1945 to the late 1980s)  
After the end of World War Two, China reinstated its control over Taiwan in 
accordance with the Cairo and Potsdam Agreements. At first, most Taiwanese were 
enthusiastic about the return and tried to adapt to the new regime from the motherland. 
But soon their initial enthusiasm and positive attitude turned into immense despair 
and anger after they found that the new government and troops from mainland China 
were so ignorant, arrogant and corrupt --- even worse than the previous colonial 
regime of Japan.
105
 The resentment and tension surged after numerous clashes took 
place at a time when Taiwan‟s economy rapidly deteriorated and people‟s life turned 
into being unbearable as a result of the poor governance of the new regime.  
In the meantime, the new regime thought that the local Taiwanese should thank the 
                                                 
104
 When Taiwan was ruled by Japan from 1895 to 1945, China was experiencing sea changes. The last 
dynasty in China‟s history, Qing, was overthrown by the nationalists in 1911 and the Republic of China 
(ROC) was established in 1912. But afterwards the new republic was weak and unstable. Firstly, the 
republic ran into years of domestic conflicts among the warlords. Then, after Chiang Kai-shek of the 
KMT achieved a partial unification of the country following the Northern Expedition, the communists 
were still independent from the control of Chiang‟s regime. The rivalry between the KMT and the 
communists relatively cooled down during China‟s war with Japan in 1937-1945, but escalated into a 
civil war in 1945 after Japan surrendered.      
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 When the KMT government in China took control of Taiwan in 1945 after Japan was defeated, it 
took over many assets belonging to either the Japanese colonial government or citizens. In the age of 
the KMT party-state rule, a significant part of these properties became private-owned by the KMT 
itself, planting seeds of the future controversy about the legitimacy of KMT‟s assets. The issue is still 
in dispute now. 
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motherland for what it had sacrificed during the war with Japan. From its perspective, 
the sacrifice was crucial in ending the Japanese colonial rule. Besides, it also 
suspected that the Taiwanese had been “brain-washed” by Japan in their culture and 
thinking. It had doubts about the loyalty and identity of the Taiwanese to China. From 
its standpoint, the Taiwanese needed to be re-educated to become Chinese again.
106
  
The tension between the local Taiwanese and the new Chinese regime eventually 
escalated into to an island-wide uprising of local people against the new regime for 
weeks in 1947. The uprising was triggered by an incident involving a conflict between 
the police and a female vendor of cigarettes in the capital city Taipei on February 28. 
Due to the inept response of the police, the incident turned into a riot of local citizens 
in Taipei for protest and revenge and then soon expanded into an island-wide uprising. 
Shocked by the scale of the revolt, the central government in China led by Chiang 
Kai-shek of the KMT sent more troops to Taiwan to “restore order.” As a result, 
thousands of Taiwanese people died during the ruthless military crackdowns.
107
 This 
is the so-called “228 incident,” which forged the foundation of the anti-KMT forces. It 
created enduring ethnic tensions between the local Taiwanese
108
 and new immigrants 
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 In my opinion, Wu Cho-liu‟s two historical works of fictions can best illustrate the context of the 
lack of trust and understanding between the local Taiwanese and the new regime: Yaxiya de guer 
[Orphans of Asia] and Wu hua guo [The fig]. These were both published around this time.   
107
 There is still no official number about the accurate death toll in the incident. A cautious estimation 
is that at least 10 thousand people died in the incident and the following crackdowns. See Li, “Ererba 
shijian siwang duoshaoren?” [How many people died in the 228 incident?].   
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 They are the so-called Benshengren (meaning people of this province) and now make up 
approximately 85 per cent of Taiwan‟s population. Their ancestors came mainly from two of China's 
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who came to Taiwan with the KMT regime,
109
 and propelled some Taiwanese to 
pursue Taiwan‟s independence.      
Taiwan‟s status entered into an ambiguous stage after the KMT lost the civil war to 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and completely retreated to Taiwan in 1949. 
After the CCP successfully established a new regime --- People‟s Republic of China 
(PRC) --- in China, the KMT insisted that its Republic of China (ROC) still existed 
even though it only had Taiwan under its jurisdiction. It claimed that the civil war was 
not finished and the ROC was still the only legitimate government of the whole China. 
It pledged to retake mainland China in the near future when the time was ripe. As 
such, what Taiwan stood for became complicated. On the one hand, Taiwan was still a 
part of the ROC as a province according to the ROC constitution; on the other hand, 
as its territory was almost completely overlapping with that of the ROC,
110
 Taiwan 
was de facto an equivalent of the ROC as a country.  
The claim that the ROC still existed in Taiwan, however, could only be sustained 
internationally under the support of the U.S. in the first half of the Cold War. Initially, 
                                                                                                                                            
southeast provinces - Fujian and Guangdong. Due to their difference of local dialects from their 
original places, Benshengren could be further broken into two ethnic groups: Holo and Hakka. The 
population of the Holo group reaches 73 per cent of the total in Taiwan; the Hakka has only 12 per 
cent. 
109
 They are the so-called Waishengren (meaning people from outside the province) or mainlanders and 
now make up approximately 13 per cent of Taiwan‟s population. Due to Waishengren‟s close 
relationship with the KMT regime, this group dominated Taiwan's politics for many years before 
Taiwan‟s democratisation in the late 1980s.  
110
 In addition to the province of Taiwan, the ROC government still controls a small part of Fujian 
province, which consists of only two small island counties – Kinmen and Lienchiang - off the southeast 
coast of China.     
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in fact, the U.S. took a hands-off attitude towards the KMT regime, which was on the 
verge of a total collapse in 1949. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, however, 
forced the U.S. to change its stance. It began to bolster the KMT regime with a timely 
injection of economic and military aid until the regime was relatively consolidated in 
the late 1960s. In return, the KMT regime, as the U.S. expected, played a role in 
countering the spread of communism and the influence of “Red China” in East Asia. 
Thus, the ROC in Taiwan under the KMT regime was portrayed by the West, the U.S. 
in particular, as a symbol of “Free China” during the early years of the Cold War. 
Yet, domestically, the “Free China” discourse was maintained in quite ironic ways. On 
the one hand, Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT built a Leninist party-state in Taiwan to 
ensure its effective monopoly of power and control over people. In the name of the 
unfinished civil war with the CCP, martial law was imposed to serve the party-state by 
essentially stripping away people‟s political rights and liberties and ruthlessly 
cracking down on political dissents as well as tightly controlling the media.
111
 On the 
other hand, in an attempt to demonstrate its difference from the CCP to the West, the 
KMT allowed open and direct elections to be held at local levels from the 1950s. In 
later years, it also allowed partial by-elections for lawmakers of the Legislative Yuan 
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 The martial law rule was maintained from 1949 to 1987, the longest ever in the world history. 
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(Taiwan‟s parliament) and members of the National Assembly112 when it was no 
longer likely to recruit vacancies with replacements in Taiwan.
113
 Nevertheless, those 
elections were far from being fair and democratic. Only a small minority of seats were 
open for direct election. People were forbidden to form political parties to challenge 
the KMT, and election fraud, like vote-buying was common. Elections in Taiwan 
under the martial law rule were more for painting the KMT government as a 
pro-democracy regime.  
The claim of “Free China” was, after all, no match for the evolving political reality in 
the world politics. With the CCP consolidating its rule in China and more and more 
countries recognising the PRC instead of the ROC as the only legitimate regime of 
China, it was getting unrealistic to convince the international community about the 
continued existence of ROC and its claim over China. The defining moment finally 
came in 1971 as the majority of the member countries of the United Nations (UN) 
decided to replace the ROC with the PRC to hold the seat of China in the UN. Then, 
shortly after the devastating blow, the U.S., Taiwan‟s most important ally, also 
prepared to normalize its relations with the PRC. In 1978, the U.S. finally ended its 
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 This was Taiwan‟s second parliament which used to be mainly in charge of constitutional 
amendments and electing the president and vice president of the country on a four-year basis before 
1996. It was abolished in June 2005. 
113
 Before the KMT officially gave up its goal to retake the mainland China in the early 1990s, it 
insisted that Taiwan‟s parliament had to be composed of members from the constituencies of all China, 
an attempt to maintain its legitimacy as a regime for the whole China. Thus, all lawmakers elected 
before 1949 in China could keep their positions in Taiwan permanently until they died. 
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formal relationship with the ROC and officially recognised the PRC. As a result, the 
legitimacy of the KMT regime and Taiwan as a country in the international 
community was seriously undermined.  
Still, the KMT regime and Taiwan did not collapse afterwards. Externally, it was 
mainly because of the continued strong commitment of the U.S. to safeguard Taiwan 
from the military threats from China. Though the U.S. no longer had formal 
diplomatic relations with Taiwan after 1978, through the Taiwan Relations Act passed 
by the U.S. Congress in 1979, the U.S. still maintained a strong and close “informal” 
relationship with Taiwan. According to the act, the U.S. was committed itself to 
providing Taiwan with defensive weapons and implicitly ensuring the safety of 
Taiwan if it was attacked by the PRC.  
Domestically, the rapid progress of economic development was the key to preventing 
the KMT regime and Taiwan from falling apart. Thanks to the success of its 
export-oriented strategies, Taiwan‟s economy grew at double-digit rates in the 1980s 
and emerged as a new economic power house in Asia into the 1990s, known as one of 
four little Asian “dragons” or “tigers.”114 Thus, against the thriving economy and 
achievement of economic growth, the confidence of people in Taiwan was greatly 
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 The four little dragons were Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. 
  63 
boosted. Meanwhile, while what has contributed to “Taiwan Miracle”115 is open to 
debate,
116
 the forward and effective industrial policies formulated by the strong 
developmental state under the KMT regime were widely regarded as one of the key 
factors. In a word, the falling legitimacy of the KMT regime was significantly shored 
up by its performance in economic governance. 
The success of the developmental state in Taiwan from the 1950s to the late 1980s 
relied on its exceptional autonomy and capacity. The strong autonomy of the 
developmental state came from both the authoritarian nature of the KMT regime and 
the regime‟s weak linkage with the local society in the past. Due to the autonomy, the 
developmental state was relatively independent of the influence of the society and was 
able to be less constrained by the society in decision-making. But the strong 
autonomy did not guarantee that the state was always capable. The high capacity of 
the state, actually, came from a group of capable economic technocrats. Empowered 
by the KMT regime, these technocrats were capable of setting the target and strategy 
for national development from a long-term perspective of national interest. But, why 
was the KMT regime willing to empower the economic technocrats? Firstly, as a 
regime which had few linkages with the Taiwan society before 1945, the KMT was 
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 See the term used in Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle. 
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 For example, some have stressed the effects of the Cold War on promoting Taiwan‟s economic 
growth. They argue that countries in the U.S. camp during the war often benefited from special market 
access arrangements of export products to the U.S. See Heo and Tan, “Democracy and Economic 
Growth: A Causal Analysis.”   
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clearly aware that its legitimacy was largely built upon its performance in pushing for 
economic development. It needed the skilful bureaucrats to make this happen and 
continue. Secondly, the KMT heeded its lesson of losing the Chinese civil war to the 
CCP: economic disorder would easily trigger social unrest, costing its power. Thirdly, 
the threat of the military invasion of the PRC reinforced the KMT‟s commitment to 
economic development, a crucial base of national survival.  
Under such circumstances, the financial development was under the strong control of 
the state from 1945 to the late 1980s. Two measures were undertaken to ensure the 
strong grasp of the state on the financial system in the initial stage of the period. First, 
the KMT government took over and nationalized all financial institutions which used 
to be owned by the Japanese during the colonial rule. Second, it reopened those 
state-owned banks which used to run banking business in China before 1949. Coupled 
with the postal saving system, these national banks from the above two sources 
became the solid base of the KMT‟s control of the financial system. To be more 
specific, the system was dominated by a state-controlled banking sector, composed of 
domestic banks, local branches of foreign banks, investment and trust 
companies(ITCs), credit cooperatives, credit departments of farmers‟ and fishermen‟s 
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associations(CDFFAs) and Chunghwa Post.
117
 
Though this state-dominant financial system was criticised as financial repression,
118
 
the system actually worked relatively smoothly and contributed significantly to the 
economic development in Taiwan before the mid 1980s. Academics were impressed 
to see that low price inflation and high real interest were both well-maintained from 
the 1960s to the early 1980s in Taiwan except for two irregular inflations in1974 and 
1980-1981 which were associated with two oil shocks (see Table 3.1).
119
 As the low 
price inflation made Taiwan‟s economic development immune to the threat of 
domestic inflation, the high real interest encouraged people to save with high yields to 
depositors and protection of implicit deposit insurance of state-owned banks. Together, 
these created a stable and conductive financial environment for capital formation and 
economic growth.   
In terms of the linkage with the industrial policies, through the state-dominant 
financial system, the government extracted private savings to support state enterprises 
and export industries with preferential interest rates. With cheaper credit, it was 
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 Chunghwa Post only took deposits and did not directly provide loans. All its deposits initially were 
sent to be saved either in the central bank as a tool for controlling money supply or particular 
state-owned banks for implementing some government policies. Now it can decide how to deal with its 
deposits but is still constrained from direct involvement in the loan market.     
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 A concept coined by McKinnon and Shaw to indicate the inefficiency of allocation of financial 
resources due to the state‟s aggressive intervention in the financial market. See McKinnon, Money and 
Capital in Economic Development and Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development. 
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 McKinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a 
Market Economy, 35-36. 
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hoping to make the state enterprises efficiently carry out the mission of building up 
basic industrial infrastructures such as utility facilities, logistics, steel industry, and 
petro-chemical industry, and provided a conductive industrial environment and 
lower-priced material to the small and medium enterprises to improve their 
competitiveness in exports. In the mean time, the export industries also enjoyed lower 
interest loans (as shown in Table 3.1) and tax breaks to further increase their 
competitive advantage in the international market. 
Table 3.1 Interest Rates and Inflation Rates in Taiwan (Percentages) 
End of Year 
At Banks Curb-Market 
Unsecured 
Loans 
Consumer 
Price Inflation Saving Deposit* Unsecured Loan Export Loan 
Average 
1956-62 17.0 20.9 11.2 41.1 84.4 
1963-73 10.1 14.1 9.7 25.4 3.4 
1974 13.5 15.5 9.0 29.3 47.5 
1975 12.0 14.0 7.0 26.4 5.2 
1976 10.7 12.7 7.0 27.6 2.5 
1977 9.5 11.5 6.5 25.6 7.0 
1978 9.5 11.5 6.5 27.2 5.8 
1979 12.5 15.2 10.5 30.1 9.8 
1980 12.5 16.2 10.5 31.3 19.0 
1981 13.0 15.2 11.0 30.1 16.3 
1982 9.0 10.7 8.2 27.7 3.3 
1983 8.5 10.2 8.0 26.8 1.8 
1984 8.0 10.0 7.7 29.9 1.7 
*One-year saving deposits. 
Source: McKinnon, The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a 
Market Economy, 36. 
 
In a nutshell, through controlling the financial system, the state could extract private 
savings for rapid capital formation and had the power to allocate scarce financial 
resources on its targeted industries and sectors. That is why political economist T. J. 
Cheng describes the state as a banker controlling the commanding heights in the 
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financial system of Taiwan before the 1990s.
120
 But “the commanding heights”, 
according to Cheng, has more implications. As the KMT was an alien regime 
dominated by elites from the minority mainlander ethnic group, it had used the 
financial system as a tool to maintain its power. Firstly, as the state controlled the 
commanding heights, the local Taiwanese capitalists were constrained from 
involvement in running private banking. As a consequence, there were no giant 
Taiwanese financial capitalists who could pose a potential threat to the KMT regime. 
Secondly, the room for private banking institutions was only restricted to a few areas 
for specific reasons. For grassroots finance, mainly the credit cooperatives and the 
rural credit unions, it not only served the financial needs of the rural areas but also as 
a tool and favour to deal with local factions around the island.
121
 The Medium and 
Small Business Banks (MSBBs) were established on the existing civil banking 
organizations and granted the special task to provide loans for the development of 
small and medium enterprises which were the backbone of Taiwan‟s export industries. 
As for a small number of ITCs and commercial banks, they were used to patronize 
those business forces which were in cooperation with the KMT regime (mostly 
mainlander-run businesses) and demonstrated as good gestures to local business 
interests and overseas Chinese investment as well. Nevertheless, as a whole, these 
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 Cheng, “Guarding the Commanding Heights: The State as Banker in Taiwan.” 
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 The details about the relationship between the KMT, local factions and grassroots financial 
institutions will be examined in Chapter 7 of this thesis. 
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private banking institutions played relatively insignificant roles in terms of market 
shares, business scopes and economic scales, compared to the strong state-owned 
financial institutions. 
3. Political and financial developments in the KMT era  
 (Part 2: from the late 1980s to 2000)  
Despite its distinct performance on economic governance, the KMT regime, however, 
was still fearful of losing its governing legitimacy in the 1980s. The first and utmost 
challenge was the fallout after the UN shut its door to Taiwan and the U.S. normalized 
its relations with China in the 1970s. The immediate effect was the end of the “Free 
China” myth, the central pillar of the KMT regime‟s ruling legitimacy over Taiwan. 
Now that most countries around the world, including the U.S., recognized the PRC as 
the only legitimate regime of representing China, Taiwan was slipping into a crisis 
where its statehood was questioned worldwide. Besides, since the KMT regime never 
gained its governing legitimacy over Taiwan through normal democratic procedure 
before the 1990s, how could it continue its rule by a widely dismissed myth of “Free 
China?” Third, the fast shrinking of the number of the countries which maintained 
formal relations with Taiwan also reinforced the pressure on the KMT regime. As the 
sense of isolation and frustration grew stronger among the general Taiwanese about 
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their existence and position in the international community, they inevitably began to 
question the competence and ruling legitimacy of the KMT regime.  
Meanwhile, the KMT regime was also facing vast challenges from a revitalising civil 
society. With the take-off of Taiwan‟s economy and the resulting general improvement 
of living standards and education over the previous two decades, the continuing 
existence of the martial law and authoritarian rule was getting unbearable for the 
rising middle class in particular and the public in general. The demand for social 
reform was clearly reflected in the surge of organized social movements on various 
social issues even before the martial law was lifted in July 1987.
122
 It not only sent a 
strong signal to challenge the authority of the KMT party-state, but also indicated an 
increasingly maturing civil society in which the public were getting conscious of their 
basic rights and willing to protect or pursue their rights.  
In the meantime, the demand for political reform was also soaring even though the 
KMT regime had just heavily crushed the anti-KMT forces in the Kaohsiung Incident 
of 1979.
123
 The incident put many key leaders of the tangwai (people outside the 
                                                 
122
 According to Hsiao‟s studies, the first wave of organized social movements which took place 
between 1980 and 1986 comprised of seven movements: 1) the consumers' movement, 2) the 
anti-pollution protest movement, 3) the nature conservation movement, 4) the women's movement, 5) 
the aborigines' movement, 6) the students' movement and 7) the New Testament church protests. See 
Hsiao, “Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan.” 
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 Right before the incident, the KMT was facing a double governing crisis. On the one hand, its 
legitimacy was faltering due to the decision of the U.S. to cut its formal relations with Taiwan and 
establish official ties with China in 1978. On the other hand, it was deeply worried about the rising 
opposition had taken shape after several local elections in the 1970s. Hence the KMT decided to halt 
the momentum of the anti-KMT movement by arresting almost all of its leaders when they organised a 
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KMT) in prison and it seemed to abruptly reverse the momentum of the rise of the 
opposition. But as soon as elections were resumed in the 1981, the associates
124
 of 
the jailed tangwai leaders soon filled the power vacuum and continued to strengthen 
the influence of tangwai among the voters in several elections.
125
 The high tide of 
tangwai campaigns was reached at the time when tangwai leaders decided to defy the 
ban of the martial law on establishing a new political party. The first opposition party, 
the Democratic Political Party (DPP), was hastily founded by those leaders in late 
1986.  
In face of these critical challenges to its rule, the KMT‟s leader Chiang Ching-kuo, the 
son of Chiang Kai-shek and the last authoritarian leader in Taiwan,
126
 surprisingly 
took a more conciliatory approach to deal with them. Different from his father‟s way 
of rule and that of his own in his early years in power in the late 1970s, Chiang 
Ching-kuo was more tolerant of the surging social and democratic movements in 
Taiwan in his final years in power in the 1980s. He seemed to have sensed the 
profound change of Taiwan‟s society and the need to transform the KMT to meet 
those new challenges. For example, he consciously launched a reform to transform the 
                                                                                                                                            
public gathering on the streets in Kaohsiung on International Human Rights Day in late 1979. 
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 The main part of the associates came from either the spouses or the attorneys of the jailed leaders. 
Many of those attorneys later became the rising political stars of the DPP. Former President Chen 
Shui-bian and former Premier Hsieh Chang-ting are all good examples.   
125
 From the 1970s, regular elections had provided a key venue for the opposition forces to organize 
themselves and challenge the KMT regime. Tangwai was the product of this mechanism and practice.  
126
 Chiang Kai-shek died as a dictator in 1975 and his son Chiang Ching-kuo soon took power, serving 
as president until his death in 1988. 
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power structure of the KMT by injecting more fresh talent with native Taiwanese 
background, including his successor Lee Teng-hui, into the party. The move aimed to 
not only balance the dominance of mainlanders in the top decision-making circle of 
the party and the state, but also designed to send a message to the general Taiwanese, 
the majority of the residents on the island, that the KMT was on its way of becoming 
more Taiwanese.       
Chiang Ching-kuo‟s more liberal approach in dealing with the social/political 
challenges was crystallised in his attitude toward the establishment of the DPP in 
1986 and his decision to lift the martial law in 1987. After the DPP was “illegally” 
founded according the martial law, Chiang Ching-kuo took no action. He rejected the 
idea of dissolving the DPP or persecuting its leaders. Instead, in less than a year, about 
six months before his sudden death in 1988, he announced the lifting of martial law. 
The move essentially relaxed government controls on the civil society, marking the 
beginning of Taiwan‟s rapid democratisation in the next decade.  
Lee Teng-hui, the deputy of Chiang Ching-kuo, ascended to power after Chiang‟s 
death. Taiwan went through relatively successful democratic transitions during Lee‟s 
era when he was both the President of Taiwan and the head of the KMT from 1988 to 
2000. Indeed, in just 12 years, many milestones of democratic reform were achieved. 
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For example, firstly, in May 1991, Lee declared the termination of the Period of 
Communist Rebellion and scraped the Temporary Provisions effective during the 
period. The move was not merely to officially stop treating the Chinese Communist 
Party of the Mainland China as a rebellion group. More importantly, it showed the 
KMT regime‟s determination to pursue liberal democracy in Taiwan.127 Secondly, in 
December 1992, the members of the Legislative Yuan were all directly elected by the 
people in Taiwan for the first time after those so-called “senior members” who were 
elected to represent mainland constituencies in 1948 were forced to resign in late 
1991. Since then, the Legislative Yuan began to emerge as one of the major political 
centres in Taiwan‟s politics as its legitimacy was greatly enhanced by its direct 
mandate from the voters. Thirdly, in December 1994, the mayors of Taipei and 
Kaohsiung and the governor of Taiwan Province, the three highest posts of Taiwan‟s 
local governments, were all subject to open competitions through direct elections by 
the electorate. This not only significantly strengthened the autonomy of local 
governing but also marked the rising power and importance of these posts in national 
politics.
128
 Fourthly, in March 1996, for the first time, Taiwan's President was 
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 In the name of the Chinese Civil War, the Temporary Provisions were in place from 1948 to freeze 
a part of constitution from functioning so that the power of the president could be enormously 
expanded and there was no term limit for the president. In other words, the provisions facilitated and 
justified the rule of the authoritarian leaders Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo.  
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 Since 1994, many rising political stars have tried to run for the three posts and a number of them 
have become national leaders as president or premier after their terms as mayors in Taipei and 
Kaohsiung. Former President Chen Shui-bian, current President Ma Ying-jeou and former Premier 
Hsieh Chang-ting are all typical examples.   
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popularly elected.
129
 This was a defining moment of Taiwan‟s democratisation as the 
highest position of the national government was finally decided by the residents in 
Taiwan after they had been ruled by different foreign regimes over the past four 
centuries. From this moment, the period of democratic transition in Taiwan was 
formally finished as it had transformed from a non-democracy to a totally 
representative and accountable government.
130
 Fifthly, Lee streamlined the 
government structure by “freezing” the Taiwan Province Government (TPG) in 1998. 
Taiwan used to maintain a redundant multi-tier government structure. From 1946 to 
1998, under the central government, which was located in the national capital Taipei, 
the TPG was in charge of all “local” affairs on a territory almost completely 
overlapping with the whole nation.
131
 The TPG and its assembly (the Taiwan 
Provincial Assembly, TPA) worked with real function until 1998. Under the 
cooperation between Lee and the DPP, a constitutional reform in 1997 downsized the 
TPG and TPA to empty shells. 
What was even more extraordinary about these achievements of democratic reforms 
was that they were all reached in a gradual, stable and peaceful way. Shelley Rigger, 
an expert on Taiwan‟s politics, has vividly characterized the past success of Taiwan‟s 
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 Lee Teng-hui won the presidency with 54 per cent of the vote. 
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 See the definition of democratic transition at Chapter 2, 34. 
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 The system was maintained to support the central government‟s claim to the whole of China after 
the KMT lost the civil war and fled to Taiwan in 1949. 
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democratisation as below: 
“Among these uneven „third-wave‟ democratizations,132  Taiwan‟s stands out as 
relatively smooth and successful. Taiwan‟s transformation from single-party 
authoritarianism to multiparty democracy came about with very little violence or 
bloodshed. Nor did it require wrenching economic or social upheavals. In fact, one 
might describe Taiwan‟s experience as a „best-case‟ democratization.”133     
In retrospect, a number of scholars have attributed this „best-case‟ democratisation to 
the leadership of Lee Teng-hui. They argue that Taiwan‟s democratisation was 
undertaken in a top-down way, in which the ruling KMT led by Lee Teng-hui 
controlled both the pace and the content of democratic reforms.
134
 Indeed, in the 
abovementioned achievements of Taiwan‟s democratic reforms, Lee‟s commitment to 
reform and his determination to overcome existing obstacles were indispensable. But 
this view ignores, at least, two supporting forces behind Lee‟s credit --- a demanding 
civil society and the rising opposition DPP.  
A “demanding civil society” was observed and defined by sociologist Hsin-Huang 
Michael Hsiao at the end of the 1980s: 
“A new kind of political culture is gradually appearing in Taiwan --- a participatory 
one --- emerging, slowly but surely, from the mobilization of its civil society in the 
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 Huntington, The Third Wave. 
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 Rigger, “Democratization in Greater China: Taiwan‟s Best-Case Democratization,” 285. 
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 Ibid  
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1980s. Taiwan‟s civil society is no longer a passive recipient of the state‟s domination. 
It has been mobilized through a learning process engendered by these protest 
movements. Through this, the civil society as a whole, not just those active in the 
movements, have learned how to make claims on the state. It can be characterized as a 
„demanding civil society‟ with a new kind of „participatory political culture‟ as its 
socio-psychological base.”135 
In fact, it was because of the mounting pressure for more political reform from this 
“demanding civil society” that Lee Teng-hui could get a strong leverage to fight 
against those who were resisting change --- which mainly came from the old guards of 
his own party. In other words, for Lee Teng-hui, a reform-minded leader without a 
solid power base in the nation and his party at his early years in power,
136
 a 
“demanding civil society” was both a driving force to push him to undertake reform 
and a powerful weapon to carry out reform tasks.  
The same logic also applied to Lee‟s interaction with the DPP on the issues of 
political reforms. For Lee, though the DPP was emerging as a strong competitor to his 
party,
137
 it was also an important outside source of his leverage on pushing through 
some particular political reforms. For example, since the early 1990s, the DPP had 
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 Hsiao, “Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan,” 178. 
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 Lee was promoted by Chiang Ching-kuo as a competent technocrat with a local Taiwanese 
background. But why Chiang finally picked Lee as his deputy was not clear.   
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 Since the DPP was born in 1986, it consolidated itself through taking part in regular elections and 
winning stable support. In terms of voting shares in the elections for the members of the Legislative 
Yuan from 1989 to 1995, it got 28.29 per cent in 1989, 36.09 per cent in 1992 and 33.17 per cent in 
1995. Meanwhile, it performed even better in the elections for city mayors and county magistrates. It 
received 38.34 per cent of the votes in 1989 and 41.03 per cent in 1993. 
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strongly campaigned to have the president and vice president directly elected by the 
people not by the members of the National Assembly. The issue gradually got support 
among the public but the KMT was divided on it. Lee finally decided to cooperate 
with the DPP on the issue and mobilize more public opinion to support the change. In 
other words, the persistent campaigns of the DPP on the issue ahead of the change had 
provided Lee with basic momentum and social support. Lee‟s final success on the 
reform owed significantly to the assistance of the DPP.  
In short, Lee used the cry for reform from the public and the rise of the DPP to crush 
the resistance to his political reform. The peaceful and gradual democratic transitions 
were only possible through the mutually reinforced interplays among Lee, a 
demanding civil society and the rising DPP over 12 years when Lee was in power 
from 1988 to 2000.  
As Lee‟s KMT seemed to be capable of controlling the progress and course of 
democratization, its autonomy in governing was actually in decline. In order to 
address the impact of democratization and maintain its rule, the KMT had to give 
more power and resource to crucial business groups and local factions in exchange for 
their loyalty and cooperation in the existing socioeconomic alliances and 
political-economic institutions. As a result, some influential business groups and local 
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factions began to interfere in the decision-making process within the state through 
their business organizations, lawmakers in the legislature and even representatives in 
the central standing committee of the KMT. In a word, the seeds of subsequent 
dismantlement of a developmental regime were sown in KMT‟s attempt to prolong its 
rule. 
As the developmental regime was challenged and squeezed, serious side effects 
emerged in the process of Taiwan‟s financial liberalization. First, with the increasing 
influence of foreign and private financial institutions, the state was losing its leverage 
to control or maintain the stability and order of the financial system. Second, the 
direction, pace and content of financial liberalisation were more frequently disrupted 
than before by the intervention of the rising political forces. Thus, while the financial 
system was greatly deregulated and more private players entered the market in the 
1990s, the cases of financial irregularity like bank runs and bad loans also surged to 
record highs, and the project to privatise or deregulate the state-owned banks was also 
beyond the control of the KMT government.         
4. Political and financial developments in the DPP era 
 (from 2000 to 2008)  
Taiwan‟s democracy entered into a new era when Chen Shui-bian of the DPP became 
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the president from 2000 to 2008.
138
 It was the first time that Taiwan was governed by 
a political party other than the long-time ruling party, the KMT, after the Second 
World War. While the "peaceful transfer of political power" from the KMT to the DPP 
proved again the remarkable progress and maturity of the young democracy, it also 
marked the beginning of a new testing time of profound challenges.  
With hindsight, the DPP government faced at least three new challenges during its 
years in power. First, the DPP was inexperienced in governing the country due to its 
lack of chance of playing the role as a ruling party during the uninterrupted rule of the 
KMT over the post-war decades in Taiwan. As a result, awkward policy U-turns of 
the DPP government, out of its inexperience in assessing the situations of reform 
projects, occurred frequently. The most infamous case was probably the decision to 
terminate the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant in 2000. The decision was 
in line with Chen‟s election platforms and the DPP‟s long-time commitment to 
creating a nuclear-free environment. But the decision was suddenly made without 
consulting the opposition parties, the business groups and the general public in 
advance. Thus, the decision was highly controversial and ended up as a failure --- 
eventually the project was restarted in 2001.
139
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 In the end, Chen‟s administration failed to win the support of the Council of Grand Justices in 
acknowledging its power to unilaterally terminate the project without the consent of the legislature.  
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Second, through the whole eight years, the DPP never essentially controlled the 
Legislative Yuan. Without a majority support, the DPP government faced constant 
troubles in implementing its policy agenda. The consequence was constant boycott of 
the opposition parties on key bills, budgets or nominations of government officials 
that mattered a lot to the DPP or even the whole country. For example, the arms sales 
offered by the Bush administration of the U.S. to Taiwan in 2001 were not approved 
by the Legislative Yuan until 2007. Another example was the nomination of new 
members of the Control Yuan.
140
 After President Chen nominated the new members 
in late 2004, the opposition parties boycotted the nomination until the end of Chen‟s 
second term in 2008. The Control Yuan, as a result, ceased to function for almost four 
years.  
Third, clash of national identities between those who identified themselves as 
Taiwanese and those who see themselves as Chinese escalated.
141
As a result, politics 
became increasingly polarized and made sound policy deliberations less likely.
142
 
The clash, of course, had much to do with the pro-Taiwan independence stance of the 
DPP. But, from a long-term perspective, it might be an inevitable result of Taiwan‟s 
democratisation --- democratisation allowed people to question what “Republic of 
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 The former tended to regard Taiwan as a separate and different country from China; the latter is 
inclined to see Taiwan as a part of China. 
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 See more discussion about the challenges of the DPP and Taiwan‟s democracy after 2000 in Rigger, 
“The Unfinished Business of Taiwan‟s democratisation.” 
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China” meant for themselves and Taiwan, and what kind of relationship that Taiwan 
should maintain with China. Actually, in the final years of Lee Teng-hui‟s rule, the 
KMT government had defined Taiwan‟s relations with mainland China as a “special 
state-to-state relationship.” Whatever the reasons, polarization of politics resulting 
from escalating clashes of national identities did have a strong effect on the making of 
public policies. Cross-Strait policy was probably one of the worst victims of these 
clashes. As the ruling DPP was cautious toward the pace and content of negotiations 
and interactions between Taiwan and China, it was often criticized by the opposition 
parties as “locking up the country.” Eventually, the opposition parties even bypassed 
the government and went to negotiate with the Chinese authority directly.           
The three challenges mentioned above were not necessarily separate. On many 
occasions, in fact, they were linked and reinforced, creating even more obstacles. 
Under such circumstances, the DPP had faced a much more difficult situation than the 
KMT in governing the country. Thus, it was no surprise to see stronger resistance to 
the DPP‟s attempts to sell and implement many crucial policies including those for 
overhauling the financial sector.       
The DPP inherited a financial system which was on the verge of collapse. The 
harmful side effects of failing to put a new and sound financial sector in place during 
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the 1990s were crystallised in a looming bad debt crisis in 2000. Consequently, to 
prevent the crisis from worsening and to defuse it entirely became the top priority of 
the DPP‟s financial policies during its first term in power from 2000 to 2004. While 
overall the DPP was successful in reaching those reform targets, it paid a high price in 
terms of its image as a reformist party. What contributed to its success and failure are 
the main themes in the following case chapters that cover the DPP‟s era in addressing 
financial governance and reform. 
But one thing has to be mentioned first here is about the philosophy of the DPP‟s 
financial governance when it was in power. It had showed an even stronger tendency 
than the KMT to embrace “free market economics.” It had strong faith in size, market 
mechanism and private players. Thus, after quelling the concern of financial crisis 
during its first term, it sought to create national champions in the banking sector by 
forcefully encouraging mergers and acquisitions among banks and financial holding 
companies in its second term from 2004 to 2008. The move raised a huge controversy 
as many people questioned its legitimacy to sell state-controlled banks to the private 
players in a reckless way in a short period of time. Some even questioned whether the 
Chen administration might have secret deals with particular business conglomerates 
for its own benefits in terms of political donations or bribes. All these cost the DPP 
much popularity and forced its measures of financial reform in this aspect to be 
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scrapped in the end. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a general context about Taiwan‟s history and its political 
and financial development during different eras from 1949 to 2008. It shows that 
political regimes have significantly shaped the function, structure and development of 
the financial sector. In particular, it demonstrates how democratisation has influenced 
the path, pace and content of financial liberalization, reform and governance through 
undermining the autonomy and capacity of the state since the late 1980s. In the 
following case chapters, from Chapter 4 to Chapter 7, more concrete examples will be 
presented and examined to justify the argument.           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  83 
Chapter Four 
The Prolonged Reform of State-owned Banks (1988-2008) 
The reform on the state-owned banks (SOBs) is the most enduring event among the 
attempts of the Taiwanese state to overhaul its financial system. It was launched in the 
late 1980s and continued for the whole of the 1990s by the KMT government. Until 
today, it is still unfinished even after the DPP was in power from 2000 to 2008. What 
has contributed to its continuing extension or failure is the main concern of this 
chapter. 
The ultimate target of the SOB reform was to effectively enhance the efficiency of 
Taiwan‟s financial system as the SOBs had been dominant lenders in the banking 
sector in terms of their market shares. To reach the target, originally, the KMT had 
planned to undertake a series of measures of privatisation and deregulation for the 
SOBs. The standard for privatisation was to reduce the government‟s share holding of 
a bank to below 50%. Once this was achieved, all the regulations related to 
state-owned enterprises would cease applying to the bank.
143
 In contrast, to 
deregulate a SOB indicated to keep state ownership of the bank but liberate it from 
government red tape on budget, personnel, auditing and so on. This would only apply 
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 However, the government could still control the bank to some extent as long as it keeps a 
significant part of shares. It is only after the government sells all its shares of a bank that the bank 
becomes purely private. 
  84 
to those SOBs which were not for privatisation due to their special “policy 
missions”144 or technical difficulties of ownership transfer.  
The root of the delayed or failed reforms of the SOBs, I argue, lies in the rapidly 
changing political landscape of Taiwan during democratic transition and consolidation 
over the recent two decades. It, in a significant part, stems from the fact that the 
state‟s ability to control its reform agenda has been constrained by the newly rising 
political forces as a result of Taiwan‟s rapid democratisation. With the new legitimacy 
as elected representatives or officials, in the name of check and balance, politicians 
have strong incentives and interests to meddle in the SOB reform policies. To be more 
specific, the interplays among three key policy players, including the Executive Yuan 
(Cabinet), the Legislative Yuan (Parliament) and the Taiwan Provincial Government 
(TPG) with its Assembly (TPA) before they were downsized in 1998, have together 
decisively shaped the pace and content of SOB reform.  
This chapter is thus divided into five parts to elaborate the argument. First, a review 
of the origins of the SOB reform is presented to situate the issue in its initial context. 
Then, the attention is drawn to the original SOB reform plans formulated by the KMT 
government at the beginning of Taiwan‟s financial “Big Bang” in the late 1980s.  
The rationale behind the policy designs will be explored, providing a foundation to 
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trace the change of the reform afterwards. Part Three and Four will highlight the 
impacts of interventions from other political forces outside of the Executive Yuan, the 
main body of the central government and the state apparatus, in two main reform 
areas: privatisation and deregulation. In these two parts, we will see why, in addition 
to the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan and the TPG as well as its Assembly were 
key players, and how did their interplay affect the SOB reform in the whole 1990s. 
Finally, Part Five sheds lights on the development of the SOB reform under the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government from 2000 to 2008. The point will 
be made on whether the first transfer of ruling parties changes the nature of the issue. 
That is, as Taiwan‟s democratisation moved to a new height, did it significantly alter 
the way by which the SOB reform was addressed? In conclusion, I will outline the 
implications of the SOB reform for financial governance in Taiwan and challenges 
ahead for the SOB reform.  
1. Origins of the reform (the late 1980s)  
The origins of the SOB reform involve the unprecedented challenges that the 
authoritarian KMT government faced on both the domestic and external fronts in the 
second half of the 1980s. On the external front, due to the massive trade surplus that 
Taiwan enjoyed with the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. kept forcing Taiwan to 
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take necessary measures to improve the trade imbalance with the threats of 
unilaterally retaliatory measures authorised by the U.S. “Super 301.”145 The so called 
“necessary measures” could be divided into three parts. The first was to ask Taiwan to 
import more goods from the U.S. by either reducing its tariffs or undertaking special 
procurements for U.S. products. The second was to ask Taiwan to open its domestic 
market to the U.S. companies. The third was to ask Taiwan to significantly appreciate 
its currency against the U.S. dollar. Since the U.S. was Taiwan‟s most important 
export market and closest ally in East Asia, Taiwan had no choice but to accept most 
of the U.S. requirements.  
In terms of the impact of these concessions on Taiwan‟s financial market, the second 
and third part had far reaching consequences. Firstly, the introduction of new financial 
institutions from the U.S. posed a threat to the survival of local players, most of which 
were under state control. Secondly, the massive and dramatic appreciation of Taiwan‟s 
currency, the New Taiwan Dollar (NTD), lead to a financial chaos as the KMT 
government allowed the NTD to appreciate almost 40 per cent from 40 NTD: 1 USD 
in 1986 to 25 NTD: 1 USD in 1989. The huge trade surplus plus the surge of “hot 
money” from abroad in seeking for the profit of NTD appreciation created the 
excessive supply of local money, leading to an economic bubble.   
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 “Super 301” is the section of the U.S. Trade Act that gives power to the U.S. Trade Representative 
to investigate U.S.‟s trade partners to see if they apply fair and open access to U.S. exporters. 
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The effects of the economic bubble emerged fast on the domestic front. At the peak of 
the bubble, the enthusiastic participation of the public in speculative investments on 
objects like stocks, properties, illegal investment companies as well as underground 
lotteries, could be sensed almost everywhere. Thus, the threat of the burst of the 
economic bubble and its potentially disastrous social consequences forced the KMT 
government to seek effective financial solutions.  
What was even worse for the KMT government was that rising democratic 
movements also brought serious challenges to its legitimacy of rule at the same time. 
One of the main challenges was targeted at the KMT‟s party-state business empire. 
The DPP, the first opposition party established in 1986, and other anti-KMT forces 
accused the KMT of exploiting its status as the ruling party by using the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) to promote its own business. Besides, the low efficiency and 
monopoly of the SOEs which occupied a significant part of the economy in upstream 
industries and utility facilities as well as public transportation was also under heavy 
attack. The demands to swiftly privatise most SOEs and return KMT‟s “suspiciously 
acquired” assets back to the people were building momentum by gaining increasing 
support from the public. Thus, the political side reinforced the pressure for genuine 
and comprehensive economic reform as the KMT was desperate to boost its 
legitimacy. 
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Under such circumstances, the KMT government decided to push for economic 
liberalisation in an unprecedented scope and scale. Unsurprisingly, the SOEs 
including those SOBs became the prime targets for liberalisation. Two key measures 
of economic liberalisation were set in motion in 1989. The first one was to set up a 
cabinet-level task force, the SOE Privatisation Committee (SOEPC), in pursuing the 
privatisation of the SOEs. Shortly after the SOEPC was set up, 20 SOEs were chosen 
on the first list for privatisation, among which 8 were state-owned financial 
institutions. The second one was aimed exclusively at the financial sector. By 
significantly revising the Banking Law, Taiwan‟s version of “Big Bang” was unveiled. 
Apart from scraping control on banks‟ interest of deposits and loans, the new Banking 
Law increased the penalty of financial crimes, strengthened banks‟ capacity in 
managing risks and allowed the establishment of new private commercial banks 
which had been banned for decades.
146
 Although this policy did not directly get the 
SOBs involved, the inevitable competition pressure brought by the new private 
players in the following years deepened the sense of crisis of the major players at the 
time --- the SOBs. 
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baogao”[A report to the Legislative Yuan on the revisions of the Banking Law]. 
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2. Plan and rationale of the reform 
If we pay attention to what has occurred to SOB privatisation in recent years, we 
might think that to privatise most SOBs has been a consistent policy since the late 
1980s. But this is not the whole picture. At least, under the KMT rule before 2000, the 
SOB privatisation, in fact, was just one part of the project to reform the SOBs. As 
mentioned, in fact, two crucial ways of reform were initially adopted: privatisation 
and deregulation. For the former, it was believed that numerous SOBs could get rid of 
SOE regulations by becoming “private” banks and thus could compete with private 
players on a level playing field. For the latter, while recognizing the efficiency that 
would be brought by privatisation to some SOBs, the government also sought to 
enhance the operational autonomy of the rest of SOBs by this alternative way. It was 
planned to draft a new act, Regulations Governing State-run Financial Institutions 
(RGSFI), to push for the SOB deregulation. The government argued that for some 
SOBs state ownership was not the key for their competitiveness. The excessive 
government regulations were. If the new act could be enacted, it would bring similar 
positive effects as privatisation. The difference was that with the new act the 
government could still maintain a part of its banks as government-owned without 
worrying that they would lose their competitiveness. “State-owned but run in a private 
  90 
way” was the slogan that the KMT used to symbolise the spirit of the new act.147    
The former minister of finance Paul Chiu
148
 recalled why there was a need for this 
dual approach in a reply to the legislators during the question time in the Legislative 
Yuan in 1999: 
”…Despite their enormous contributions to our national economy over the past 
decades, the state-run financial institutions (SFIs)
149
 have been under immense 
pressures of competition from the newly established private financial institutions from 
abroad and at home due to the active opening-up of Taiwan‟s financial markets by the 
government in recent years. …Nevertheless, constrained by the existing government 
regulations on their personnel, budget and audit, the SFIs have found difficulty in 
improving their operational efficiency and become vulnerable to the surging 
challenges from new rivals. Thus, on the one hand, we have been pushing the 
privatisation of some SFIs; on the other hand, for those SFIs that are bearing policy 
missions or won‟t be privatised in the near future, we will enact the RGSFI [to let 
them gain operational autonomy and efficiency in another way].”150  
In his later response to questions from legislators, Mr Chiu gave an example of banks 
with policy missions. He said that the government-owned Export-Import Bank of the 
Republic of China would not be privatised because it had special functions to 
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facilitate export and import trade of Taiwan.
151
 Then he went on to say that it would 
take time for some SOBs to be privatised because they needed to be restructured and 
registered again as corporations first; once they were ready, they would be transferred 
into private banks as well.
152
 
Ultimately, the KMT government failed to deliver these SOB reform policies as it 
initially planned. For the SOB privatisation, it only managed to complete a number of 
cases after 1997. For the SOB deregulation, the expected new RGSFI act never passed. 
The delay and failure must be explained as the KMT kept formally full control of the 
state power in the 1990s at the executive and legislative levels.  
3. The delay of SOB privatisation in the KMT era (the 1990s)  
3.1 The SOB privatisation and democratisation 
As mentioned earlier, the SOB privatisation was initiated in the wider context of all 
SOE privatisation in 1989. Therefore, the proceeding of the SOB privatisation was 
moving with all the SOEs all the way. After announcing its broad direction and plan 
for the SOE privatisation, the Executive Yuan took its first step to implement its 
agenda in details – providing a legal framework for the SOE transformation. It 
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proposed to revise the existing “Act of Privatization of Government-Owned 
Enterprises” (APGOE) as the fundamental law for SOE privatisation. The purposes of 
the statute are made clear in the first two articles: 
“This Statute is enacted to facilitate the privatization of government-owned 
enterprises, to exert the market mechanism, and to enhance the operational efficiency 
of enterprises (Article 1).” 
“The privatization of government-owned enterprises, either in whole or in part, shall 
be governed by this Statute… (Article 2)”153 
Then, shortly after the statute was approved by the Legislative Yuan in 1991, the 
Executive Yuan rushed to promulgate the “Enforcement Rules of Statute of 
Privatization of Government-Owned Enterprises” in 1992. The rules were made to let 
involved parties of government agencies, SOEs and their employees learn how to 
follow the APGOE in details. The next step, as planned, after the legal foundation for 
the SOE privatisation was in place, was to let the Legislative Yuan to review the 
budget and plan for individual SOE privatisation case submitted by the Executive 
Yuan.  
As far as the SOB privatisation was concerned, five banks were the focus of the 
debate before the late 1990s. These five banks were: First, Hua Nan, Chang Hwa, 
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Farmers and Chiao Tung,
154
 as the third column of Table 4.1 shows. The first three 
were under the TPG control and the other two were under the central government.  
Table 4.1 Progress of privatisation of state-owned banks in the 1990s 
Bank Names 
Controlled by 
which authority 
Year of proposal 
for privatisation 
Planned Year for 
completing 
privatisation 
Year of 
privatisation 
First Commercial Bank TPG* 1989 n/a 1998 
Hua Nan Commercial Bank  TPG 1989 n/a 1998 
Chang Hwa Commercial Bank TPG 1989 n/a 1998 
Taiwan Business Bank  TPG 1989 n/a 1998 
Farmers Bank of China CG** 1992 1996 1999 
Chiao Tung Bank CG 1994 1997 1999 
Taipei Bank Taipei City n/a n/a 1999 
Bank of Kaohsiung Kaohsiung City n/a n/a 1999 
Taiwan Cooperative Bank  TPG These banks were not planned to be privatised 
soon.  The new drafted act RGSFI would 
apply to them before privatisation.  
Land Bank of Taiwan  TPG 
Bank of Taiwan  TPG 
Central Trust of China CG 
*TPG: the Taiwan Provincial Government; **CG: the Central Government 
Source: The author‟s own collection from newspapers and parliament minutes 
It is not clear why the central government targeted these TPG-controlled banks first. 
With hindsight, it might be due to the following reasons. First, in terms of business 
nature, although the three TPG-controlled banks were government-owned, their 
banking business was basically commercial-oriented with few specific policy 
missions imposed by the government. Second, the government shares in two of the 
three banks were less than 60%, making them relatively easier to be privatised (i.e., 
reduce government shares to be under 50%). Besides, because these three banks were 
holding each other‟s shares to a certain extent, they would be linked in the change of 
their share structure if anyone of them proceeded with privatisation. Third, the three 
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 Why the Taiwan Business Bank was not mentioned in the public debate about SOB privatisation is 
not clear as it was on the list for the first wave of SOB privatisation. A possible reason is its relatively 
smaller size in term of assets compared to the other three big provincial banks.     
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banks were all flagship SOBs in terms of their ranking in assets and market shares in 
lending. If they could be successfully privatised first, the rest of SOBs would be easier 
to be addressed with previous landmark examples.
155
 
Whatever the reasons, the central government‟s efforts in SOB privatisation suffered a 
serious setback at the very beginning. As soon as the central government unveiled the 
list, the TPA passed a crucial resolution in October 1989 to damp the central 
government‟s hope of a quick solution. The resolution required that the TPG shares in 
the three big provincial banks should be maintained at or above 51 per cent.
156
 In 
other words, it was impossible to privatise these banks under this resolution as the 
TPG would always have more than half of the banks‟ shares. The resolution became 
the biggest obstacle on the way for the central government to speed up SOB 
privatisation as the resolution was maintained until May 1997. The long blocking 
requires a detailed explanation.  
Historically, the TPG had enormous power over the banks under its authority despite 
the fact that all these banks were also subject by law to the supervision of the central 
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diyu 51%” [resolution on share sale passed with conditions: TPG‟s holding no less than 50 per cent]. 
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government. The central government barely intervened in TPG‟s affairs in this area 
due to TPG‟s special status and role in Taiwan‟s politics. The TPG‟s jurisdiction was 
almost completely overlapping with the one of the central government except for 
Taipei, Kaohsiung and a number of tiny islands surrounding Taiwan, and the 
autonomy of the TPG was safeguarded by Taiwan‟s constitution at that time. In the 
face of such a sizable provincial government, the central government had to show its 
respect for the autonomy of governance of the TPG. Besides, before 1992 the Taiwan 
Provincial Assembly (TPA) was the highest level legislature where all members were 
all directly elected by their constituents in Taiwan.
157
 The TGA was used as a 
showcase for the KMT government to demonstrate to the international community 
that Taiwan had democracy at a time when Taiwan was still under martial law and had 
limited democracy. As a result, the power of TPA was recognized on the issues under 
its supervision.
158
 Furthermore, prior to 1994, while all the TPG governors were 
appointed by the central government, they needed the approval of TPA to confirm 
their nomination. Thus, the power of TPA could not be underestimated by the central 
government. Against this backdrop, when the central government took initiatives to 
firstly privatise three SOBs under the authority of TPG and TGA, instead of forcing 
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 The Taipei City Council and Kaohsiung City Council also enjoyed the same status but their 
constituencies were small in comparison with the TPA.  
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 Because of this special status, many of today‟s leading political figures in Taiwan began to build 
their political reputations as the members of TPA. The former Premier Su Tseng-chang and his 
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the TPG and TPA to accept its decision, it needed to “convince” both of them.  
Apart from the tricky central/provincial government relationships, the new political 
landscape as the result of Taiwan‟s rapid democratisation since the mid-1980s 
reinforced the influence of TPG and TPA. Taiwan‟s democratisation moved into a new 
stage in the late 1980s after the DPP was founded in 1986 and the Martial Law was 
lifted in 1987. In appearance, the KMT was still dominant everywhere, but the 
importance and influence of elected officials and representatives were surging as 
people expected them to play a more significant role in a new democratic era. As a 
result, those newly elected officials and lawmakers started to challenge more often the 
decisions or orders from the central government or their parties to reflect the concerns 
and interests of their constituents.  
The long-upheld TPA resolution of 1989 was one of the typical examples. The 
resolution was passed because the TPA members claimed that they were worried the 
rights and benefits of the current employees in the three TPG-controlled banks would 
not be well-protected after privatisation, especially when they found that related laws 
for privatisation were not in place.
159
 While it was true that those laws were not in 
place until 1992, the TPA members‟ lasting opposition to the privatisation until 1997 
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 Chang, “Te gao: sanshangyin jueyian jijiang fanan” [An analysis: on the upcoming TPA decision to 
repeal the resolution regarding the ceiling of share holding of three TPG-owned commercial banks]. 
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implied other reasons.  
Most of all, these banks were convenient tools for TPA members. With these banks, 
the TPA members could get cheap loans for themselves or their cronies even when 
lacking sufficient collateral security to back them up. They could even force the banks 
to purchase their branch offices in a specific location at a much higher price, just 
because those office buildings belonged to the cronies of some TPA members. In fact, 
some TPA members even held shares of these banks and got involved in inside trading 
on the stock market. This was all because, in the name of supervision, the TPA could 
essentially control “their” banks. For example, they could decide who would be 
promoted in the TPG-controlled banks and how much budget these banks could get at 
annual reviews.
160
 
Chang Chao-shun, a senior banker with the background of TPG-run banks, also 
provided his related observation in my interview:
161
  
“Before their elections, some TPA members (or their „figureheads‟) would try to get 
loans from the TPG-run banks to finance their costly campaigns. If re-elected after 
elections, they would get new loans from the TPG-run banks with new „figureheads‟ 
to repay the previous loans. The process would be repeated until the money they 
                                                 
160
 Lienhepao, “Shelun: Kuangzheng minyi daibiao ganyu jinrong jigou de waifeng”[Editorial: 
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 Chang was the chairman of the Overseas Chinese Bank in 2004. He was transferred to run Taiwan 
Business Bank in 2005. Then soon again he moved to be in charge of the First Commercial Holding Co. 
from 2006 to 2008. The interview was made in August 2004. 
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borrowed became non-performing loans. The reason why they could do this was 
because the promotion of high-ranking managers of the TPG-run banks needed their 
endorsement in private. In other words, if someone wanted to be promoted to a high 
position in a TPG-run bank, he needed to find recommendation from some TPA 
members first, which was crucial in the final decision of the TPG governor. This is 
also why some managers in the central Taiwan (where the TPG/TPA was located) 
branches of the TPG-run banks were easily got promoted. As a result, not surprisingly, 
the bad loan percentages there were much higher than the other branches.”162 
As a matter of fact, the TPG was also opposed to privatising its banks. The TPG never 
openly revealed its opposition to the privatisation but it always used the TPA 
resolution as an excuse to defend itself. Actually, in its own first privatisation plan 
unveiled in 1995, the three banks were not even mentioned in the plan at all.
163
 The 
fundamental reason for this negative attitude was the concern of fiscal problems that 
the TPG faced. The first directly elected TPG governor James Soong had even openly 
accused the central government of concentrating tax incomes on its own hands 
regardless of the fiscal difficulty of his government and constituents.
164
 Given that 
the three banks‟ revenues were important sources of annual fiscal income to the TPG, 
especially at a time when the TPG was in serious debt, the TPG would not easily let 
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privatisation proceed soon.
165
 
The blocking from the Legislative Yuan against the two central 
government-controlled SOBs took place in similar scenarios though for slightly 
different reasons after a new parliament was created in 1992. Under the strong protest 
of the public who opposed the continuing existence of “permanent” national 
representatives in the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly for decades,
166
 the 
KMT undertook political reform through cooperation with some lawmakers in the 
Legislative Yuan by sending a petition
167
 to the Constitutional Court of the Judicial 
Yuan for interpretation regarding the qualifications of those representatives. 
Consequently, the interpretation
168
 disqualified those representatives in 1990 and 
Taiwan‟s first parliament where the lawmakers were completely and directly elected 
by their constituents was created in 1992.
169
 The new Legislative Yuan immediately 
seized the centre of the political stage. The newly elected lawmakers were all keen to 
voice their opinions on public policies considering the public was constantly watching 
their performance, which would affect their chance of getting re-elected at the next 
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election.  
The central government initiated its privatisation plans for the Farmers Bank and 
Chiao Tung Bank in 1992 and 1994 respectively. While it was not very clear why 
these two central government-controlled banks were chosen to be privatised first, 
based upon the way the government handled SOB privation at that time by releasing 
its shares in the stock market, it might be because these two banks were listed 
corporations and it would be less difficult to sell their shares quickly. Initially, the 
KMT government assumed these two banks were qualified for privatisation and 
would be sorted out in an efficient way. Unfortunately, most lawmakers had different 
views on the issue and the Executive Yuan had difficulty in convincing them until 
1998. Although most lawmakers agreed with the direction to privatise the two banks, 
they expressed following concerns time and again:  
1. These two banks all had special policy missions. Farmers Bank was for the 
farming industry; Chiao Tung Bank was for mid or long-term development of targeted 
industries. If they were privatised, would they continue these missions?
170
 
2. Some precedents showed that SOE privatisation turned out to transfer shares from 
the government to a number of private conglomerates, putting public interest at risk. 
The two SOBs might end up in the same situation.
171
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3. The government‟s privatisation policies were not complete while the government 
only tried to reduce its share holding to be less than 50%. If the government was 
really serious about giving up its control of the two banks, it should sell all its shares. 
The government was just trying to free the two banks from the supervision of the 
Legislative Yuan after privatisation.
172
 
4. The prices and timings to sell the government shares of the two banks‟ in the stock 
market were not appropriate. The two banks shares deserved higher prices and their 
release should be undertaken under the condition that it would not affect the price 
level of the stock market.
173
 
With these concerns not being properly addressed by the government, they argued, the 
bipartisan decision in the Legislative Yuan was to continue blocking the government‟s 
privatisation plan for the two banks. 
3.2 Political reforms broke deadlocks of SOB privatisation  
The aforementioned oppositions from the TPG/TPA and the lawmakers in the new 
Legislative Yuan notably disappeared in 1997 after President Lee Teng-hui launched 
new political reforms in 1996 and 1997. After Lee was re-elected as President --- for 
the first time by popular vote --- in March 1996, he sought to find consensus among 
different political forces about the development of Taiwan in several key policy areas 
such as cross-strait relations, economic development and constitutional reform. With 
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support from the DPP,
174
 Lee successfully convened the National Development 
Conference (NDC) in December 1996 and put the political consensus reached in the 
NDC into practice by constitutional amendments in July 1997.  
The most important result from this series of political reforms regarding the SOB 
privatisation was the decision to downsize the TPG and TPA by the end of 1998 with 
almost all their functions and assets including TPG-controlled banks transferring to 
the central government. In response, the TPA decided to overthrow its 1989 resolution 
and implement the privatisation of the three TPG-controlled banks.
175
 Suddenly, “A 
case which had been delayed for two decades was sorted out in two years.”176 Chen 
Yi-shan, a journalist of a leading magazine in Taiwan, described the moment in her 
investigation report right after the TPA decision. In this report, Chen also reviewed the 
change and process regarding privatisation of TPG-controlled banks over the past two 
decades before late 1997: 
“…In the 1970s, due to the KMT‟s memory about financial chaos in the mainland 
China before 1949, the [central] government never thought to give up its control of 
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state-owned banks
177
. …In 1983, then Premier Yu Kuo-hua thought it was still better 
not to privatise TPG-run banks in light of their „big size‟ in the banking sector even 
though he agreed to let new banks in the future private-owned. … In the late 1980s, 
the [central] government began to favour the idea of privatisation. But the elected 
representatives emerged to become new obstacles of privatisation. While the [central] 
government announced to privatise three TPG-run commercial banks in 1989,  The 
TPA responded with passing the „51 per cent‟ resolution in the same year. …After 
political delay for two decades, now a political conference [the NDC] speeded up the 
pace of privatisation.”178     
This report not only concisely confirms my previous analysis but also indicates a new 
political wind which would affect the following pace of SOB privatisation was 
blowing. Soon after in 1998, all the three banks including another smaller bank were 
all privatised as the fifth column of Table 4.1 indicates. The success of the reform 
triggered a follow-up at the Legislative Yuan. On the one hand, the reform had set a 
precedent and all involved parties were satisfied with the results.
179
 On the other hand, 
the political climate pushed the Legislative Yuan to react to the privatisation issue. 
Because one of the resolutions passed in the NDC required that all the SOEs should 
be privatised in 5 years, though not legally binding, the Legislative Yuan had pressure 
to follow. As a result, Farmers Bank and Chiao Tung Bank all successfully completed 
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their procedure of privatisation in 1999.   
4. The failed deregulation on the SOBs in the KMT era (the 1990s) 
As the SOB privatisation was seriously delayed throughout the whole 1990s, the other 
dimension of SOB reform – deregulation – failed completely in the end. The KMT 
government was never able to pass the Regulations Governing State-run Financial 
Institutions (RGSFI) despite repeated attempts at the Legislative Yuan. At least ten 
versions of RGSFI were drafted by the KMT since the first formulation of the idea of 
deregulation in the 1970s.
180
 However, according to the study of Lee Yun-san, since 
the beginning a lasting dispute among different branches of the central government 
doomed its enactment.
181
  
As the draft of RGSFI was proposed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) under the 
Executive Yuan and its purpose was to free the state-run financial institutions from the 
existing regulations for all civil servants and SOEs, it ran into the strong opposition 
from other related governing Yuans: the Control Yuan, the Examination Yuan and the 
Legislative Yuan. For the Control Yuan, it had the power to audit whether government 
agencies used their budgets in accordance with their original plans and amounts. For 
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the Examination Yuan, it was in charge of recruiting civil servants and their 
promotions and pensions. As for the Legislative Yuan, it had the power to review all 
the budgets and plans of government agencies before they were implemented. If the 
new act RGSFI could make an exception, these Yuans contended that the Executive 
Yuan would cross the line of power boundary and create constitutional controversies. 
As a result, the MOF had tried to strike a compromise among the Yuans and all those 
different versions of the RGSFI were the results. Unfortunately, the gap among 
different views was so huge that a deal was difficult to be reached.  
While this explanation is convincing in a sense, it does not seem to be able to explain 
why an authoritarian regime like the KMT before the 1990s could not coordinate 
different views on this issue. Perhaps, the real cause behind the delay to put the 
RGSFI into practice is that the KMT did not really want it to happen before the 
financial “Big Bang” of 1989. As the SOBs were still very helpful in promoting 
industrial policies, excluding largely the participation of private players in the banking 
sector and maintaining the stability of the financial system, the KMT lacked 
incentives and determinations to enact the RGSFI.
182
 
To break the deadlock, a constitutional amendment with regard to the RGSFI was 
approved by the National Assembly in 1994. The article says:  
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The state shall manage government-run financial organizations, in accordance with 
the principles of business administration. The management, personnel, proposed 
budgets, final budgets, and audits of the said organizations may be specified by 
law.
183
 
The passage of the article stemmed from the strong lobby pushed by the Association 
of Banks when sustainable SOB privatisation was still not in sight and new private 
commercial banks just entered the banking sector. The SOB members of the 
association attempted to strengthen their position in the future market by enacting the 
RGSFI.  
The latest draft of the act was sent to the Legislative Yuan for deliberation in 1997. 
Once again it did not get through. Firstly the Legislative Yuan was too concentrated 
on SOB privatisation that it did not have a session for discussing the draft act. Then, 
when the act was finally discussed in 1999, most lawmakers insisted that there was no 
need to enact the act if the government planned to privatise almost all SOBs soon. 
Also, they argued that, as a number of cases of SOB privatisation were just completed 
recently, all the MOF had to do was to keep doing this task.
184
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5. The SOB reform in the DPP era (2000-2008)  
5.1 The DPP’s basic stance before 2000 
Before the DPP came to power in 2000, it held an extremely negative attitude toward 
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) including the state-owned banks (SOBs). From its 
perspective, the SOEs were inefficient to the economy and provided special access for 
profit to the KMT. Taking side with a number of liberal economists,
185
 the DPP saw 
the SOEs as a burden to the economy for their survival lay not in their 
competitiveness but in their monopolistic or oligarchic positions in their individual 
sectors. If they could be privatised and other private enterprises were allowed join the 
competition, their productivity would pick up and the whole economy would benefit 
because of better product quality and lower prices spurred by open and fair 
competitions among market competitors. It also denounced the SOEs as channels for 
political feedbacks to some high-ranking government officials and military officers 
after they retired. Normally, these retired officials and officers would be granted the 
positions as the chairmen or presidents in some SOEs. What was even worse was that 
the SOEs were frequently contributing to the growth of the KMT‟s own business 
empire by providing massively profitable contracts, an evident symptom of the 
KMT‟s abuse of its long-time political rule.  
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Because of this negative stance, the DPP upheld privatisation as a tool to dismantle 
the colossal SOEs and undermine the KMT‟s economic power base. In the DPP‟s 
Fundamental Guidelines, the section on economic, fiscal and financial policies briefly 
outlined these goals: 
The SOEs have to be privatised and exposed to market competition. In order to get rid 
of political cronyism and market monopolies, and enhance operational efficiency, this 
basic principle should be followed. For some SOEs enjoying monopolistic or 
oligarchic market positions but having difficulties being privatised in the near future, 
their functions have to be adjusted and put under the careful surveillance of the 
legislatures.
186
 
Accordingly, the DPP should have shared a common ground with the KMT regarding 
SOE privatisation since the KMT‟s announced policies were on the track that the DPP 
wished. Nevertheless, in practice, the DPP was also worried that the KMT might 
manipulate the process of privatisation for its own benefit. As the KMT was the ruling 
party, it had easy access to inside information about many projects of the SOE 
privatisation. In the name of privatisation, the KMT could either let its own business 
empire acquire some SOEs or instead let its powerful partners, the local business 
tycoons allied with it, get similar juicy deals. As a consequence, SOE privatisation 
would not produce a healthier economy but a lasting twisted economic system under 
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the dominance of the KMT business empire and its cronies. Moreover, even after 
privatisation, the KMT government could still control most former SOEs through 
controlling the majority in their boards as the biggest share holders. Under such 
circumstances, while the “privatised” SOEs were still under the government‟s control, 
they were no longer under the monitoring of the legislatures. Thus, the DPP tended to 
insist on a “real” privatisation of the SOEs: without any interference from the 
government and the KMT in any way.  
The DPP‟s concerns were highlighted and addressed in the National Development 
Conference (NDC) of 1996 because the KMT needed the support from the DPP to 
avoid the failure of the conference. Under the demand of the DPP representatives and 
the widespread support of other participants, the NDC reached two important 
consensuses with regard to SOE privatisation and KMT enterprises:  
1. All the SOEs have to be privatised in 5 years. 
2. The KMT promises that its enterprises will not take part in the investments which 
are involved with business in monopolistic or oligarchic position and government 
projects.
187
 
Overall, the DPP‟s stance on SOE privatisation before 2000 was cautious support. It 
embraced the idea of using privatisation as a means to improve the SOEs in particular 
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and the whole economy in general. But the worry that the KMT might exploit its 
ruling position to benefit from the process of privatisation made the DPP see the issue 
with caution. 
5.2 Two stages of financial reform under divided government 
After the DPP took power in 2000, the issue of SOB reform was reduced into how 
much and how fast the rest of the SOBs should be privatised and controlled. The DPP 
government gave up the idea of enacting a new act to deregulate a part of the SOBs 
and decided that most SOBs were needed to be privatised soon. But the issue of SOB 
reform was no less complicated for the DPP than it was for the KMT before 2000. No 
sooner than it came to power, the DPP faced a looming non-performing crisis and a 
significant number of financial institutions were on the verge of insolvency. It had to 
sort out the crisis before it could continue the SOB reform. Besides, the issue of 
“government-run but private-owned” banks needed to be further addressed. As Table 
4.1 shows, the KMT actually had privatised eight SOBs before 2000. But these banks 
were still controlled by the government after 2000 because the government still held 
the biggest part of their shares.
188
 Whether the government should keep reducing its 
shares caused new controversy about the state‟s role in the banking sector. 
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Furthermore, politics in Taiwan during the DPP era made constructive policy 
deliberation less likely. Even though the DPP won the presidential elections of 2000 
and 2004 consecutively, the KMT and its ally the People First Party (PFP) kept 
control of the Legislative Yuan. The constant confrontation between the opposition‟s 
“Blue camp” and the ruling party‟s “Green camp” (composed of the DPP and its ally 
the Taiwan Solidarity Union, TSU) on national identity grounds and other related 
issues made politics more polarised than ever. As a result, party discipline was much 
more tightened in all political parties in the Legislative Yuan. The former bipartisan 
opposition to the KMT‟s Executive Yuan‟s policies obviously declined. What 
occurred more, instead, was that the Blue overthrew, altered or blocked the policies of 
the Green, putting the DPP government in a difficult ruling position.
189
 
Nevertheless, as we look back at the DPP‟s first term in government from 2000 to 
2004, unlike its many policies in other areas, the DPP‟s financial reform policies 
suffered relatively less from its minority position in the Legislative Yuan. Despite 
numerous delays on approving essential bills, budgets or plans by the opposition 
parties, the DPP managed to attain notable credit for its financial reform. The goal of 
the first stage of financial reform was the so-called “258 financial reform.” Initiated 
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by President Chen Shui-bian in August of 2001, the reform target was to lower 
non-performing loan ratios to below 5 per cent and raise capital adequacy rates to 8 
per cent of domestic banks within two years. Eventually, the target was achieved on 
time. Meanwhile, after the passage of the Financial Holding Company Act in 2001, 14 
financial holding companies had been established from 2001 to 2002. In addition, 
with regard to speeding up the disposal of seriously troubled financial institutions, the 
Financial Restructuring Fund was established and had successfully bailed out 47 of 
these institutions and forced them to drop out the market through closures or mergers. 
Also, the DPP government overhauled the financial regulation system by setting up 
the Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC), an single integrated agency aiming at 
independently supervising and monitoring the operation of the whole financial 
system. 
With hindsight, two key factors contributed to these better-than-expected outcomes. 
First, as a looming banking crisis approached, the opposition parties were under social 
pressure to be in cooperation with the DPP on reform bills and measures. Although 
sometimes they disagreed on some technical matters or worried that the DPP might 
get too much credit, they did not totally block the DPP from implementing financial 
reform, especially as it attained strong support from the media and public opinion. 
Secondly, the convention of the Economic Development Advisory Conference 
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(EDAC) by President Chen in 2001 reinforced the mandate of the DPP reform agenda. 
The conference took place at a time when Taiwan experienced the worst economic 
downturn in past decades. By inviting representatives from the ruling and opposition 
parties, scholars, business leaders, and labour unions, President Chen was hoping to 
use the conference to find out common goals and effective solutions to the 
unprecedented economic challenges facing Taiwan.
190
 What was approved by the 
conference got such a strong legitimacy that no political parties could oppose them 
without good causes.  
The conference also sped up the SOB privatisation as one of the consensuses reached 
required that the government-run banks should be entirely privatised.
191
 The DPP 
then focused on reducing the government shares in the “government-run but 
private-owned” banks.  
Based on the accomplishment of financial reform made in his first term, in October 
2004, President Chen took a further step in his second term on consolidating the 
banking sector by unveiling his goal of “the second stage of financial reform” --- to 
half the number of government-run banks to six by 2005 and the number of financial 
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 See the background of the conference at a press release at Office of the President, Taiwan, 
“Background for Convening the Economic Development Advisory Conference.” Available at 
http://www.president.gov.tw/2_special/economic/e_index.html (accessed August 14, 2005). 
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 In the common views of the finance group of the conference, which is available in Chinese at: 
http://www.president.gov.tw/2_special/economic/index-92.html (accessed August 14, 2005). 
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holding companies to seven by 2006, increase the market shares of three domestic 
banks to above 10 per cent,
192
 and encourage one financial institution to be taken 
over by a foreign counterpart or listed in overseas markets.
193
 The rationale behind 
this reform agenda, according to the former Vice Premier Wu Rong-yi, who was 
commissioned to supervise the banking sector reform in 2005, was to solve the 
problem of over-banking and strengthen the competitiveness of local players by 
increasing their scale. The long-term goal of the second stage of financial reform was 
to have three to five “national champions” banking groups that would together have a 
market share above 80 per cent. As the private players remained wary about merging 
with their rivals, the government decided to begin the consolidation process by 
requiring the SOBs and government-run banks to seek for mergers and acquisitions 
first.
194
  
However, the push for the second stage of financial reform in 2005 raised public 
concerns and surging oppositions of the labour unions when government-run banks 
were planned to be acquired by private players. The typical case is the failure of the 
sale of shares in government-run Taiwan Business Bank. The labour union of the 
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 The three banks could be private or public-owned and did not rule out the participation of foreign 
capital. The point is to cultivate national champions of banks and make the banking sector less 
scattered.     
193
 Lin, “Dier jieduan jingai xingli licu jinkong zheng bing” [The second stage financial reform aims at 
creating profit by consolidating financial holding companies]. 
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 Chou and Lu, “Erci jingai zhihuiguan guihua lantu” [Commander of the second stage financial 
reform specified the blueprint]. 
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bank was not satisfied with the early-retirement packages for laid-off workers 
proposed by the private bidder E. Sun Financial Holding Co. After a four-day strike 
and prolonged negotiations, the bidder dropped its bid.
195
 Since then, a controversy 
had been raised on the way the DPP government “privatised” government-run banks. 
Some were questioning that the government was deliberately selling out its banks to 
private players at a low price, which not only undermined the public interest but also 
put the benefit of current employees of banks at risk. Against the backdrop that the 
income gap between rich and poor was increasing over recent years in Taiwan, the 
government‟s rushed attempts to sell banks to private conglomerates had been viewed 
by critics as adding fuel to the fire.
196
 Seizing the opportunity, the opposition parties 
vowed to stop the government from pushing ahead with the second stage of financial 
reform, casting more uncertainty on the reform‟s future. With the setback, the DPP 
government could only push for the mergers among the government-controlled banks 
as this approach would encounter less resistance and opposition.
197
 While it 
eventually did reach the target deadline to half the number of government-run banks 
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 Lin, “Sale of state-run bank declared a failure.” 
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 A social movement group, Fanzi Lianmeng [Alliance of fairness and Justice], is one of the most 
active critics. See its view on the issue on its website: http://www.justice.org.tw/index.htm (accessed 
August 20, 2005). Also see the analysis from the perspectives of consumers and bank labours at Hsia, 
Sujiao yapian: shuangka fongbao shuachu Taiwan fujhai weiji [Plastic Opium: The credit and debit 
cards crisis and debt crisis in Taiwan]. Hsia, “Jinrong zihben ruhe chihren [How financial capital 
destroys people‟s lives]. 
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 For the mergers among government-controlled banks did not involve private players at all, thus 
raised less concern of benefiting any private player.  
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to six by 2005,
198
 the rest of the reform fell apart in 2006 amid growing 
controversy.
199
    
Conclusion 
As this chapter shows, the rapid democratisation over the recent two decades in 
Taiwan has significantly affected how the Taiwanese government addressed the SOB 
reform. Due to rapid democratisation, the government has been forced to 
accommodate a new political environment where the power of the elected politicians 
at the provincial level (the TPG/TPA) or at the national level (the Legislative Yuan) 
has been elevated to such an extent that it constantly challenged policies formulated 
by the administrative power centre. Meanwhile, the nature of challenge has significant 
difference before and after the first power transfer in 2000. While the impact of 
democratisation on SOB reform was more felt in term of independent behaviour by 
elected politicians from all political parties in the KMT era, it evolved into a clash 
between the ruling party and the opposition parties in the DPP era.  
Democratisation has brought mixed impacts on the SOB reform. On the one hand, the 
government has suffered delay or failure; on the other hand, the transparency and 
accountability of the government is far more improved. The prospect of financial 
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 The six government-run banks were the First Financial Holding Company (FHC), Hua-Nan FHC, 
Mega FHC, Bank of Taiwan, Taiwan Cooperative Bank, and Land Bank of Taiwan.    
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 For more details about the controversy, please see Section 3.2 of Chapter 5. 
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governance particularly and economic governance generally in Taiwan will depend on 
whether democracy can further deepen to find a right balance among governing 
transparency, accountability and efficiency.  
As far as the SOB reform is concerned, a major challenge is unsolved --- the role of 
government-run banks is not clear. On the one hand, the majority views agree to 
reduce the government intervention in the banking sector. But, on the other hand, as 
people are also worried that the influential financial groups owned by private 
players
200
 might control the sector and put the public interest at risk, people are 
expecting the government can play a stronger role as a counter balance. If the 
government keeps selling all its shares of the banks it still controls, it will lose a 
strong leverage against the dominance of big private players from abroad or at home.  
To sum up, the SOB reform in Taiwan is at a crossroads. In a new democratic era, the 
rapidly changing political landscapes behind the reform and the shifting public 
opinions on the issue have made it more complicated and controversial. The next 
chapter, which focuses on the state‟s policies on the new private commercial banks, 
will provide another strong case to prove this view.    
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 In the financial sector, there are three most influential family financial groups: the Koo family with 
Chinatrust FHC (No.7) and China Development FHC (No.12), the Wu family with Taishin FHC (No.2) 
and Shin Kong FHC (No.8), and Tsai family with Cathay FHC (No.1) and Fubon FHC (No.6). The 
numbers behind these FHCs are their rankings in terms of total assets among the 14 FHCs in Taiwan. 
Politically, these families are active in maintaining their relationships with all the main political parties. 
Their influence is persistent no matter which party is in power.    
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Chapter Five 
 The policies on the new private commercial banks (1988-2008) 
Aside from the reforms on the state-owned banks (SOBs), another crucial plan in 
Taiwan‟s financial “Big Bang” launched in the late 1980s was to open up the banking 
sector to the new private players. The plan was a milestone in Taiwan‟s financial 
history as the banking sector had been dominated by the SOBs for decades after the 
Second World War. Basically, the argument for the need of the plan was similar to 
that of SOB privatisation. It was strongly believed that the addition of more private 
banks could bring greater competition, improve service quality and push the SOBs to 
upgrade effectively. In other words, most people were anticipating a new banking 
sector where the dominance of SOBs would become history and the whole sector 
would turn out to be more diverse, competitive and efficient. 
In contrast to the SOB reform which ran into serious delays and failures as the 
previous chapter has shown, the plan to allow the establishment of new private 
commercial banks went through almost without any difficulty. From its approval in 
1989 to the granting of licences to 15 new banks in 1991, the plan was completed in 
only about two years. Why, against a similar background, could the plan get through 
in a relatively easy way?  
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Moreover, it seems that the government, no matter under the KMT or DPP, has 
difficulty in dealing with the new private banks after the opening. In the KMT era, 
bank runs and non-performing loans (NPLs) surged with the increase of new private 
banks over the 1990s. In the DPP era, as briefly mentioned in Chapter 4, the public 
has serious concerns about the growing influence of a small number of family 
business groups which will have a huge potential to control a significant part of the 
financial sector through acquisitions of small private players and state-controlled 
banks under official encouragement after 2000.  
What went wrong with the government‟s policies on the new private banks from 1988 
to 2008 is the focus of this chapter. Three key questions are highlighted. Why did the 
government want to open the banking sector in the first place? Why did the 
government allow 15 new private banks to open at the same time in 1991? Why did 
the government run into difficulty in managing the new private banks afterwards?  
In my view, the policies on the new private commercial banks are just like to “open 
Pandora‟s box.” Before the box was opened, the government was confident that 
everything would be under its control and expected that all the good effects would 
come along with the new entries of private players. After the box was opened, 
however, some “unexpected” troubles occurred and challenged the government‟s 
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capability in coping with them. This is another case to justify the argument of the 
thesis from the perspective of how the emerging business power in the banking sector 
makes it difficult for the state to deliver sound financial governance in the context of 
Taiwan‟s rapid democratisation. 
1. A forced opening (1988-1989) 
1.1 Private Banks before 1991 
Looking back at the post war history of Taiwan‟s financial development, there is no 
question that the decision to lift the ban on the establishment of new private banks in 
1989 is an enormous breakthrough. Prior to the lifting, the KMT government had 
deliberately repressed the development of private banks and let the SOBs dominate 
the financial system. The policy was upheld for two fundamental reasons: the KMT‟s 
overriding concerns of financial stability and its deep distrust of big private capital.  
As a “foreign” regime which only began to have formal connections with the 
Taiwanese after their previous colonial government of Japan surrendered in 1945, the 
KMT had been highly alert to how to consolidate its effective rule in Taiwan 
especially after its loss of the civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 
1949. In addition to imposing the martial law to tighten political control and constrain 
political rights, the KMT heeded its lessons from the civil war --- it could only sustain 
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its rule by effectively controlling hyperinflation and maintaining financial stability, 
which was a crucial precondition for preventing social disorder and fostering 
economic development. Moreover, the official ideology of KMT preached by Sun 
Yat-sen,
201
 the “three principles of the people” or San Min Chi I (nationalism, 
democracy and the people‟s livelihood), advocated that state capital was more useful 
and reliable for national development than private capital. Hence, it was not surprising 
that the KMT monopolized the banking sector through SOBs and controlled key 
industrial sectors through state-owned enterprises (SOEs).    
As a result, private banks were relatively few and weak before 1991 on Taiwan. The 
only private banks which could exist were all with special considerations. The first 
kind of these banks was connected with overseas Chinese capital, composed of The 
Bank of Overseas Chinese and United World Chinese Commercial Bank. Their 
origins have been well explained in their official websites:  
“…was established with funds from overseas Chinese and domestic investors in 
response to the government‟s appeal for overseas Chinese to return and invest in 
financial institutions in Taiwan, and thereby help develop business and industry in 
general and overseas Chinese-invested enterprises in particular. ”202  
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 Sun Yat-sen was the founding father of the KMT and Republic of China. 
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 See the website of Bank of Overseas Chinese: http://www.booc.com.tw/english/about_us_1.asp  
(accessed April 9, 2007). The bank was acquired by Citi financial group in 2007 to become Citibank 
Taiwan Ltd. United World Chinese Commercial Bank had merged with Cathay United Bank in 2003. 
But similar statement has also been mentioned on the website of new merged bank in Chinese. See 
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At a time when Taiwan was short of foreign capital and the KMT regime was in 
competition with People‟s Republic of China (PRC) under the CCP for the favour of 
overseas Chinese from the 1950s to 1970s, the existence of private banks with 
overseas Chinese capital had its economic functions and symbolic meanings in 
politics.  
The second kind of private banks established in Taiwan before 1989 was those banks 
which used to have business operations in mainland China. Shanghai Commercial & 
Savings Bank (SCSB) and International Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) were 
under this category. The SCSB used to be the biggest private bank in mainland China. 
It transferred to Taiwan with the KMT regime after 1949. Its unique existence relied 
on its special past and sound relations with the KMT.
203
 As for the ICBC, it used to 
be called “Bank of China” and was a state-owned bank with origin traced back to the 
late Qing Dynasty. It was privatised in 1971 before the PRC replaced the Republic of 
China‟s (ROC) position in the United Nations for the fear that PRC might claim its 
ownership of the bank when Taiwan lost most official recognitions worldwide.
204
   
The third group of private banks before 1989 was composed of the private companies 
                                                                                                                                            
https://www.cathaybk.com.tw/cathaybk/about.asp (accessed April 9, 2007). 
203
 The current chairman of SCSB, Mr. Yung Hung-ching, comes from a legendary business family that 
has a successful business record for more than 100 years in China. The Yung family is still active in 
business in China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
204
 Nevertheless, as the government still held largest shares of the bank, the bank was still run by the 
government. 
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for mutual loans & savings. Although these companies were not called “banks”, they 
actually provided financial service to their members on savings and loans and worked 
liked cooperatives for decades in Taiwan. Following the promulgation of the revised 
Banking Law in 1975, these companies were required to transform into commercial 
banks for the purpose of providing financing assistance and guidance to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in specific regions. In other words, they all became 
regional SME banks. Totally, there were seven of this kind of regional SME banks 
and each of them was named after the place where its banking business was 
centred.
205
  
Overall, among the 24 domestic banks, 11 private banks existed before the entry of 
new private banks in 1991. But the actual influence of these private banks was much 
smaller than it appeared in the whole banking sector. As Table 5.1 shows, in terms of 
their assets shares among all financial institutions in the banking sector, they only 
represented less than 9 per cent. In contrast, the SOBs had almost 54 per cent. 
Likewise, the same applied to the foreign banks. Although there were 36 of them, 
their total assets only stood for less than 3 per cent.  
Apart from size and amount, in a heavily regulated banking industry, the scope of 
business of private banks was highly constrained too. For example, for the 7 regional 
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 For example, the one in Taichung was called “Taichung Business Bank.” 
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SME banks, they could only operate in certain administrative areas and the majority 
of their lending was required to target the SMEs. In addition, the kind of service the 
private banks could provide was also subject to the discretion of the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF). Normally, the SOBs, especially those with mainland origins, were 
given the widest scope of business and their service consisted of the most lucrative 
business like foreign exchange transactions and overseas business.
206
 
Table 5.1: Landscape of Taiwan’s banks in 1990 
 
 
Private Banks State-owned Banks 
Foreign 
Banks Overseas 
Chinese 
Mainland 
origin  
regional 
SME  
Mainland 
origin 
Pre-war origin others 
Name of 
banks 
1.Bank of  
Overseas 
Chinese 
2.United World  
Chinese 
Commercial 
Bank 
1.Shanghai  
Commercial 
& Savings 
Bank 
2.International 
Commercial 
Bank of 
China 
1.Taipei 
2.Hsinchu 
3.Taichung 
4.Tainan 
5.Kaohsiung 
6.Hualien 
7.Taitung 
 
 
 
1.Central Trust of 
China 
2.Chiao Tung 
Bank 
3.Farmers Bank of 
China 
 
1.Bank of Taiwan 
2.Land Bank of 
Taiwan 
3.Taiwan 
Cooperative 
Bank 
4.First Bank    
5.Hua Nan Bank     
6.Chang Hwa Bank 
7.Taiwan Business  
Bank 
1.Export-Import  
Bank of the ROC 
2. Taipei Bank. 
3.Bank of Kaohsiung 
 
 
Numbers 2 2 7 3 7 3 36 
Total 11 13 36 
Asset (%) *8.89 *53.68 *2.9 
Source: the author‟s collection  
* The asset percentages of different kind of banks among all the financial institutions in the banking sector. See 
Lee, Jih-chu “Taiwan kaifang minyin yinhang zhi jingyan yu zhanwang ”[Reflections on Taiwan‟s policies on new 
private banks ], December 2002, NPF Research Report, National Policy Foundation. The paper is available at 
http://www.npf.org.tw/PUBLICATION/FM/091/FM-R-091-063.htm (accessed April 11, 2007). 
In a word, the private banks played a far less significant role than the SOBs in 
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 It was a discrimination policy against those banks with pre-war origins in Taiwan. As the 
mainlanders controlled the KMT before the late 1980s, their favour of those banks with mainland 
origins was demonstrated in this kind of regulation for banks‟ business scope. See a critique to the 
policy in Huang, “Yi liang jiang shidai zhi jinrong zhimin zhengce” [Recall the financial colonialism 
under the KMT authoritarian rule].  
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Taiwan‟s banking sector before 1991. Except for these special cases, it was impossible 
to set up private banks under the KMT regime before the 1990s. 
1.2 Mounting pressures for lifting the ban    
Nevertheless, in the second half of the 1980s, the KMT government was under 
mounting pressures to open the closed, tight-controlled and state-dominated banking 
sector. The convergence of pressures from a number of sources forcefully pushed the 
KMT government to pursue economic liberalisation.
207
 But, for the sake of focus, 
here we will only concentrate on the part of emerging business influence, which had 
played an important role in pushing the government to lift the ban on entry of new 
private banks.  
After a long span of rapid and sustainable economic development for almost three 
decades, the rise of the business class seemed inevitable and in Cheng‟s terms, “the 
rapid growth had liberalizing social consequences that the KMT had not fully 
anticipated.”208 As he observed, economic take-off had led to tremendous social 
transformation:  
“With the economy taking off, Taiwan displayed the features common to all growing 
capitalist societies: the literacy rate increased; mass communication intensified; per 
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 These sources mainly included the US‟s strong requirement to open markets, rapid rise of political 
oppositions, emerging business power and a bubble economy. Please see details in Chapter 4. 
208
 Cheng, “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” 481. 
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capita income rose; and a differentiated urban sector-including labour, a professional 
middle class, and a business entrepreneurial class--came into being.”209  
Also, he noticed that  
“…the dynamic capitalist system had simply outgrown the regime's political 
capacity. …The ever-expanding civic and economic associations are simply beyond 
the capacity of the KMT to monitor, much less to control. Moreover, there is a limit to 
which the regime can penetrate internationally oriented organizations, such as the 
Junior Chambers of Commerce, the Lions Clubs, and the Rotary Clubs.”210  
In short, the business class had consolidated its economic power and gained its 
autonomy which was gradually beyond the KMT‟s control in the late 1980s.  
In fact, to be more specific, the business class could be further divided into two 
groups: the SMEs and big enterprises. For the SMEs, they had been the majority of 
the business class due to the KMT‟s distaste of big capital. Individually, they were 
relatively weak and unorganized. But because they had been less reliant on the 
protection, credit and other forms of assistance from the state for their development, 
and they were the main drivers for industrial production and exports, they were more 
capable of keeping a distance from the party-state under the KMT. As a result, 
without too much economic concern, the SMEs were more willing to defy the KMT 
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and join the anti-KMT forces as democratic movements picked up in the mid 1980s. 
Particularly, as the oppositions constantly appealed to economic fairness and 
dismantling the twisted economic structure dominated by the SOEs (including the 
SOBs) and KMT-run enterprises, the SMEs were inclined to lend their generous 
sympathy and support to the campaigns of the oppositions.
211
 
For the big enterprises, despite the KMT‟s deliberate repression, they gradually 
consolidated their business bases during the economic take-off. Although they were 
the minority inside the business class, politically they were more influential. They had 
tended to be in cooperation with the KMT in exchange of economic privilege and 
monopoly in certain industrial sectors such as textiles, food processing, cement and 
petrochemical inside the domestic markets. Due to this special partnership, they were 
inclined to give less support to democratic movements in the 1980s.
212
 But as their 
business expanded, the restricted sources of credit had gradually become an obstacle. 
They were longing for easier access to cheaper credit through diverse channels. 
Moreover, from their perspectives, the banking industry was lucrative after witnessing 
the huge profits made by the SOBs for decades.
213
 It was tempting for them to join 
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 Ibid, 481-486. 
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 According to Wang, there was not any public statement expressed by the big capitalists in support 
of democratic or social movements in the 1980s in Taiwan. See Wang, “Taiwan xin zhengshang quanxi 
de xingcheng yu zhengzhi zhuanxing” [The State, Capital, and Taiwan‟s Political Transition], 141. 
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 There are two indicators of a bank‟s performance: return on assets (ROA = Net Profits/Assets) and 
return on equality (ROE = Net Profits/Equity Capital). In 1990, before new private banks join, the 
average ROA of domestic banks was 0.9 per cent and the ROE was around 17 per cent. In comparison 
to international standards, these numbers were not bad. 
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the industry. Profit concerns aside, in their expectations, to own a bank would also 
both help diversify and expand their business territory, as well as facilitate their 
investment in the future.     
Overall, it appeared that to require the government to open the banking sector to new 
private players had gained wide support among the business class. Although the 
business class alone was not powerful enough to make a breakthrough, its support of 
lifting the ban on new private banks reinforced the given pressures that the KMT had 
encountered from multiple sources.  
1.3 From reluctance to eventual opening 
In spite of the widespread speculations that the KMT would consider to allow 
applications of new private banks, the KMT still could not make up its mind in 1988, 
a year before the financial “Big Bang.” In fact, the call for lifting the ban to new 
private banks had been formally suggested by a task force organized by the KMT 
government itself in 1985.
214
 The KMT delayed the reform until it was almost 
unlikely to hold it anymore. Yang proposed some reasons behind the reluctance.
215
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 The task force was called “Jingji gexin weiyuanhui” [The Committee for Economic Reform] and 
organized by the Executive Yuan. It was aimed to seek solutions for future economic reform based on 
common ground among government officials, business leaders and academics. 
215
 Yang, “Yinhang kaifang minying weihe youyu ” [Why does the government hesitate to open the 
banking sector? ], 121-122. The last two reasons were more related to the SOB privatisation. In Yang‟s 
paper, to open the banking sector indicated to allow new private banks to establish and to sell the SOBs 
to the private sector. 
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First, the KMT was concerned that the gap between rich and poor might become 
wider if some conglomerates controlled certain banks. It was likely that these 
conglomerates might abuse their positions and use the savings in their banks for their 
own investments. Second, the KMT was also worried that no banks would be willing 
to implement policy missions imposed by the government if they were private. In 
contrast, the SOBs were convenient and easy to control for this purpose. Third, recent 
cases had shown that private financial institutions were not as reliable as government 
ones. The incident of Tenth Credit Cooperative of Taipei in 1985 was a perfect 
example. In which, the private owner had constantly and deliberately violated related 
financial regulations by moving funds out of the credit cooperative for his own 
overstretched business ambition. Eventually, the credit cooperative collapsed amid a 
panic run on it, generating financial disorder and social turmoil. Four, the SOBs could 
provide massive annual revenues to the government. The loss of revenue after 
privation became a concern as well. Finally, the vested interests like current SOB 
employees and lawmakers who benefited from easy loans might be opposed to the 
reform. 
Two cabinet reshuffles after Lee Teng-hui took over the presidency from Chiang 
Ching-kuo created a window of opportunity for speeding up reform. With an eye to 
consolidate his vulnerable power and push reforms, President Lee Teng-hui 
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strategically undertook two cabinet reshuffles in 1988 and 1989. In the first reshuffle, 
he greatly changed the cabinet members of Yu Kuo-hua, the last premier under 
Chiang Ching-kuo. Then, in the second one, he was allied with Lee Huan, who was 
then the general secretary of the KMT, to force Yu to leave his post in May 1989. Yu 
had been criticized for not being able to effectively respond to the multiple challenges 
rising with the rapidly changing nation, undermining the image and popularity of the 
KMT. After Yu‟s resignation, Lee Huan became the new premier.  
The departure of Yu marked the decline of the conservative wing of policymakers on 
financial policies. Yu was the governor of the Central Bank from 1969 to 1984 before 
he became the premier from 1984 to 1989. Under his leadership for two decades, the 
prime goal of financial policies was always stability; reforms could only take place in 
a piecemeal way. Now that Yu and his affiliates had lost power, the new minister of 
finance Shirley W. Y Kuo, who took office in 1988, had less resistance in pushing 
large scale financial reform inside the administration. The draft of the revised version 
of the Banking Law finally surfaced in early 1989.  
While the draft contained many measures for banking reforms, the measure 
concerning the establishment of new private banks drew most public attention. The 
immediate reason for this heavy attention was an overheated economy in which the 
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public had unusually extra funds to engage in speculation investments. Due to the 
underdevelopment of capital markets and the stringent banking sector, people could 
only invest their money in limited items such as stocks, property, underground lottery 
and illegal investment companies. Many people suffered in the rush for wealth as 
related regulations and rules were not in place. The abrupt boom and bust of the 
illegal private investment companies was one of those disastrous examples. These 
companies attracted funds from the public with high return yields. Then they poured 
the pooled funds into highly speculative investments. But the formula could only 
work when the target investments were booming. If not, these companies collapsed 
immediately, not to mention those companies which were deliberately set up for 
financial fraud. It was widely believed that the KMT government was going to crack 
down on these illegal investment companies with updated regulations proposed in the 
new Banking Law. Also, the KMT was planning to address excessive money held by 
the public by luring them into the investments for new private banks. Given these 
concerns and the strong interest of business class mentioned earlier, the Legislative 
Yuan efficiently approved the revised Banking Law in July 1989. The gate to establish 
new private banks was finally opened. 
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2. Fading prudence (1989-1991) 
2.1 A prudential beginning 
As Taiwan was marching into democracy after the martial law was lifted in 1987 and 
the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, the state-business relations went through 
intricate and rapid transformation. The period from 1989 to 1991, in which the 
detailed rules, criteria and procedures for bidding new private bank licences were 
made and the final winners were revealed, indicated such a sea change.  
In the beginning, after the revised Banking Law was passed, the KMT government 
appeared to be prudent in handling issuing the licences to new private banks. It 
emphasized that it was the duty of the government to ensure that the upcoming new 
banks could be built and run upon sound basis from the very beginning. From its 
perspective, to run a bank involved public interest as the bank‟s funds came from the 
general public‟s savings. If something went wrong with a bank, the social impact 
would be huge and pervasive.  
Accordingly, the MOF set following tough guidelines as the major requirements and 
criteria of setting up a new private commercial bank:  
1. The required minimum capital to establish a new commercial bank is NT$10 billion. 
2. The maximum share holding that each individual person could possess is 5 per cent. 
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For the family members or associated enterprises of the same person, the ceiling of  
  their total share holdings of a new bank is 15 per cent.       
3. The qualifications of chief managers of a new bank have to meet the requirements  
  imposed by the MOF.
216
  
For the first rule, it was designed to make it difficult for applying the licences as the 
required minimum capital of NT$ 10 billion was quite high according to global 
standards. Ideally, the rule could hold some applicants back and significantly reduce 
the number of potential applicants. For the second, it was hoped to reduce the 
influence of certain business families or conglomerates over a new bank. The ceiling 
of share holdings could prevent a new bank from the capture of certain individuals or 
conglomerates. As for the third, it was aimed to ensure that all the new banks would 
be run by quality managers. In other words, professionalism in management and 
operation was regarded as one of the major means to guarantee a healthy development 
of a new bank in the future. 
Initially, most potential applicants seemed to be calm about these guidelines, for not 
many of them anticipated that the government would easily issue new licences. After 
all, the deregulation was the first big move that the KMT made to depart from its 
conservative past. It made sense for the KMT to adopt a cautious and gradual attitude 
                                                 
216
 For example, people who have criminal records of serious crimes or have not enough experience in 
the banking industry will not be allowed to become the high ranking managers of a new bank. See the 
whole requirements for applying a license to run a new private commercial bank at Ministry of Finance, 
“shangye yinhang sheli biaozhun” [Requirements for establishing a commercial bank]. 
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toward the issue. Therefore, instead of challenging these guidelines, all business 
groups which had interest in bidding for new bank licences began to undertake a large 
scale of mobilisation of resources and connections in an attempt to increase the 
likelihood of meeting the requirements and criteria for setting up a new private 
commercial bank and outperform their rivals . In the process of mobilisation, an 
“unusual” combination and cooperation among business tycoons, former government 
officials, lawmakers and even academics emerged.  
It was “unusual” because this kind of combination and cooperation used to operate in 
private and within the KMT control. In the past, the authoritarian regime was 
dominant over the private sector in their interactions. In appearance, the private sector 
had its chambers of commerce and associations in expressing its collective opinions 
and protecting its interest.
217
 It even had representatives in the Central Standing 
Committee (CSC) of KMT, the power centre of the party. But in reality, the leaders of 
those institutions were “chosen” by the KMT and the institutions ended up more like 
the KMT‟s tools to control and monitor their members. Meanwhile, the final decision 
of crucial policies in the CSC of KMT was up to the leaders of the KMT; the business 
representatives only played passive and minor roles. In short, business was 
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 The Chinese National Federation of Industries, the General Chamber of Commerce of the ROC and 
the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce were three main institutions of this kind 
during the KMT authoritarian rule before the 1990s. 
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subordinate to the state in terms of their power relationships.
218
 
Now it turned out that the business tycoons and their conglomerates were at the centre 
of all connections in mobilizing resources. Former government officials and 
legislators were not afraid to join the applications in a public way. What was more 
surprising was that the KMT did not see this phenomenon as a threat any more. All in 
all, these signs had shown the significant change of the state-business power 
relationships. The dominance of the state seemed to be in a transition to become 
history. 
2.2 The race of resource mobilization 
As of 12 October 1990, the deadline for applying new bank licenses, the MOF 
received 19 applications. The list of the applicants was a collection of well-known 
listed enterprises and influential politicians. It crystallized the consequence of 
intensive mobilization of resources and connections among business groups and 
political forces over the past one year. Basically, the main driving forces behind the 
mobilization were a host of conglomerates. To be more specific, as Table 5.2 shows, 
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 Dr. Guo Jiann-jong, a political economist trained in the UK, emphasized that this institutional 
arrangement to incorporate business representatives under the KMT party-state umbrella was an 
essential part of Taiwan‟s developmental state before 2000. From this perspective, he argued that the 
developmental state did not even exist under the DPP rule from 2000 to 2008 due to the DPP‟s lack of 
capacity to incorporate business interest and maintain its own autonomy at the same time. Dr. Guo 
offered this analysis in my interview in late 2004 as he was the Executive Officer of the Taiwan 
Thinktank. 
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some of them were more dominated by one single business family; some were more 
equally controlled among a number of business groups.
219
 However, the most unusual 
case was the KMT bank: Hua Shin. The KMT‟s business empire planned to expand 
into the banking industry by establishing its own bank. As the KMT was the ruling 
party, the public was concerned about how the MOF would handle the case. 
Table 5.2: The list of 19 applicants for new bank licences 
Name of the 
bank 
Chairman Chairman’s background Major driving forces 
Fubon Tsai Wan-tsai wealthy businessman the chairman‟s family 
Taishin Wu Dong-liang wealth businessman the chairman‟s family 
UNION  Lee Tsun-jing former government official the Lin family 
Far Eastern Hsu You-hsiang wealthy businessman the chairman‟s family 
Wan Tong Wu Tsun-shian wealthy businessman 
business groups with 
Tainan origins 
Cosmos  Hsu Sheng-fa wealthy businessman several business groups 
Bao Dao Chen Chong-guang wealthy businessman  several business groups 
Ta An Lu Run-kang former government official several business groups 
Ya Tai Chiu Chia-hsiung senior banker 
business groups based in 
Taichung 
Chung Sing Wang Yu-yun politician  the chairman‟s family 
Ta Chong Chen Tian-mao politician several business groups 
Chinese Wang You-tseng wealthy businessman  the chairman‟s family 
Fan Ya Hsieh Ren-dong senior banker the Yang family 
Hua Shin Lin Li-xin senior banker KMT 
E. SUN  Lin Chong-hsiung academic several business groups 
Fu Guo Lee Deng-mu wealthy businessman several business groups 
Hui Tong Tsai Wan-lin wealthy businessman the chairman‟s family 
Wu Chou Chen Si-ming former government official several business groups 
Lan Yang Liu Shi-cheng former government official several business groups 
Source: Tsaihsun [Wealth Magazine], November 1990, 155.  
Besides, the column of “chairman” also revealed some differences. Some chairmen 
were formally involved in politics and had close connections with the KMT. For 
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 Even until now, most enterprises in Taiwan are family-oriented. That is, a single family can control 
an enterprise in terms of ownership and management.  
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example, Hsu Sheng-fa, chairman of the Cosmos Bank, was the member of KMT‟s 
CSC. Wang Yu-yun, chairman of Chung Sing Bank, was the former KMT mayor of 
Kaohsiung. Chen Tian-mao, chairman of Ta Chong Bank, was the KMT speaker of 
Kaohsiung City Council. The characteristics of these chairmen were that they were 
politicians with massive personal family businesses. With both the advantage of 
political influence and personal wealth, they were hoping to have an upper hand in the 
race for new bank licenses.      
Some chairmen were retired government officials related to financial policies or 
management. For instance, Lu Run-kang chairman of Ta An Bank, was the former 
minister of finance. Chen Si-ming of Wu Chou Bank, Liu Shi-cheng of Lan Yang 
Bank and Lee Tsun-jing of UNION Bank were all with similar backgrounds. In most 
cases, they were invited by a handful of conglomerates in an attempt to promote the 
image of their banks to the public as “led by experienced professionals.” Meanwhile, 
it was also believed that former government officials had better knowledge toward 
how to apply for bank licences and their closer connections with current government 
officials who were supervising banking policies provided further advantages for their 
applications.   
With similar logic, some senior bankers were invited to head some new banks in the 
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run for licences. Normally, they were used to downplay the influence imposed by the 
business families behind their banks. It was frequently claimed that their banks were 
not subject to any business family. Instead, their banks were in professional hands. To 
have senior bankers as the chairmen of their banks was the best justification. Chiu 
Chia-hsiung, chairman of Ya Tai Bank and Hsieh Ren-dong, chairman of Fan Ya Bank, 
were examples of such cases. 
Nonetheless, for some business families, they cared less about the professional 
qualifications of their chairmen. For, according to official requirements, it was 
compulsory to have senior bankers as the general managers of all new banks. Hence, 
they just chose to have the current leaders of their business families as the heads of 
their banks. Tsai Wan-tsai, chairman of Fubon Bank, Wu Dong-liang, chairman of 
Taishin Bank, Hsu You-hsiang, chairman of Far Eastern Bank, Wu Tsun-shian, 
chairman of Wan Tong Bank, Wang You-tseng, chairman of the Chinese Bank and 
Tsai Wan-lin, chairman of Hui Tong Bank were all examples. 
In short, in order to outperform their rivals and meet the requirements for new bank 
licences set by the government, all the applicants had done their best to mobilize 
resources to organize their best teams to deal with the MOF. But before the winners 
were formally revealed, very few people expected that the KMT government would 
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allow a large number of new private players to enter the banking sector. 
2.3 A surprisingly wide open: shift of power relationships 
On 26 June 1991, after almost 9 months of preparation, examination and speculation, 
the MOF finally announced the winners of new bank licences. To everyone‟s surprise, 
15 out of 19 applicants were granted licences. The amount was much higher than 
expected. For the new Minister of Finance Wang Jian-hsuan, who took office in June 
1990 after the third cabinet reshuffle since Lee Teng-hui took presidency in 1988, had 
revealed mixing messages before the final result was unveiled. By sticking to the 
original tone of prudence that the MOF had shown on the issue of new bank licences, 
Wang firstly said that he considered issuing 3 to 5 licences of new banks. Then on the 
eve of unveiling winners of new bank licences, he claimed that there would be more 
winners than everyone expected. Still, the list of 15 winners of new bank licences 
shocked the public. After all, to let more than 80 per cent of applicants pass meant that 
the MOF‟s review was not serious at all. The causes behind the policy shift and the 
implications of the final list of winners need further analysis.  
From the inside story revealed by the press,
220
 which was also confirmed by my own 
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 See the story reported by Chen, “Wang Jian-hsuan hezhun shiwu jia xinyinhang neimu”[The inside 
story of Wang‟s approval of 15 new private banks], 80-85. 
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research interviews with two former government officials
221
 who were involved in 
the application review of new private banks, it showed that Wang Jian-hsuan was the 
key person in making the decision to have more entries of new private banks than 
initially planned. While it was not very clear why Wang made the decision, two levels 
of analysis, micro and macro, for possible explanations were frequently mentioned. 
From a micro analysis, emphasis was placed on Wang‟s personal characteristics and 
attitude. During Wang‟s term as Minister of Finance for 26 months, he portrayed 
himself as a man of conviction --- a government official who defended public interest 
and dared to defy the pressures from vested interests, conglomerates in particular. Due 
to this stance, it was argued that he disliked the way that some conglomerates tried to 
make huge profit through manipulating share prices by establishing their own banks. 
In an attempt to “punish” these conglomerates, he deliberately allowed 
more-than-expected new banks to enter the banking sector at the same time.
222
 The 
rationale was that as the supply of new bank stocks was excessive, there would be 
smaller room for a surge of share prices of the new banks.   
By contrast, a macro analysis put its focus on the shift of power relationships between 
the state and the business. Observers had noticed a subtle adjustment in which the 
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 They are Mr. Lin Shih-lang and Mr. Wang Chun-chih. The interviews were made in September 
2004. 
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 Hsu, “Xintuoye gaizhi chongji zhi duoshao?” [What is the impact of transforming 
investment trust companies into commercial banks?], 269-270. 
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state began to take a more conciliatory approach towards the business. In Wang 
Jenn-hwan‟s terms, the adjustment was to upgrade the capitalists‟ power position from 
a subordinate role “like sons of the KMT” to “junior partners.”223 In other words, as 
the KMT was still in charge in its power relationships with the capitalists, the 
capitalist had enjoyed more power than before. From this perspective, Wang 
Jian-hsuan‟s wide open policy to new private banks was just one of those examples 
that showed the ascendance of the capitalists during Taiwan‟s democratisation in the 
early 1990s. 
A reporter had similar observation after she had followed the development of the new 
bank policy until the list of license winners was officially revealed:  
“The final results show that the MOF made the decision with political considerations. 
It is a product of being „strict in reviewing but loose in issuing‟ the licenses. …The 
technocrats [in the MOF] wanted to resist outside interventions and pressures with 
strict and objective criteria in reviewing the application cases for new bank licenses. 
But the political environment has changed [and made it unlikely]. … A high-ranking 
official with duty in financial policy has revealed: „The MOF was under enormously 
invisible pressures to issue so many licences.‟ ”224  
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 Wang, “Taiwan xin zhengshang quanxi de xingcheng yu zhengzhi zhuanxing” [The State, Capital, 
and Taiwan‟s Political Transition], 151. 
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 Yeh, “Congkuan fangxing duobiao yinhang ye you shiluogan --- zhengce yunzuo sannian lijing 
sanren caizhang juece yibian zaibian” [Even winners of new bank licenses are not happy with the 
wild-open policy --- financial policy-making swung all the way through three ministers of finance over 
three years].  
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The reporter concluded her report by questioning the MOF: 
“Why are we forced to accept the reality when we all hate money politics? Why are 
we all somehow disappointed with the result when we anticipated so much from the 
entry of new banks in the first place? The MOF owes the public an explanation.”225 
With hindsight, I prefer to take side with the macro analysis. While Wang Jian-hsuan 
might really have made the decision for the purpose of “punishing” the conglomerates 
which applied for new bank licences, the consequence suggests otherwise. Most 
conglomerates were delightedly to get what they wanted and lost nothing. Although 
they might not be able to earn a lot from their banks‟ share prices; their dreams to 
have their own banks were fulfilled. That was why some interpreted Wang‟s decision 
as a concession to conglomerates, far from a punishment. They accused him of being 
incapable of resisting the strong lobby pressures from various business groups and 
political forces which were behind the applicants‟ bid for new bank licences.226  
On top of that, the micro analysis is inclined to miss the bigger picture of the whole 
event especially considering what had occurred to Wang Jian-hsuan afterwards. Wang 
was forced to resign in October 1992. The main reason of his departure was that his 
tax reform measures had caused a backlash from the business community. It proved 
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 Professor Chen Po-chi from the Department of Economics at National Taiwan University provided 
this viewpoint in my interview. Professor Chen was close to President Lee Teng-hui as an economic 
policy adviser. The interview was made in July 2004.  
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that the KMT would rather appease the capitalists than support a reform-minded 
minister of finance. From this angle, even if Wang‟s decision on new private banks 
was really intended to “punish” conglomerates, the consequence of his policy was 
ironically in line with the main trend where the KMT was courting the business class 
to consolidate its ruling position.  
Indeed, from the race of resource mobilization during the bidding process for licences 
to the eventual wide open for new entries and Wang‟s short stay in office, it is difficult 
not to conclude that the KMT was giving away its original ground of confidence and 
prudence on the issue of new private banks. The growing influence of business class 
had reached a new height. 
3. Struggling with the aftermath (1992-2008) 
3.1 The KMT era (1992-2000) 
It was until the late 1990s when negative effects of excessive supply of loan providers 
were too obvious to ignore that the KMT government began to face up the issue of 
over-banking. But before it could adopt further essential measures on reducing the 
number of domestic banks, it was defeated by the DPP in 2000 presidential elections. 
On the whole, the KMT was busy struggling with the aftermath of its wide open 
policy on new private banks for most of the 1990s.    
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Shortly after the entry of 15 new private banks, the KMT government anticipated the 
arrival of intensified competition among banking institutions. But its focus was on 
other existing banking institutions - trust & investment companies
227
 and credit 
cooperatives. It estimated that they would suffer in the fierce competitions after the 
addition of 15 new private banks. In order to alleviate their sufferings and making 
them to compete with commercial banks on a more equal basis, the MOF suggested 
them to upgrade into or merge with commercial banks. As a result, the amount of 
domestic banks began to swell like a balloon from 1991 to 2000.  
As Table 5.3 indicates, before the lifting of the ban on new private banks, there were 
25 domestic banks in 1991. Then, with the addition of 15 new banks in 1992, 
followed by the upgrading of a host of trust & investment companies and credit 
cooperatives into commercial banks between 1993 and 2000, the total amount of 
domestic banks arrived at a record new high --- 53. That is, in just one decade, the 
number of domestic banks in Taiwan had been doubled. While the MOF put its efforts 
on upgrading disadvantaged players over the years, it did nothing to address the 
continuing increase of banks.   
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 Before the 1990s, the KMT allowed 8 trust & investment companies to undertake banking services 
for mid and long-term industrial projects. Unlike commercial banks, they could not receive deposits 
from the public and had narrower scope of business. Still, they became one of the alternative channels 
for the private sector to take part in the banking industry as the licences for private commercial banks 
were banned.  
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Table 5.3: Number of Financial Institutions (1991-2008) 
Year 
Domestic 
Banks 
Foreign 
Banks 
Credit 
Cooperatives 
Credit 
Departments 
of Farmer's 
Associations 
Credit 
Departments 
of  
Fishermen's 
Associations 
Trust and 
Investment 
Companies 
Bills 
Finance 
Companies 
Postal 
Savings 
System 
1991 25 36 74 285 26 8 3 1 
1992 40 36 74 285 27 7 3 1 
1993 41 37 74 285 27 7 3 1 
1994 42 37 74 285 27 6 3 1 
1995 42 38 73 285 27 5 10 1 
1996 42 41 73 285 27 5 12 1 
1997 47 45 64 287 27 5 14 1 
1998 48 46 54 287 27 4 16 1 
1999 52 41 50 287 27 3 16 1 
2000 53 39 48 287 27 3 16 1 
2001 53 38 39 260 25 3 15 1 
2002 52 36 37 253 25 3 14 1 
2003 50 36 35 253 25 3 14 1 
2004 49 35 32 254 25 3 14 1 
2005 45 36 29 253 25 2 14 1 
2006 42 33 28 253 25 2 12 1 
2007 39 32 27 261 25 1 12 1 
2008 37 32 27 264 25 - 10 1 
Source: Financial Statistics Monthly, Central Bank, Taiwan 
The negative effects of the reckless increase of banks firstly emerged in the mid 1990s 
as runs on financial institutions surged, and developed into a looming banking crisis at 
the turn of the century. The runs on financial institutions mainly occurred to the credit 
cooperatives and rural credit unions. As they were largely community-based, smaller 
in assets and narrower in business scope, it was not surprising to see that they were 
the first victims of the expansion of commercial banks. As for the looming banking 
crisis, it involved almost all banking institutions while their average level of NPLs 
soared across the board. Not surprisingly, people blamed over-banking for the NPL 
crisis. Due to intensified competition, many banks had loosened their reviews and 
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requirements for clients in need of loans. Consequently, some shaky clients got loans 
that originally were unavailable and put their loan providers at high risk. The risk was 
most likely to be exposed when economic downturns hit, for those shaky clients 
tended to become insolvent during economic recessions. As they had difficulty in 
paying back their loans, their banks had to bear the burden of mounting NPLs.
228
   
But we cannot help asking – what had contributed to the late response of the KMT to 
the problem of over-banking? How can we explain why the KMT was “blind” to the 
continuing increase of banks after the entry of 15 new banks? I argue that the 
evolving domestic politics under rapid democratisation was still the key to these 
questions. 
Firstly, as the KMT tried to adapt to the new political landscape shaped by rapid 
democratisation, it gradually lost its long-term vision and consistency on key financial 
policies. Since the very beginning, there had been no shortage of advice from some 
technocrats inside the KMT administration about the proper sequence of financial 
liberalisation
229
 --- to finish SOB privatisation before lifting ban on new private 
banks --- and adequate number of new private banks, the KMT somehow did not heed 
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 The next chapter will have more detailed and complete analysis of the NPL crisis. Here I just 
briefly touch upon the issue.  
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 For example, the late governor of the Central Bank, Liang Kuo-shu, had repeatedly argued for the 
proper sequence of banking liberalisation and the importance of banking supervision. Most of his 
policy advice and analysis can be found in the collection of his speeches and papers in Chu, Liang 
Kuo-shu xiansheng lunwenji [The volume of the works of Mr. Liang Kuo-shu]. 
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these advices. Instead, it just followed what was more acceptable in a new political 
environment without trying hard enough to stick to its ground.  
Actually, right after the announcement of the list of new bank licenses, the deputy 
minister of finance Lai Ying-chao had confessed to the press about the difficult 
situation the MOF facing in addressing liberalisation of the banking sector: 
“The MOF knew the [liberalisation] sequence was problematic. … But considering 
the potential conflict between the central and the local government [TPG], we gave up 
the idea to privatise SOBs before lift bans on the entry of new private commercial 
banks. There were too many problems regarding SOB privatisation while the issue of 
new private commercial banks could not be held any longer. Under such 
circumstances, The MOF could only address the latter first.”230 
Lai‟s talk confirmed that the MOF knew a better best way to handle financial 
liberalisation at that time but could only chose an easier way not. 
To compare the trajectories of the policies on SOB privatisation and new private 
banks could further highlight this point. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
SOB privatisation had been halted until 1998 for almost one decade due to the 
constant opposition not only from the DPP but also inside the KMT at various levels 
of governments and legislatures. In contrast, the decision to lift the ban on new private 
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 Lai made the talk in an interview with a reporter. See You, “Fangdu jinrong biduan caibu jiang 
zengshe fanghuoqiang” [The MOF will establish firewalls to keep financial frauds at bay]. 
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banks, which was proposed at the same time, came to reality in less than three years. 
The key behind the huge difference of reform speed was simply that there was no 
obvious and strong opposition in the latter case. 
To encourage trust & investment companies and credit cooperatives to transform into 
commercial banks was another example. The issue hardly faced any resistance as both 
the KMT and DPP shared a common ground despite for different reasons. For the 
KMT, the case was to “kill two birds with one stone.” On the one hand, the measure 
did help those disadvantaged players in a sense. On the other hand, it was responding 
to the intensive petitions made by the owners of trust & investment companies and 
credit cooperatives, many of which were close to the KMT. For the DPP, like its 
stance on SOB privatisation, it seemed to prefer market forces to state interventions in 
achieving an ideal arrangement for the banking sector. From this perspective, it had 
been in favour of seeing a more deregulated banking sector which was beyond the 
control of the KMT. Accordingly, it found no ground to oppose the upgrading of trust 
& investment companies and credit cooperatives into commercial banks. Besides, 
considering many credit cooperatives had close connections with local factions loyal 
to the KMT, the DPP was happy to see them conform more to market discipline than 
to local factions by upgrading into commercial banks. 
  149 
Secondly, due to its concerns of financial stability and political alliances, the KMT 
was reluctant to fundamentally deal with the inconvenient truth - some banks and 
financial institutions had to leave the market. In theory, as more players join the 
market, the market forces will dictate which can survive. Eventually, the market will 
automatically reach its own optimum arrangement. In practice, however, this did not 
happen to the new banking sector under the KMT rule in the 1990s. Out of the 
concern of financial stability,
231
 the KMT never allowed any financial institution to 
become bankrupt. It would take prompt measures to bail out those troubled financial 
institutions when they were on the edge of insolvency. Consequently, no failed 
financial institutions would exit the market through market mechanism.  
Financial stability aside, the KMT‟s political concerns also constrained itself from 
taking aggressive measures in the early stages towards some troubled financial 
institutions, whose owners or major stakeholders happened to be the business tycoons, 
politicians or local faction leaders close to the KMT. In the face of its political 
partners, the KMT constantly showed hesitation and lenience in conducting financial 
supervision. It was often blamed for not being able to detect irregularity in advance or 
its failure to solve problems effectively before it was too late. Table 5.4 shows some 
notorious cases as examples to highlight the strong KMT connections with troubled 
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 As mentioned earlier, due to its memory of social disorder triggered by hyperinflation during the 
Chinese civil war with the CCP, the KMT had been unwilling to see any sign of financial turmoil. 
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financial institutions.
232
  
In a word, after lifting the ban on establishing new private banks, the KMT did not try 
to really address the problem of an overcrowded banking sector. Although it did try to 
help some disadvantageous players by encouraging them to upgrade into commercial 
banks, this did not alleviate excessive competition brought by over-banking. The 
failure of the KMT in handling new private banks lay in its attempts to maintain its 
ruling power in Taiwan‟s democratic transition. By avoiding addressing the real issue 
and exerting lax regulation on its power partners, the KMT made the banking sector 
deteriorate in less than one decade after its open policy on new private banks.  
Table 5.4: The KMT factor in some troubled financial institutions 
Case/Year of outbreak Mastermind KMT connections Main crimes 
Chungsing Bank 
(2000) 
Wang Yu-yun KMT local faction leader in 
Kaohsiung city 
illegal loans 
Taichung Business Bank 
(1998) 
Liu Sung-fan KMT local faction leader in 
Taichung county and 
Legislative Yuan speaker 
illegal loans 
 
Tungkang Credit Cooperative 
(1999) 
Kuo Ting-tsai KMT local faction leader 
and legislator in Pingtung 
county 
illegal loans, 
embezzlement 
3.2 The DPP era (2000-2008) 
In contrast to the lasting delay of the KMT in overhauling the banking sector 
generally and new private banks particularly, the DPP had shown an active attitude in 
                                                 
232 For this issue is closely related to the NPL crisis, there will be more details and explanations about 
how the KMT connections have undermined financial supervision of the state in Chapter 6. Also, to 
find more similar cases, please see official investigations at: The Control Yuan, Woguo jinrong guoji 
jingzhengli zongtijian diaocha baogao [An Investigation of Taiwan‟s Financial Competitiveness]. 
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seeking effective solutions on both issues after it ascended to power for the first time 
in 2000.
233
 With the concern of the possible breakout of a NPL crisis, President Chen 
Shui-bian devoted his first term in office from 2000 to 2004 in launching large scale 
financial reforms on reducing the NPLs, encouraging mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
among financial institutions, and streamlining the financial regulations and governing 
agencies for financial supervision. Except for the U-turn on reforming the rural credit 
unions,
234
 basically President Chen had achieved most of his reform targets by the 
end of his first term.
235
       
In spite of these achievements, President Chen and the DPP had been under attack 
regarding their way of handling the second stage of financial reform launched in 
October 2004.
236
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, the critics had accused the 
DPP government of helping some family business groups expand their financial 
empires by selling shares of government-controlled banks to them with a low price. 
They claimed that the so-called “second stage of financial reform” was just a disguise 
for the irregular interactions between the DPP and those family business groups. They 
                                                 
233
 To know more about why the DPP was active on these issues and how it addressed them, please see 
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 Why the DPP failed to stick to its reform on rural credit unions will be the topic of Chapter 7. 
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 Please see the details of the reform measures and their results in the previous chapter. 
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 The four goals of the second stage of financial reform were to have at least three financial 
institutions with at least 10 per cent of the market; decrease the number of government-run banks to six; 
cut by half the number of financial holding companies; and have at least one financial institution with 
foreign management or listed on a foreign stock exchange. President Chen recalled these goals in a 
speech in May 2007 and insisted the direction of the reform was correct in spite of some flaws. See the 
full text on the official website of the Office of the President:  
http://www.president.gov.tw/en/prog/news_release/document_content.php?id=1105499424&pre_id=1105499424&g_category_n
umber=145&category_number_2=145 (accessed May 23, 2007). 
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worried that a small number of capitalists were going to control the major part of 
Taiwan‟s financial sector, impeding the public interest.237   
While this kind of criticism might be overstated, its effects were big enough to force 
the DPP to put the brakes on its reform efforts in April 2006. On behalf of the 
government, Vice Premier Tsai Ing-wen announced abandoning the original reform 
timetable but still claimed that the government's policy of encouraging financial 
consolidation would remain unchanged.
238
 The statement was widely interpreted as 
the formal admission of the DPP that some of its reform targets had been impractical 
and unattainable.
239
 Obviously, in comparison with its first stage of financial reform 
of 2000-2004, the DPP stumbled badly in the second one. Why did the DPP, with a 
solid record in the previous reform, ended up failing in this way in its second term? 
Most importantly, as briefly mentioned in the final part of the previous chapter, the 
DPP lost the battle in winning the approval of the public. In face of a public which 
still had fresh memory of the dark side of government-business relationship --- “the 
black gold politics” --- under the previous government of KMT, the DPP was too 
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 This kind of criticisms are quite common in some media on Taiwan since late 2005 after the DPP 
government failed to reach a deal with a private bank in bidding a government-controlled bank. See 
one of the typical examples of this kind of criticism at the editorial of Chungkuo shihpao [China Times]: 
“Zhe jiu shi Taiwan de „erci jingai‟?” [Is this what we call „the second stage of financial reform‟ in 
Taiwan?].  
238
 Chiu, “Fuyuan dingdiao ercih jingai cai shache” [The DPP administration has set the tone to put a 
brake on the second stage of financial reform]. 
239
 For example, see the editorial of Taipei Times on the issue: “Retake on financial reform needed.” 
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confident in its ability to avoid similar concern. While most people agreed with the 
direction of the reform --- the nation's fragmented industry needs further consolidation 
to stay competitive --- the DPP did not realize that the public was not ready to accept 
a financial industry dominated by a small number of private business groups. It 
wrongly assumed that it had a strong mandate in a rush to release the shares of those 
financial institutions under its control. It ignored the fact that a strong intervention by 
the government in forcing state-controlled banks to sell their shares to the private 
sector in just two years could easily raise speculations on the real motives behind the 
reform. 
Besides, the reform mandate of the ruling DPP was declining due to the corruption 
allegations involved with the aides and the members of the first family of President 
Chen. Since the rise of the issue in April 2006, it led to prosecution of several related 
members and huge street rallies against President Chen‟s stay in power in late 2006 
and 2007. But in terms of the setback of the second stage of financial reform, I do not 
want to lay too much emphasis on this factor. For the reform was already suspended 
before the corruption issue turned into political chaos and stalemate months later. Still, 
the undermined mandate of the DPP made it less likely for the DPP to resume the 
reform in its final two years in power until May 2008.   
  154 
The public concern regarding the likely dominance of the private business groups in 
the financial sector had its roots in a broader context shaped by recent economic and 
political development over the past years. Economically, as Table 5.5 shows, 
Taiwan‟s economy significantly slowed down after 2001 while the household income 
gaps were widening. On the one hand, the average gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth rate dropped to 3.12 per cent in 2001-2005 from 6.51 per cent in 1991-2000. 
Meanwhile, the growth of GDP per capita also faced a bottleneck. After it reached the 
highest point record at US$14,519 in 2000, it dropped with economic downturns from 
2001 to 2003. It only began to regain momentum of growth in 2004 and made a 
breakthrough in 2005. Still, after five years of efforts, the GDP per capita only had a 
slight increase of nearly US$700.  
On the other hand, as the fourth column of Table 5.5 indicates, income distribution 
was worsening against the backdrop of lacklustre economic growth from 2001 to 
2005. The disposable incomes of the households at the top 20 per cent were at least 6 
times higher than those at the bottom 20 per cent, while it was within 5.6 times for the 
whole 1990s. At a time when the general income increase nearly stagnated but the 
wealthy was accumulating more wealth, there was no wonder that people were highly 
sensitive to the issues which had potential to favour a small number of family 
business groups.   
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Table 5.5: Three main economic indicators of Taiwan (1989-2005) 
End of Period GDP Growth 
Rate（per cent） 
GDP Per Capita 
(US$) 
* Gap of 
Household 
Disposable Income  
1989 8.45 7634 4.94 
1990 5.70 8132 5.18 
1991 7.58 9008 4.97 
1992 7.85 10589 5.24 
1993 6.90 11077 5.42 
1994 7.39 11991 5.38 
1995 6.49 12906 5.34 
1996 6.30 13527 5.40 
1997 6.59 13904 5.41 
1998 4.55 12679 5.51 
1999 5.75 13609 5.50 
2000 5.77 14519 5.55 
2001 - 2.17 13093 6.39 
2002 4.25 13163 6.16 
2003 3.43 13327 6.07 
2004 6.07 14271 6.03 
2005 4.03 15291 6.04 
*Ratio of income share of highest 20 per cent to that of lowest 20 per cent 
Source: Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan 
The growing anxiety of the public over the aggressive mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) undertaken by the conglomerates could be further sensed from the popular 
discourse of “M-shade society.” The discourse originally came from Kenichi Ohmae, 
a Japanese business strategist and writer. He argued that the new global economy had 
huge effects on Japan's domestic distribution of wealth since 1985. As those who 
could adapt to the new global economy were getting wealthy, the middle class was 
rapidly shrinking in two directions. A few among the class could ascend to the upper 
class by following the trend while the majority of the class sank to the lower classes 
due to their inability to adapt. Consequently, an “M-shade society” emerged, where 
Above 6  3.12 in average  
6.51 in average 
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the middle class collapsed while the lower classes expanded in one extreme and the 
upper class in the other. Since Ohmae's book was translated into Chinese in 2006,
240
 
the notion of “M-shade society” soon became a buzz word in Taiwan. At the centre of 
the discussion was whether Taiwan was shifting to an “M-shade society” like Japan 
and how to deal with its coming. Quite frequently, the intensive M&A in the financial 
sector was cited as one of the strong signs to justify that Taiwan was following 
Japan‟s suit.241   
Finally, on the political front, it was not news that the DPP constantly had difficulty in 
pushing through its agenda as the opposition parties controlled the Legislative Yuan 
with a slim majority. In this case, the opposition parties as usual seized the 
opportunity to attack the DPP, reinforcing the related criticisms on the media and the 
influence of “M-shade society” discourse. Thus, unlike its success in the first stage of 
financial reform, the DPP could not overcome its minority status in the Legislative 
Yuan for the lack of support from the press and the public. Again, this proves the 
importance of strong support from the public opinion to the ruling DPP in pushing 
through its reform agenda under divided government. 
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 Ohmae, M-xing shehui [M-shade society].  
241
 Kuang, “M-xing shehui lai le!” [M-shade society is coming!].  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, the case of new private bank policies confirms again the key role 
played by domestic politics during the rapid democratisation in shaping banking 
reform and financial governance in Taiwan since the late 1980s.  
In the KMT era, the KMT was initially forced to open the tightly controlled banking 
sector due to multiple challenges in politics and the economy. Among which, the 
rising business class played a crucial role. Although the KMT had tried to ensure a 
prudent opening in the first place, its efforts stumbled in a surprisingly wide opening. 
Since then, the KMT was not only incapable of effectively managing these new banks 
but even encouraged more other banking institutions to upgrade into commercial 
banks, creating constant financial turmoil like bank runs and mounting NPLs. One of 
the key factors for the KMT‟s failure in maintaining a prudent open and managing the 
new private banks was its concern of staying in power in a new political environment. 
In the face of growing challenges from the DPP, whose gains of all votes in various 
national elections gradually consolidated at around 38 per cent in average, the KMT 
needed to ally itself with local factions and business groups to sustain its ruling status. 
As many of its allies were involved in some new private banks or other financial 
institutions, the KMT was forced to adjust financial policies and exert lenient 
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financial supervision.  
In the DPP era, the DPP‟s first time in power brought mixed results on the issue of 
new private banks. On the one hand, despite its lack of majority in the Legislative 
Yuan, the DPP managed to defuse the NPL crisis and created a relatively friendly 
environment for M&A among financial institutions with the support of public opinion. 
On the other hand, the DPP‟s later rush to consolidate the banking sector by releasing 
shares of state-controlled financial institutions raised public concern about the 
domination of private business groups in the financial sector. After its failure in 
addressing the public concern, the DPP was forced to terminate its efforts in 
encouraging the private players to undertake M&A with state-controlled financial 
institutions.  
To sum up, if the main function of the developmental state was effective economic 
governance in the pursuit of long-term national interest through competent 
technocrats enjoying high autonomy, we can say that it was not the case for the KMT 
regime in terms of its policies on new private banks in the 1990s. The imperative to 
prevail in a new political environment shaped by rapid democratisation had 
undermined the KMT regime‟s capacity and autonomy in dealing with the issue. As 
for the DPP, its initial success in overhauling the financial sector seemed to 
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demonstrate that the developmental state was slightly recovering. But its failure in 
pushing for consolidating the banking sector in later years made the recovery 
diminished. Looking ahead, no matter which party is in power, one of the most 
critical issues of the state‟s financial governance on the private financial institutions is 
--- how to effectively integrate different reform opinion and reach consensus on the 
role played by the new private financial institutions in the financial sector. There is no 
doubt that the developmental state in Taiwan is still facing tremendous challenges and 
tests in a democratic era. 
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Chapter Six 
The Rise and Fall of the Bad Debt Storm (1998-2004) 
Taiwan‟s non-performing loan (NPL)242 crisis emerged in late 1998, peaked in March 
2002 and virtually subsided in 2004. In terms of its scale and impact, it was not as 
huge and devastating as what other East Asian countries suffered in the regional 
financial crisis of 1997-98. From the domestic perspective, however, it was the 
biggest and most systemic banking crisis in the post-war financial history of Taiwan. 
Why such an unusual crisis erupted in the late 1990s and how it was effectively 
controlled between 2000 and 2004 are the two main questions that this chapter aims to 
address. 
The importance of these questions can be further highlighted with three related and 
crucial issues in the evolution of Taiwan‟s political economy. First, given the stronger 
power position that KMT had in the 1990s, why did it fail to prevent the crisis from 
happening? To put it another way, why it was not able to keep the crisis at bay after it 
finally erupted? Second, in contrast, how could the much weaker DPP, in power after 
May 2000, defuse the crisis more efficiently than expected, as it lacked a majority in 
parliament? To be more specific, as the DPP was struggling to push through its 
                                                 
242
 See the NPL definition at footnote 1 on page 4 of the thesis. 
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policies under divided government, how could it make a difference in disposing of 
bad loans in the banking sector? Third, to go back to the discussion on the status of 
the developmental state in Taiwan, can we still contend the decline or demise of the 
developmental state after the DPP government effectively staved off the banking 
crisis? The case provides us fresh material to reflect on the evolution and prospect of 
Taiwan‟s developmental state. Thus, unlike the two previous case chapters, which 
mainly focus on the declining side of Taiwan‟s developmental state in handling 
financial reform and governance since the late 1980s, this chapter uses a more recent 
case – the rise and fall of the NPL crisis – to demonstrate a more balanced diagnosis.  
Accordingly, the rest of the chapter is divided into three parts for further examination. 
The first part is a brief overview of the bad debt crisis from its onset to its end. With 
this introduction as a base, the next two parts are in response to the two major 
questions of the chapter. Firstly, I discuss what contributed to the NPL crisis. Through 
a brief review, I find that the current literature has rightly pointed out the key factors: 
the state‟s mishandling of financial liberalisation in the initial stages over the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, I also notice a missing part in the existing literature – a reasonable 
explanation of why the state went wrong. The alternative, I propose, is to explore the 
politics behind the state‟s failure in tackling financial liberalisation. My focus, again, 
is on how democratisation affected financial governance of the ruling KMT in the 
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1990s and how this led to a NPL crisis. With a view to demonstrate the argument, 
three main political sources of irregular increase of bad loans are examined in detail: 
over-banking, political loans and lax financial supervision. On top of that, new 
variables emerge in this particular case. I will argue that economic globalisation and 
cross-strait relations exacerbated the crisis and made it more difficult for the state to 
confine damage.  
Then the final part of the chapter sheds some light on the causes of the “unexpected” 
effectiveness of the DPP in tackling the looming NPL crisis. It is argued that a 
crisis-driven mandate, resulting from the public‟s deep fear of financial chaos, 
effectively strengthened the state‟s autonomy and capacity to address the crisis. Thus, 
even though the DPP was in a weaker position of power than its predecessor the KMT, 
it significantly benefited from the mandate to defuse the crisis with boosted 
legitimacy.    
1. The bad debt crisis 
Almost no one expected that Taiwan would show signs of surging NPLs before late 
1998. At the time, Taiwan was still praised by the international media as an economy 
strong enough to weather the East Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998.
243
 Ironically, 
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 Economist, “In Praise of Paranoia.” 
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all of a sudden, at the end of 1998, a bad debt crisis was looming. As Figure 6.1 
shows, Taiwan‟s NPL ratio spiked to 4.93 per cent, nearly touching the alert line of 5 
per cent. The total amount of NPLs jumped to NT$ 730.3 billion from NT$ 586.5 
billion of the previous year. The immediate cause for the surge in NPLs was a series 
of outbreaks of financial turmoil in some publicly listed companies. Owing to their 
high leverage of financing on reckless investments, those listed companies were 
vulnerable to the unexpected economic slowdown at that time. As they ran into 
financial troubles, their loan providers were immediately dragged into the storm. In 
response, those loan providers, in a panic to reduce losses, instantly restricted their 
credit and managed to liquidate the collateral behind the overdue loans. But this only 
made the whole situation even worse. On the one hand, the measures of tightening 
credit led to a general credit crunch, which in turn further discouraged economic 
activities and thus delayed economic recovery. On the other hand, the rush to 
liquidate collaterals of loans against a backdrop of a sluggish economy only made the 
value of collateral drop further. Eventually, the NPL problems, instead of being 
alleviated, deteriorated further.  
Under such circumstances, not only did the overall level of NPLs in the banking 
sector continue to escalate but also public concern over the stability of the financial 
system in general. A number of financial institutions even experienced panic runs as 
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their depositors worried about the potential crisis of insolvency. In order to restore 
public confidence, the government under the KMT took prompt measures to relieve 
the situation. It instructed the state-controlled financial institutions to take over the 
troubled ones. Also, it interfered in the negotiations between banks and their 
financially troubled clients, whose collapse would have the potential to trigger the 
immediate meltdown of public confidence and financial stability. The timely actions 
worked, as runs on banks quickly subsided and the stock market soon turned around 
in 1999, which were clear signs of regained public confidence.  
Source: The B a n k i n g  B u r e a u  (http://www.banking.gov.tw/dp.asp?mp=10; accessed September 10, 
2005).244 
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 The NPL ratios are calculated as: total NPLs of all domestic banks in Taiwan divided by all loans 
these banks have given out at the end of each year. 
Figure 6.1: Taiwan's NPL ratios (1995-2004) 
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However, the bad debts in the banking system were still piling up and soared from 
2000 to 2002. The climax came in March 2002 as total NPLs reached NT$ 1.4 trillion, 
the equivalent of a NPL ratio of 8.78 per cent. The reality of the crisis, according to 
some observers, was even worse, because the government applied a laxer definition of 
NPLs to downplay the issue.
245
 If not promptly addressed, they further argued, the 
bad debt bomb would explode soon.
246
 
In the meantime, two unusual concurrent events added more uncertainty to the 
prospect of Taiwan‟s political economy. On the political side, the DPP took power for 
the first time in May 2000, ending the KMT‟s five-decade long rule. The DPP, 
however, merely won the presidential election with nearly 40 per cent of votes and the 
defeated KMT and its political allies still controlled the Legislative Yuan. As a result, 
even though the newly-elected President Chen Shui-bian of the DPP could nominate 
the premier without the consent of the Legislative Yuan according to the constitution, 
a minority in parliament meant that he had insufficient power to effectively push 
through his policy agenda. On the economic front, an unprecedented economic 
downturn --- -2.18 per cent of GDP growth --- occurred in 2001 after the bursting of 
the IT economic bubble in the US. The disappointing growth rate imposed fresh 
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 Before July 2005, the financial authority in Taiwan did not regard those loans “under surveillance” 
as non-performing, which was a huge grey area. But since then, the rule has been revised to be in line 
with international norms. Now loans will be seen as non-performing when their repayment of principal 
or interest have been overdue for more than 3 months.         
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 Economist, “Too many debts to settle.” Balfour and Namgyal, “Defusing a Debt Bomb.” 
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pressure on the DPP, as it had been under criticisms for its lack of experience and 
ability in delivering a sustainable economy since the beginning of its rule. To no one‟s 
surprise, the opposition parties seized the opportunity to reinforce their attacks on the 
impotence of the DPP in economic governance.  
As a result, it appeared that the DPP was in a dire situation as it was confronted with a 
sluggish economy, a looming financial disaster and a lack of majority in parliament at 
the same time. However, eventually, a devastating banking crisis, triggered by 
mounting bad debts, did not arrive. Instead, the NPL ratios began to drop. By the end 
of 2004, the ratios were reduced to less than 4 per cent, the pre-crisis level.    
2. Why did the bad debt crisis emerge in the late 1990s? 
2.1 Existing explanations and unsolved puzzles  
Although the looming banking crisis did not develop into a disaster beyond control, 
still, a puzzle rises: why did such an unprecedented event take place in the late 1990s? 
As just mentioned, the immediate trigger of the crisis was the financial turmoil among 
a number of publicly listed companies and financial institutions in late 1998. But if 
we look at a bigger picture of the accumulating process of NPLs, there was a gradual 
warm-up period from 1995 to 1998 as Figure 6.1 shows. How can we explain the NPL 
rise before late 1998? Besides, while corporate financial troubles and economic 
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slowdown were not uncommon before the late 1990s, why was a similar crisis not 
triggered off as a result? 
At present, the dominant explanations, mainly by mainstream economists, have 
focused on the KMT government‟s mismanagement in liberalising the banking sector 
in the early years. For example, Chen Po-chih, an economics professor at the National 
Taiwan University and the former chairperson of the Council for Economic Planning 
and Development (CEPD), a cabinet-level agency, argues that the KMT government 
made six key policy mistakes in the opening-up process of the banking sector: 
1. It got the sequence wrong in the liberalisation of banking sector. It should have 
privatised the state-owned banks (SOBs) before it allowed new private banks to 
be established.  
2. It allowed too many new private banks to be set up in the early 1990s: 15 banks 
were permitted to open their business at the same time, sowing the seeds of 
over-banking. 
3. It imposed overregulation on new financial products: despite more players 
joining the banking market, the government did not leave enough space for the 
banks to develop new financial service and products. The banks ended up in a 
vicious competition where too many banks competed for the same customers 
with similar services and products. Consequently, marginal clients were 
accepted in the loan markets, making the banks more vulnerable to bad loan 
risk.  
4. It adopted loose monetary policies which led to oversupply of credit and 
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creation of economic bubbles: the bursting of economic bubbles contributed to a 
sluggish property market and dragged the banks into mounting bad loans. 
5. It undertook lax financial supervision. 
6. It hesitated to essentially fix the banking problems. Instead, it bailed out 
troubled enterprises and financial institutions, creating more serious problems 
afterwards.
247
 
A similar view, but with more systematic evidence and a focus on the fundamental 
weakness of Taiwan‟s banking sector, is provided by Heather Montgomery. 248 
According to her research, the looming banking crisis stemmed mainly from two 
factors: the extremely volatile movement in asset markets and the improper financial 
liberalization of both capital markets and the banking sector. The first factor 
originated in the crash or recession in Taiwan‟s stock and real estate markets in recent 
years. As Taiwanese banks favoured taking stocks and real estate as collateral for their 
lending, they were more vulnerable to plummeting values of stocks and real estate 
amid market downturns when they wanted to reduce the losses of bad loans by selling 
collateral. More NPLs emerged after the efforts to minimize the losses failed. 
Moreover, as many stock investors took part in “leveraged stock purchases,”249 the 
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 Chen, “Jiasu jinrong gaige cujin jingji fajhan” [Speed up financial reform to improve economic 
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 Montgomery, “Taiwan‟s looming Banking Crisis.” Another reason to single out her paper is because 
it was widely cited by the Taiwanese media at the time as an academic backup for the claim of a 
looming financial crisis. Thus it raised public concern and drew protest from the government officials 
in the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance at the same time. Montgomery worked at the Asian 
Development Bank Institute.  
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 Investors use bank loans to speculate on stocks. 
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level of equity markets was more directly linked to the asset quality of the banking 
sector. When the stock markets crashed, it inevitably led to the surge of NPLs in 
banks as a great number of stock investors were unable to meet their bank loan 
obligations.  
As for the second factor, improper financial liberalization of both capital markets and 
the banking sector since the late 1980s, it had created two negative effects on 
Taiwan‟s banking market. On the one hand, as the liberalised capital markets provided 
another source of financing for private enterprises, the banks had to confront an 
unavoidable reality that a significant part of their clients would leave for cheaper 
credit in the capital markets. On the other hand, to privatize the banking sector and 
allow the entry of 15 new private banks in the early 1990s had contributed to 
over-banking. As competition intensified between banks, many, in the endless 
cut-throat fights, were forced to not only reduce the margins of profits from individual 
loan cases but lower their criteria for lending. The consequences: first, almost all 
banks benefited far less from traditional loan business; second, accepting less 
qualified clients enhanced banks‟ risk of facing more foreclosures in the future. Thus, 
as a whole, over-banking had undermined the business environment of and assets 
quality for all banks, greatly increasing the potential of generating more bad loans.  
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Convincing as they are, these explanations invite more fundamental questions. For 
example, why did the KMT government make the six mistakes that Chen has 
identified? Why was it unable to correct the fundamental weakness of the banking 
sector that Montgomery has shown? Given that the KMT was still by and large 
overwhelmingly powerful amid Taiwan‟s democratic transition in the 1990s and thus 
in a better position to push through systematic financial reform and embark on sound 
financial governance, these mistakes and failures required further explanations.   
2.2 Political democratisation and the rise of NPL crisis 
In my view, to respond to these puzzles, firstly, we have to expose the politics behind 
the surge of NPLs. That is, while the existing explanations are right that the NPL 
crisis stemmed from the mishandling of banking liberalisation and lack of sound 
financial governance by the KMT government, we have to ask further questions 
regarding the issue: What went wrong with the KMT? What prevented it from making 
wiser decisions all the way? Here I highlight again the impacts of political 
democratisation on the state‟s financial governance as the root cause of the rise of the 
NPL crisis. For, since the crisis is the product of the state‟s earlier mistakes, the roots 
of its rise are inevitably linked to what we have discussed in the SOB reforms and 
policies on new private commercial banks. The argument will be further clarified by 
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examining the three main political sources of irregular increase of NPLs from the mid 
1990s to 2002.  
2.2.1 Over-banking 
As over-banking has been widely blamed for the rise of NPLs in the banking sector in 
the late 1990s, a political explanation of over-banking begins by asking a simple and 
fundamental question: why did the government allow over-banking to happen in the 
first place? Actually, if we put the main findings of the two previous chapters together, 
then the answer will emerge. That is, over-banking was the consequence of the state‟s 
failure at engineering a new banking sector. Despite the effort of the state to push for 
the two essential parts of Taiwan‟s banking “Big Bang” --- the SOB liberalisation and 
entry of new private commercial banks, its failure was crystallised in the forming 
over-banking. On the one hand, if the SOB reforms had not been seriously delayed by 
the Legislative Yuan and Taiwan Provincial Government and its assembly until the 
late 1990s, the surge of new private banks might have been more modest.
250
 On the 
other hand, if the Ministry of Finance had not yielded to the rising political influence 
of private business groups, the reform to lift the ban on the entry of new private 
commercial banks would not have deviated from its initially prudential tone. In short, 
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 For potential new private players, they would hesitate to join the market after most SOBs became 
more competitive through deregulation or privatisation. For the government, if it had finished the SOB 
reform much earlier, it might be able to use that as a reason to resist the pressure for allowing too many 
new banks to enter the market.  
  172 
the double failure had resulted in a loss of control of the government on engineering a 
new and ideal banking sector. As the government‟s original agenda and plan for 
banking liberalisation had been significantly affected, changed or blocked by the new 
political forces rising with democratisation since the late 1980s, the new banking 
sector was doomed for over-banking and surging NPLs.      
2.2.2 Political loans 
The second source of NPLs related to political democratisation was political loans 
involving the state-controlled banks (SCBs).
251
 The loans indicated those approved 
by the SCBs on the ground of political considerations or linkages and would not have 
been approved by normal lending procedures and criteria. To be more specific, there 
were two kinds of the political loans: one was lawmaker-related; the other was 
KMT-related.
252
 For the former, it referred to the loans gained by lawmakers due to 
their growing influence over the SCBs after democratisation. With their power in 
reviewing the budgets and overseeing the operations of SCBs, lawmakers, particularly 
those who joined the financial committees, were able to force the SCBs to lend to 
those private projects of their concerns with irregularly loose terms. In most cases, the 
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 Instead of using state-owned banks (SOBs), here I use SCBs to include those banks that had been 
privatised but still run by the government. The lawmakers could still have influence over them though 
not in the same powerful way as before.    
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 In many cases, the two were intertwined as the KMT was the ruling party and thus it was easier for 
its lawmakers to exert pressures over the SOBs and get special loans. 
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special terms involved a large amount of loans but without required collaterals as 
back up. The irregular practices stemmed from the worry of the top managers of 
SCBs that some lawmakers might deliberately boycott the budget of their banks, give 
them a tough time during the question time sessions in the Legislative Yuan or block 
their promotion in the future if they did not meet to lawmakers‟ special demand for 
loans. This sort of political loans, unfortunately, was prone to early default and turned 
into NPLs. With little concern of facing legal charges or repayment responsibility, the 
lawmakers behind the loans tended to have malicious foreclosures of their bank loans. 
For as long as their political influence was still in place, the involved SCBs would 
hesitate to seek compensation and file lawsuits. In fact, even though the SCBs did 
take actions; it was often too late or insignificant. As there were insufficient collateral 
for those loans in the first place or the applicants of loans were just the proxies of the 
lawmakers,
253
 the SCBs often ended up suffering massive losses.  
In spite of frequent media coverage on this kind of financial scandals between the 
lawmakers and the SCBs over recent years, it was very difficult for the outsiders to 
get the whole picture of the total impact of lawmaker-related political loans on 
producing bad loans.
254
 Thanks to an in-depth investigation by a journalist on the 
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 Very often, the lawmakers would use other people‟s names to get loans from the SCBs, making 
them immune to legal responsibility for the loans. For more details on how legislators force the SCBs 
to lend, please see Li, “Liwei zui zhongai de yinhang” [The most favoured banks of the legislators], 
28-37. 
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issue, however, we can at least get a clue. According to Li Hao-chung,
255
 a journalist 
of Hsinhsinwen [The Journalist], loans directly related to legislators among the top ten 
banks which had lent to legislators amounted to more than NT$ 4.5 billion by July 
2001.
256
 In addition, as Table 6.1 has shown, 8 of those top 10 banks were under 
state-control. This proves how the legislators liked to borrow from the SCBs. The 
legislators‟ special favour for loans from the SCBs could be also found on Table 6.2. 
The table shows that there were 70 lawmakers who had borrowed from the same SCB 
- Taiwan Cooperative Bank, a big SCB with strong business in community banking. 
Of all the 225 lawmakers in the Legislative Yuan, this meant that nearly one third 
directly involved borrowing from the SCB. Besides, Table 6.2 demonstrates that the 
top 6 banks from which the lawmakers most liked to borrow were again all 
state-controlled.  
It was true that these lawmaker-related loans from the SCBs would not necessarily 
end up as NPLs. But, why did so many legislators particularly favour to borrow so 
much money from the SCBs? Moreover, a great number of indicted cases had 
revealed the dark side and rationales behind this kind of loans.  
Finally, in Li‟s report, among the top 21 lawmakers who had taken out loans 
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 Li, “Liwei zui zhongai de yinhang” [The most favoured banks of the legislators], 28-37. 
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 The investigation did not include those loans that the lawmakers made in other people‟s names. For 
this kind of loans are not easily detectable on the records of banks. Thus, the real number of 
lawmaker-related bad loans was much higher. 
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exceeding NT$ 100 million from banks and faced troubles in their repayments, more 
than 90 per cent of them belonged to the KMT.
257
 That is, KMT legislators were 
more likely to take advantage of not just their power but their party‟s ruling status to 
borrow from the SCBs. In short, though Li‟s report could not directly show the 
specific amount of NPLs that lawmakers had contributed, it had revealed significant 
clues about the impact that the lawmaker-related political loans had on the pile-up of 
NPLs.  
Table 6.1: The top 10 lenders to the legislators in terms of loans 
Ranking Name of Banks State-controlled or not Amount* 
1 Taipei Bank Yes 817.3 
2 Taiwan Business Banks Yes 687.0 
3 First Commercial Bank Yes 668.9 
4 Land Bank of Taiwan Yes 473.6 
5 Taiwan Cooperative Bank Yes 471.0 
6 Chang Hwa Commercial Bank Yes 382.4 
7 Farmers Bank of China Yes 291.2 
8 Cosmos Bank No 255.1 
9 Bank of Overseas Chinese Yes 239.9 
10 Union Bank of Taiwan No 239.7 
**Total 4,526.1 
*Unit: NT$ million. ** The sum is the author‟s own calculation. 
Source: Li, “Liwei zui zhongai de yinhang” [The most favoured banks of the legislators], 32-33. 
As for the KMT-related political loans, they specifically indicated the loans from the 
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SCBs to a number of big private enterprises close to the KMT and their effects on 
creating NPLs were even stronger. With hindsight, the loans appeared to be the 
KMT‟s powerful tools for rewarding its faithful supporters in the business circle. In an 
attempt to reinforce an essential part of its power base in the times of democratic 
transition, the KMT allowed its political adherents which owned business 
conglomerates to not only get much higher-than-usual amount of loans with limited 
collateral requirements but special terms for repayment of loans in the midst of the 
credit crunch. The consequences of these irregular loan practices, in most cases, 
produced more bad debts. For if those business giants stumbled in bad investments or 
economic recessions, their loan providers would immediately find it impossible to 
essentially make up losses from the collateral behind the defaulted loans. Or the 
lenders would suffer even more losses when the big borrowers‟ business still failed to 
turn around in the end under special repayment terms. 
Table 6.2: The top 6 lenders to the legislators in terms of borrowers 
Ranking Name of Banks 
State-controlled 
 or not 
Amount of 
borrowers 
1 Taiwan Cooperative Bank Yes 70 
2 Land Bank of Taiwan Yes 50 
3 Taiwan Business Banks Yes 30 
3 Bank of Taiwan Yes 30 
5 First Commercial Bank Yes 29 
6 Farmers Bank of China Yes 25 
Source: Li, “Liwei zui zhongai de yinhang” [The most favoured banks of the legislators], 32-33. 
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Again, while this type of political loans had been repeatedly reported by the 
Taiwanese media in the forms of financial scandals, the scale of its real damage as a 
whole was not clear to outsiders. The lack of disclosure came mainly from banks‟ 
legal duty to protect the information of their clients. But the political nature and 
irregularity behind the loans also made it less likely for banks to speak out. It was not 
until the outbreak of the Chinese Bank scandal in early 2007, which caused a 
large-scale run on the bank and threatened to destabilise financial stability as a whole, 
that the related authorities began to take actions to publicly reveal the main defaulters 
of bank loans. Under public pressure,
258
 in March 2007, the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC) under the DPP administration finally required all banks to publish 
their lists of major defaulters with overdue loans exceeding NT$ 100 million. The 
disclosure showed that among the 42 local banks and 33 foreign lenders in Taiwan, 
there were around 1500 loan accounts matching the criteria as of June 2006 and they 
had contributed bad debts of NT$ 370 billion in total.
259
 Also, the disclosure 
demonstrated that the most damaged banks, again, were all run by the government. 
For instance, the first four most serious cases were all SCBs: (1) Chang Hwa Bank 
with bad loans of NT$ 52 billion,
260
 (2) Mega International Commercial Bank NT$ 
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33 billion,
261
 (3) Bank of Taiwan NT$ 32.1 billion and (3) Taiwan Cooperative Bank 
NT$ 30 billion. 
Furthermore, the list of top defaulters revealed more profound political implications 
when all accounts in the names of individuals and their associated firms were put 
together. Take the top three defaulters as examples. The number one was Chu 
An-hsiung and his An Feng Group with defaulted loans of NT$ 16.4 billion.
262
 The 
second was Yang Tien-sheng and his Ever Fortune Group. They had incurred bad 
debts of NT$ 14.2 billion. The third was Chen Yu-hao and his Tuntex Group. They 
had loans of NT$ 11.3 billion in default. Together, the top three defaulters had 
contributed bad debts of NT$ 41.9 billion, the equivalent of more than 10 per cent of 
the total NPLs disclosed this time.  
The ability of the Top Three to borrow and default so much money, mostly from the 
SCBs, was the best illustration of how business tycoons close to the KMT were 
accountable for mounting bad debts in the banking system during the KMT era in the 
1990s. The rise and fall of the Top Three, in business and politics, shared some 
common features. First, with their initial success in business, they began to build their 
political influence over the KMT. They either ran for political offices (by themselves 
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and Chiao Tung Bank, which merged in 2006, 
262
 Tzuyou shihpao [Liberty Times], “An-feng 164 yi Chang-yi 142 yi Dong-di-shi 113 yi,” [The top 
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or their family members) or became the main business partners with the KMT-run 
firms and contributors to the KMT election campaign funds. Second, by taking 
advantage of their growing weight in politics, they managed to get unusual supplies of 
credit, predominantly from SCBs, to rapidly expand their business territory. As their 
business boomed further, they gained more resources to lift their political power or 
influence to a higher level. Third, their fortune began to reverse when their business 
was so overstretched in a short period of time that their high leverage of financing 
could not be sustained any more. As a result, their business empires began to collapse 
and so did their political clout. 
Table 6.3 Backgrounds of the Top Three Defaulters* 
Business Groups NPLs** Owners  Political connections 
An Feng 16.6 Chu An-hsiung KMT local faction leader in Kaohsiung. 
Member of the Control Yuan. 
Speaker of Kaohsiung City Council. 
Ever Fortune 14.2 Yang Tien-sheng The leader of the third KMT political force in 
Taichung County. 
He and his son Yang Wen-hsin developed their 
political careers as local representatives or 
legislators for more than a decade.  
Tuntex  11.3 Chen Yu-hao KMT‟s business partner. 
Major contributor to KMT‟s election campaigns 
* as of June 2006 ; ** in NT$ billions 
To be more concrete, take the number one defaulter Chu An-hsiung as an example. 
Based on his wealth, he made his political debut as a Kaohsiung City councillor and 
then became a member of the Control Yuan. The peak of his political career arrived 
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when he was elected as the speaker of Kaohsiung City Council. Meanwhile, his wife 
Wu Der-mei also had a successful political career as a legislator. Together, the couple 
crafted one of the most powerful political families among the KMT local factions in 
Kaohsiung City. Over the years of their political success, their business territory 
rapidly expanded. Thanks to their surging political weight, they got easy access to 
credit from banks, mostly SCBs, to enlarge their business investments which mainly 
involved the steel industry. Chu‟s business stumbled badly in late 1998 during a 
nationwide financial crisis triggered by a bursting of economic bubble. But, through a 
rescue package endorsed by the KMT government, his business did not fall apart 
immediately and his political career lasted until late 2003. Eventually, he fled to 
China after he was convicted on a bribery charge for buying votes during the 
Kaohsiung City Council election of 2002.
263
 With his escape, inevitably, an enormous 
financial mess – defaulted loans of NT$ 16.6 billion - was left to his loan providers.264 
2.2.3 Lax financial oversight  
Lax financial oversight has been widely regarded as one of the key factors that 
spurred the irregular surge of NPLs in the late 1990s. The KMT government‟ ability 
in implementing financial supervision had been compromised by the KMT‟s concern 
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of staying in power during the democratic transition. Through exercising “selective” 
financial oversight, it hoped to secure the support of its political allies that had a stake 
in banking business.
265
 The cases of political loans in the previous section are clear 
examples. The practices of political loans would not have existed for so many years, if 
the government seriously checked and oversaw banks‟ operations all the time. But the 
cases of political loans were chiefly associated with SCBs. Here in this section the 
attention will turn to another big hole of the government‟s financial oversight – new 
private commercial banks established by KMT politicians after 1991, which had 
caused no less damage in terms of engendering bad debts. 
Among the 15 private commercial banks which got permission to begin their business 
in 1991 under the government‟s policy of opening up the banking sector, at least one 
third was controlled by individual KMT politicians with business backgrounds. Since 
then, it turned out that most of this kind of banks went through scandals, bank runs 
and financial difficulties in later years. The consequence was by no means a 
coincidence. Official investigation
266
 had shown their common problem: shaky 
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(accessed March 30, 2008). 
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corporative governance. Disregarding related laws, regulations and procedures, their 
owners used depositors‟ money at will to finance other investments until the “magic 
formula” could not be sustained any more. These owners‟ reckless behaviour simply 
relied on their political weight inside the KMT. Due to their political influence, their 
banks were immune to the government‟s regular checks and supervisions. When their 
banks eventually failed, they just left the mess to the government and fled to overseas. 
As a result, they not only seriously undermined financial stability and caused social 
panic but also cost an enormous amount of public funds to bail them out. For instance, 
according to the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), which is charge of 
dealing with insolvent financial institutions, it has spent NT$ 58.5 billion and 47.5 
billion of tax payers‟ money respectively in cleaning up the mess for Chung Sing 
Bank and Chinese Bank, the two most notorious banks of this kind.
267
 
To be more specific, let us begin with Chung Sing Bank. Its chairman Wang Yu-yun 
was an economic and political powerhouse in Kaohsiung City. The KMT had to rely 
on his support, along with the other two influential political families (Chu and 
Chen)
268
, to consolidate its power base there. On the eve of the transfer of power from 
the KMT to the DPP in 2000, Chung Sing Bank was caught with irregularity in using 
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its funds by the Ministry of Finance, causing a run on the bank. Later on, according to 
the prosecutor of the case, Wang had conducted irregular lending business with a 
certain number of clients who would not be qualified for massive borrowings by 
normal procedures. By using his power as chairman of the bank, he often bypassed 
normal procedures and let these irregular cases get through for years without being 
stopped by the financial supervision authority.
269
 The outcome was a mountain of 
NPLs of nearly NT$ 80 billion and the government had to take over the bank and used 
public funds to address its collapse.  
The second infamous case was the Chinese Bank. The bank was established by Wang 
You-theng who owned a business conglomerate - the Rebar Asia Pacific Group – and 
the bank was part of it. As a business tycoon, Wang had been closely connected with 
the KMT for mutual cooperation for decades. As Wang was the head of the General 
Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of China, one of the top three business and 
industrial organisations in Taiwan, for more than 20 years, he assisted the KMT to 
control a significant number of business groups and corporations through the umbrella 
organization. In return, Wang was rewarded as a member of the KMT Central 
Standing Committee for several years. Moreover, in order to further enhance his 
                                                 
269
 Chen, “Weifa fangdai babaiyi yuan jinri zhenjie: zhongxingyin an Wang Yu-yun jiangbei qiuchu 
zhongxing” [Illegal loans NT$80 billion case close soon: Wang Yu-yun will be indicted for long 
sentence in Chung Sing Bank case].  
  184 
family‟s political influence, his son Wang Ling-lin held a political office as a KMT 
parliamentarian for three terms. Against such political strengths and connections, 
Wang You-theng‟s business territory expanded rapidly in the 1990s. However, news 
regarding the financial “black hole” of Wang‟s business had never ended since the late 
1990s because of Wang‟s extremely speculative ways of doing business. The final 
straw came as two affiliates of the Rebar Asia Pacific Group filed for insolvency 
protection in late December 2006. As Wang and his wife fled to China right before the 
legal action, the move immediately triggered a run on the Chinese Bank and 
eventually led to the collapse of the whole business group in early 2007. In later 
investigation, the prosecutor found that for more than a decade Wang had not only 
embezzled a huge amount of money from his own business group including the 
Chinese Bank but also borrowed heavily from a number of banks without required 
qualifications.
270
 In estimation, Wang gained more than NT$ 73 billion from his 
financial crimes
271
 and incurred debts of NT$ 55.2 billion with numerous banks.
272
        
2.3 External factors 
Nevertheless, unlike the given literature and explanations provided above, the 
domestic perspective of analysis alone is not sufficient in accounting for the rise of 
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the NPL crisis. In this particular case, external factors – economic globalisation and 
cross-strait relations - also played their significant parts. Due to economic 
globalisation, the Taiwanese government, like many governments around the world, 
has found that it is getting more difficult to manage the flow of capital. Because of the 
freer movement of funds, Taiwan has experienced massive outward capital flight to 
South East Asia and China since the second half of 1980s. According to statistics, 
from 1987 to 2006 the total amount of FDI from Taiwan to China alone has reached 
US$ 100 billion.
273
  
This vast outflow of capital results in two problems concerning NPL accumulation. 
Firstly, with the outflow of capital, the domestic investment shrinks and industries 
move out, creating a rising unemployment rate and long-term recession of the 
property market. Indirectly, the banks suffer growing NPLs as the value of their 
collateral --- real estate in most loans --- decline sharply as a result of the property 
market downturn. Secondly, in the process of capital outflow, a host of businessmen 
not only bring their own money with them but also the money they borrow from the 
banks in Taiwan. In some cases, the borrowers deliberately default their payment for 
bank loans from Taiwan and stay in China for their new business. As Taiwan is still in 
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political standoff with China, it is difficult for the Taiwanese government to bring 
these economic outlaws to justice through mutual coordination and cooperation 
between the two sides. Thus, some businessmen can capitalize on the special 
cross-strait relations by relentless borrowing from Taiwan without the intention to pay 
off their loans. This is the so-called “Borrow to invest in China; Leave debts in 
Taiwan.”  
The most notorious case is Chen Yu-hao, the founder of the Tuntex group and KMT 
funder. Chen‟s group was one of the top 10 enterprises in the 1990s in Taiwan. Due to 
an over-expanding and highly-leveraged way of investment, the Tuntex group ran into 
financial trouble in the late 1990s. Eventually, the group collapsed in 2002. Chen fled 
the country and defaulted on loans of more than NT$ 50 billion.
274
 Ironically, instead 
of becoming bankrupt, he now runs another business empire on the other side of 
Taiwan Strait: China.  
Chen‟s case drew public attention again in 2004 during the presidential election 
campaigns. Chen Yu-hao emerged to hold press conferences in the US to accuse DPP 
candidate Chen Shui-bian of denying accepting his political donations for several 
times during the 1990s. As the accusation was about Chen Shui-bian‟s integrity and 
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credibility, it raised intensive media and public attention for weeks. But, Chen 
Yu-hao‟s statement was being questioned by many due to his huge debts left in 
Taiwan and his close connections with the KMT in the past. While it is not clear 
whether Chen Yu-hao‟s move has affected the final result of the election, his 
involvement has reminded us again the domestic roots of some financial problems 
that appear to be contributed by external factors. 
3. The NPL crisis under the DPP  
After its peak in 2002, as Figure 6.1 has shown, the overall level of bad loans in 
Taiwan‟s banking sector dropped sharply during the subsequent two years. The result 
was a big surprise to many as the ruling DPP had been in deep trouble in pushing 
through its main policies after it won the presidency in 2000 because of its minority 
status in parliament. The unexpected efficiency raises a puzzle: How could a weaker 
government under the DPP perform better than its stronger counterpart under the 
KMT considering that the DPP did not control the majority in parliament despite its 
hold of presidency? So far, there is scant academic literature on this question. But 
Brück and Sun‟s case study on the successful passage of “Financial Holding Company 
Law” in 2001 has provided a partial answer.275 They argued that effective governance 
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could still be achieved under divided government. The key factors were strong media 
pressure to pass the law and no obvious opposition from related interest groups. On 
the one hand, the strong media pressure to pass the law forced the opposition parties 
to cooperate with the ruling DPP, as the opposition parties were worried that their 
lengthy blocking tactics might backfire and damage their party image and support 
among the public. On the other hand, it seemed that the potential opponents who 
might suffer from the proposed bill happened to be the same people who would 
benefit after it was passed. Thus, there was no obvious opposition from related 
interest groups, making strong lobbying force against the bill rare.
276
   
Although Brück and Sun‟s paper is not directly related to the study of NPL reform, 
their work is still relevant for two reasons. Firstly, the enacting of the Financial 
Holding Company Law was part of the DPP government‟s plan to strengthen the 
quality of most financial institutions by increasing their business scale and scope. The 
government assumed that the newly-established financial holding companies would 
be stronger to handle NPL problems. Secondly, the whole NPL reform actually 
proceeded under similar conditions. To swiftly write off the NPLs and put the banking 
sector in order also had widespread support from the media and the public.  
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Nevertheless, because the NPL crisis is a much broader issue than the Financial 
Holding Company Law, there are limits in applying the main argument of the Brück 
and Sun‟s paper. First, the opposition parties did constantly use their parliamentary 
majority to force the DPP government to revise its plans for NPL reform. Second, 
while the DPP may have suffered fewer problems from the opposition parties on the 
issues of financial reform, it failed to push through quite a few of its crucial bills in 
other policy areas. Third, Brück and Sun did not further explain where the strong 
media support and public consensus on the need for reform came from, thus ignoring 
more fundamental factors. Finally, a related question, which is beyond the discussion 
of Brück and Sun‟s paper, is why the more powerful KMT government, which 
controlled both the presidency and parliament, could not stop NPL piling-up before it 
stepped down in 2000, albeit it did temporarily restore economic order in 1999.  
My argument for the puzzle is that a looming crisis like the NPL one would 
significantly boost the state‟s autonomy and capacity in delivering necessary reforms 
on this specific issue through a crisis-driven consensus shared by the whole society. In 
other words, as the consensus crippled opposing forces against reform, it also made 
the state regain its strength. Thus, while the state under the DPP might still appear less 
capable in delivering sound governance on many other policy issues, it was ironically 
powerful and efficient with strong mandate in defusing a crisis which had the huge 
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potential to destabilize the society and economy. 
The argument above is not completely new. A handful of scholars have contended that 
the rise of the developmental state in East Asia was in part due to the overwhelming 
imperative of national security.
277
 Because of the threat of invasion from the enemy, 
the state could apply a top-down approach to manage the economy without worrying 
about its people‟s opposition. Taiwan and South Korea in the 1950s are all typical 
examples. For the topic of this chapter, the NPL crisis, in my view, plays the similar 
role in granting a powerful mandate to the state under the DPP for necessary reforms. 
Taiwan has been in the shadow of the potential invasion from China since 1949. Its 
diplomatic isolation in the international community has reinforced the shadow. As a 
result, to maintain socio-economic stability and keep economic prosperity has become 
the priority of every governing administration. A NPL crisis was a sensitive issue 
from this perspective. Firstly, it would cripple the economy when most banks tighten 
their credit policy because of the fear of confronting more bad loans. Secondly, if 
banks turned insolvent because of too many bad debts, panic bank runs would gravely 
affect socio-economic stability. Thirdly, no administration could survive the 
consequence for not being able to solve a NPL crisis in time and no political party is 
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willing to be regarded as the main obstacle in the way of tackling the crisis.  
But if so, then why did the KMT seem not to handle the issue well before it lost 
power in May 2000? Ironically, it was simply because the NPL problems were not 
serious enough at that time and the rescue measures adopted by the KMT in late 1998 
and early 1999 effectively relieved public concern for the time being. In contrast, no 
sooner had the DPP ascended to power, the crisis deepened and public concern 
escalated again. The DPP had no choice but to do its best to dampen the looming 
crisis.  
In order to dispose of the NPLs as soon as possible, six main measures were taken by 
the DPP government without meeting with strong obstacles. First of all, it provided 
incentives for the banks to actively write off their bad loans. The MOF announced it 
would reduce its Gross Business Revenue Tax and Deposit Reserve Ratio 
requirements on the banks with the condition that they had to use the reductions 
completely for writing off their NPLs. Besides, the banks which had lower NPL ratios 
would be rewarded with fewer business restrictions from the financial authority. Thus, 
the banks were more willing to use their own annual revenues to write off their bad 
loans. As Table 6.4 shows below, with these two sources, the banks had totally 
disposed of NPLs of nearly NT$ 1.4 trillion from 1999 to January 2005. 
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Secondly, learning from the experience in handling the NPL issue in the US, Japan 
and South Korea, the CDIC was given the authority to establish and run the Asset 
Management Companies (AMC) and Financial Restructuring Fund (FRF)
278
. The 
AMC was used to speed up the procedure that banks could get rid of their 
non-performing assets; the FRF would allow the CDIC to develop a public fund of 
NT$ 140 billion to bail out those seriously troubled financial institutions and force 
them to exit the banking market by closures and mergers. 
Table 6.4: Writing off NPLs in Domestic Banking Institutions  
 NT$ million 
Period / Items 
The subtotal of 
write-offs                
(A+B) 
Savings from the 
GBRT and DRR 
reductions   
(A) 
The banks‟ own 
revenue been used 
in write-offs  
(B) 
Average amount of 
banks‟ own revenue 
been used in write-offs  
1999/01 ~ 1999/12 140,176 20,686 119,490 9,958 
2000/01 ~ 2000/12 163,501 38,344 125,157 10,430 
2001/01 ~ 2001/12 256,891 34,195 222,696 18,558 
2002/01 ~ 2002/12 413,853 26,822 387,031 32,253 
2003/01 ~ 2003/12 236,848 20,183 216,665 18,055 
2004/01 ~ 2004/12 162,235 20,408 141,827 11,819 
2005/01 9,340 1,814 7,526  
Total 1,382,844 162,452 1,220,392   
Source: the Banking Bureau, http://www.banking.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=57696&CtNode=708  
(accessed June 15, 2006) 
Notes: 1. “Domestic banking institutions” includes domestic banks and trust & investment companies. 
2. GBRT: Gross Business Revenue Tax    
3. DRR: Deposit Reserve Ratio    
Thirdly, the MOF encouraged the acquisitions and mergers among the financial 
institutions in an attempt to strengthen their capacity to handle the NPLs by increasing 
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their business scope and scale. Thus, key reform bills like the Financial Institutions 
Merger Act and the Financial Holding Company Act were passed by the legislature.  
Fourthly, the Central Bank launched a project of low interest mortgages of more than 
NT$ 300 billion for the youth and those who would purchase their first property. 
Apart from the intention to help those who were with middle or low incomes to own 
property, the main purpose of the project was to boost the demand for property and 
sustain the property market. Thus, indirectly, the banking sector would not have more 
bad loans generated from the downturn of the property market. But Lin Chin-lung, 
Director General of Department of Banking at the Central Bank tended to play down 
the role of the Central Bank. “We are just like the manager of a reservoir. When the 
market needs „water‟, we open the gate and vice versa. We do not target particular 
policy issue.”279 However, Chang Jing-Sen, vice chairman of Council for Economic 
Planning and Development (CEPD), made it clear: “The role of the Central bank in 
the NPL issue was to make sure the property market would not crash. As the market 
was highly related to bank loans and collaterals, its stabilisation would be crucial in 
alleviating the NPL problems. And, this was where the Central Bank could exercise 
its power.”280 Therefore, overall, the central bank played a key role in addressing the 
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 Lin made this explanation in my interview in late 2003. 
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 Chang revealed this point in my interview made in September 2004. His views were similar to my 
another interview with Mr.Tseng Chao-ming, a former economic policy staff of Chen Shui-bian and 
later a staff at the chairperson office of CEPD. 
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NPL problems albeit these given various interpretations.  
Fifthly, in August of 2001, President Chen set two specific goals for the next stage of 
financial reform to highlight his reform agenda: lowering NPL ratios to below five per 
cent and raising capital adequacy rates to eight per cent of domestic banks within two 
years, which was known as “258 financial reform.”  
Sixthly, to strengthen financial governance, the DPP government overhauled the 
financial regulation system by apparently following the example of UK Financial 
Services Authority. The Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) was established to 
independently supervise and monitor the operation of the whole financial system.
281
 
In the past, the power of financial supervision was divided and shared between the 
Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank.
282
 
At the end of DPP‟s first term in power, the efforts to effectively dispose of NPLs in 
the banking sector were realized. The average NPL ratio of all domestic banks had 
fallen from the peak of 8.78 per cent in early 2002 to 4.32 per cent at the end of May 
2004.
283
  
But to say that there was no boycott from the opposition parties on these reform 
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 Actually, the number continued to drop after 2004. For example, the NPL ratio was only 2.90 per 
cent in April 2005. 
  195 
measures is by no means true. For example, under the insistence of the opposition 
parties, the government‟s efforts to significantly increase the size of the FRF failed. In 
addition, the FSC could only start to operate after the end of President Chen‟s first 
term for the opposition was concerned that the DPP might still control the powerful 
agency if the DPP lost in the presidential elections in March 2004.
284
 But, overall, the 
opposition parties could not derail the main direction of the reform and it seemed that 
their views on how to effectively reduce the swelling bad loans were not very 
different from the ruling DPP. Besides, as Taiwan‟s economy bounced back from the 
2001 recession quickly, the recovery between 2002 and 2004 greatly helped ease the 
NPL crisis as well. Consequently, the failure to increase the size of the FRF did not 
halt the reform on restructuring the banking sector too much.   
Conclusion 
The exploration of the rise of the bad debt storm in the late 1990s has confirmed again 
the negative impacts of democratisation on financial governance of the state in 
Taiwan, the main argument of the two previous cases and this dissertation. From the 
examination of three main political sources that spurred the surge of NPLs --- 
over-banking, political loans and lax financial supervision --- it was evident that the 
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  196 
ruling KMT in the 1990s had compromised its ground on financial reform and 
governance in exchange for the lasting support of its own lawmakers and crucial 
political allies at the local level and in business circles. The price of the compromise, 
consequently, was a new but ill-regulated banking sector and the surge of bad loans. 
Nonetheless, unlike previous cases, external factors were singled out for the first time 
in the thesis and this particular case. It was found that economic globalisation and 
cross-Strait relations had affected the state‟s attempt to contain the bad debt storm. 
Based upon these findings, it seems that Taiwan complies with the popular claims on 
East Asian developmental states: “the eclipse of the state”285 or “the demise of the 
development state.”286 On the other hand, however, the case of NPL crisis has also 
presented a quite different dimension about the state‟s financial governance. The case 
shows that when the devastating crisis loomed, the state could regain its autonomy 
and capacity through a strong mandate imposed by the public. Thus, despite the 
difficulty of divided government, the weaker DPP government could still defuse the 
bad loan crisis effectively.  
Hence, while it is true that the developmental state in Taiwan has shown obvious signs 
of weakening from the current and two previous cases, it might be too early to declare 
its end at this stage. Indeed, some research on other policy area such as Taiwan‟s 
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industrial policies in recent years also offer positive evidence about the resilience of 
the Taiwanese state in adapting to the changing political and economic environment 
over the past decade.
287
 Accordingly, in future studies, it might be better to focus on 
figuring out the conditions that are positive to the function of the developmental state. 
In other words, Taiwan‟s developmental state is an evolving entity. While there is no 
doubt that it is in a transition, its direction and prospects, however, are not that clear.  
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Chapter Seven 
The Policy U-turn on the Reform of Rural Credit Unions (2000-2002) 
In contrast to the relative success at handling the NPL crisis in 2004, the DPP 
government actually failed to implement a risk-management system for the credit 
departments of farmers' and fishermen's associations (CDFFAs) in late 2002.
288
 The 
failure was a huge shock since the DPP had strongly held the view that the reform was 
reasonable, achievable and irreversible for a long time before the final policy U-turn. 
Overall, the policy flip-flop was widely regarded as a huge setback to the DPP‟s 
ambitious plans to overhaul Taiwan‟s financial system in the early stage. Apart from 
the resignation of two ministers as a result of the incident, the far more serious 
consequence was that the image of the DPP as a reformist party was tarnished. Given 
these calamities, a puzzle arises: Why did the DPP eventually melt down in the 
reform? 
To put the puzzle in the perspective of the thesis, the following related questions are 
expected to be clarified through examining this particular case. Compared with the 
previous case, why did the strong mandate that the DPP had in tackling the NPL crisis 
not work as effectively in coping with the CDFFAs? Judging from the failure of the 
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CDFFAs reform, can we stay positive on the effects of democratisation on financial 
governance of the developmental state after 2000? Or, does the first transfer of ruling 
parties in Taiwan‟s post-war history in 2000 make a difference in strengthening 
financial governance of the developmental state in Taiwan?       
To explain the policy U-turn and answer these related questions, I argue the need to 
situate them in the political context of the DPP‟s emergence to power before 2000 and 
its motivation to push for the reform from 2000 to 2002. I contend that the immediate 
cause of the dramatic policy change lies in the unrealistic expectation of the DPP 
when it decided to launch the reform in the first place. The DPP was so indulged in its 
own overconfidence that it was not able to recognize the fundamental flaws inherit in 
its reform project. This fundamental misjudgement, however, had deeper origins that 
could be attributed to the rising process of the DPP on its way to power.  
Accordingly, the rest of the chapter is divided into three parts to elaborate the 
argument. The first part is a short review of existing explanations for the policy 
U-turn. Then the second part focuses on the account of what had fuelled the 
unrealistic expectation of the DPP before it launched the reform. The third part goes 
to the deeper roots behind the deadly choice of reform projects for the rural credit 
unions. Finally, in the conclusion of the chapter, the implications of the case to the 
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questions mentioned above regarding democratisation and change of ruling parties as 
well as financial governance of the developmental state are discussed.       
1. The explanations for the failure of the reform 
When we look back at the first term of the DPP government from 2000 to 2004, its 
dramatic policy U-turn on the reform for rural credit unions in late 2002 is one of the 
most embarrassing events to confront the DPP. Shortly after the U-turn, the approval 
rate of President Chen Shui-bian dropped sharply to 38 per cent, a record low since 
the beginning of his presidency.
289
 Then it was followed by the resignation of 
Premier Yu Shyi-kun to take responsibility for the failure of the reform. Though, 
eventually, Yu remained in office after talks with Chen, two cabinet-level ministers, 
Lee Yung-san of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Fan Chen-tzung of the Council 
of Agriculture (COA), soon stepped down to take the blame. The political fallout even 
led to infighting inside the DPP, as some heavy weight figures of the DPP openly 
challenged Chen regarding his decision of the policy U-turn.
290
 Moreover, the effects 
of the policy U-turn also spread to the economic front. For instance, Standard and 
Poor‟s, a well-known international rating agency, decided to downgrade Taiwan‟s 
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 For example, DPP lawmakers Tuan Yi-kang and Hong Chi-chang jointly wrote a newspaper article 
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the setback of its financial reform. See Tuan and Hong, “Women hai neng bu neng kandao 
zhenzheng de gaige?” [Can we expect a real reform?]. 
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credit rating over the concern that the DPP government had changed its basic 
direction of financial reform.
291
 The move would inevitably increase the cost of 
raising funds in capital markets by Taiwanese businesses. However, the worst damage 
of the policy U-turn went to the reformist image of the DPP. For years before 2000, 
the image was one of the most valuable political assets that the DPP had in its 
competition with the conservative and corrupt KMT. Now, suddenly, as a result of the 
policy U-turn, the value of the asset sharply depreciated. Given these consequences, a 
puzzle emerges: What contributed to the DPP‟s failure on the reform? 
The dominant and direct account, mainly provided by Taiwan‟s media, focuses on the 
personality of the key decision maker --- President Chen Shui-bian. It attributes the 
collapse of the reform to Chen‟s eventual concession to the pressure of farmers and 
fishermen when they threatened to launch a huge rally of protest in front of the 
Presidential Palace.
292
 One senior commentator, for example, described Chen as 
“vacillating, treacherous, and weak, easy to panic and liable to give in to threats.”293 
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No doubt, this kind of explanation is simple, clear and convincing given that policy 
flip-flops are common in democratic countries. Out of the concern of losing 
popularity or power, indeed, it is not rare that politicians or political parties cave in to 
pressures and back down from their original policy positions. This, however, still 
leaves the following puzzles unanswered in this particular case. First, after Chen‟s 
concession, why did the protest of farmers and fishermen still take place as planned? 
It was estimated that more than 100,000 farmers and fishermen angrily went to the 
street in Taipei on the planned day even though they had learned about the policy 
U-turn days ago. Second, as many of those who were in favour of the reform were the 
DPP supporters attracted by the party‟s progressive ideas, why did the DPP prefer to 
upset its own supporters with the U-turn decision? From the perspective of pursuing 
self-interest, it is hard to make sense of the self-inflicted damage. Third, how could it 
account for the strong confidence of the DPP in the reform prior to the U-turn? The 
deep faith in the success of the reform could be best demonstrated in Chen‟s open 
defiance to former President Lee Teng-hui for his negative comments on the reform. 
Lee, also an agricultural economist by training, contended two months before the 
policy U-turn that the policymakers of the MOF did not really understand agricultural 
finance. If they insisted to implement the wrong policy, he predicted, the DPP would 
pay for it by risking to lose its power. But Chen immediately responded by saying “if 
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(we) stop reform because of fear of losing power, it is the behaviour of a coward. …  
We will be more likely to lose power if we stop reform.”294 The response was very 
unusual considering Lee was the “spiritual leader” of the Taiwan Solidarity Union 
(TSU),
295
 an important political ally of the DPP at that time. Fourth, why did the DPP 
government only realize the scale of the pressure from the farmers and fishermen so 
late? As a political party which was known for its sophisticated skills at opinion polls 
and prompt reactions to public opinions, the DPP‟s late response in this particular 
event was hard to understand. Finally, as the reform on the rural credit unions was 
actually only a part of the broader reform on Taiwan‟s banking sector, in contrast to its 
relative success with the other financial institutions such as commercial banks, why 
did the DPP only fail so badly in this part?    
In light of these puzzles, alternatively, I argue to ascribe the failure of the CDFFAs 
reform to two main factors: the DPP government‟s overconfidence and a fundamental 
flaw inherent in its reform project. For the former, it can be further traced back to two 
sources: (1) the DPP believed that it had a strong mandate to push reform in every 
financial issue; (2) the encouragement of early success. The interplay of the two 
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sources contributed to an overconfident ruling party, which saw all the opposition to 
its CDFFAs reform as merely a backlash from conservative forces and vested interests, 
and assumed that the mandate it enjoyed would allow it to win the battle in the end. It 
was against this backdrop that the DPP did not heed any warning or advice on its 
CDFFAs reform until it was too late. For the latter, the flaw points to the undetected 
false assumption underlying the reform project, which assumed that there was no 
difference between the CDFFAs and the commercial banks, and that projects working 
well on the latter would also be applicable to the former. But why was the DPP so 
determined that it could not see this fundamental flaw? I argue that it was due to the 
DPP‟s distance and unfamiliarity with the farmers‟ and fishermen‟s associations on its 
rise to power over the past years, and this made the DPP choose a reform project 
proposed by the MOF instead of the COA,
296
 whose project was more acceptable to 
most farmers and fishermen. 
2. The overconfident DPP government  
2.1 Mandate to reform 
The first angle to address why the DPP government could be so confident about its 
reform on the CDFFAs in the first place is from the evolution of the DPP‟s election 
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  205 
campaign strategy and how it won the presidential election in 2000. On its way to 
power, the DPP used two key weapons to appeal to voters and compete with the KMT: 
(1) a pledge to pursue reform, and (2) the promotion of pro-Taiwan consciousness. 
These were respectively set against, (1) the pervasive corruption created by 
uninterrupted one-party rule under the KMT, and (2) the pro-China ideology 
advocated by the KMT from 1945 to 2000. Nevertheless, under Lee Teng-hui‟s 
leadership, the KMT also gradually underwent a transformation to make itself more 
like a “native party” in the 1990s, giving the DPP less room for manoeuvre on the 
Taiwan consciousness issue. Thus the DPP increasingly put more emphasis on 
fighting corruption and “black gold politics” with promises of bringing cleaner 
politics and efficient government.
297
 This was also crucial to Chen Shui-bian‟s 
victory in 2000. His achievement in improving the administrative efficiency of Taipei 
City Government as the Taipei mayor, from 1994 to 1998, had won him a reputation 
as a reformer, a great political asset for him to run for the presidency afterwards. Not 
surprisingly, the campaign focus of Chen in the presidential election of 2000 was 
reform again, which could be summarized by his two main slogans: “A young Taiwan 
with a vigorous government” and “A government governed by clean forces for all 
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people.”298 Obviously, Chen was trying to define his image as a symbol of efficiency 
and reform in contrast to an aging and corrupt KMT regime.  
His strategy worked against the backdrop of a divided KMT
299
 and the verbal intim-
idation from Beijing before the election. However, Chen won narrowly, with a vote 
share of only 39 per cent. With a KMT-dominated legislature, financial reform was 
singled out by the Chen administration as the priority issue on the reform list for the 
following reasons. The first was to carry out Chen‟s campaign promise on financial 
reform. During his election campaign, Chen used a TV commercial to intensely attack 
the KMT government for spoiling its cronies with privileged bank loans, causing 
massive bad loans in the banking sector.
300
 Now that Chen was in power, people were 
watching to see whether he could really “defuse a debt bomb.”301 Secondly, there 
were serious concerns in the international media about Taiwan‟s looming banking 
crisis. They warned of the possibility of a small version of the Asian financial crisis 
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breaking out in Taiwan if some urgent measures were not taken.
302
 Their reports put 
tremendous pressure on the Chen administration because negative foreign media 
reports would discourage foreign investment, which was critical to a small and open 
economy like Taiwan. In addition, due to Taiwan‟s international isolation status, 
foreign media reports also had significant impacts on the public‟s confidence.303 
Thirdly, the financial turbulence had reached the point that there was no room for a 
delayed response when the DPP just took power. According to the Banking Bureau 
under the Financial Supervision Committee (FSC), at the end of 2000, as Table 7.1 
shows, the total NPLs of all domestic banks (including the Trust and Investment Co.) 
in Taiwan was NT$ 798.3 billion and the NPL ratio was 5.47 per cent, almost double 
the figure of 1995. What was even worse was the much higher NPL ratios among the 
community financial institutions including the credit cooperatives and the CDFFAs. 
In contrast, the NPL ratio was 12.45 per cent for the credit cooperatives and 17.91 per 
cent for the CDFFAs in average; their NPLs were NT$ 66.2 billion and 138 billion 
respectively.
304
 In other words, when Chen Shui-bian took office, the whole banking 
sector was already in trouble. There was a potential “time bomb”, which, if not 
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defused in time, threatened the whole economy and social stability of Taiwan. And the 
CDFFAs were the most likely part to detonate first. Given this, it was reasonable for 
Chen to target those troubled community financial institutions as the priority for 
financial reform especially when he was so desperate to prove his ability to lead the 
county and secure his power base. 
Table 7.1: NPL Ratios Among Different Financial Institutions (Unit: Per cent) 
End of Period Total 
Domestic 
Banks* 
Local 
Branches of 
Foreign 
Banks 
Sub-total 
Credit 
Cooperatives 
CDFFAs 
1995 Dec. 3.00 2.88 0.82 4.02 3.12  5.07  
1996 Dec. 4.15 3.74 1.00 7.10 6.13  8.24  
1997 Dec. 4.18 3.74 1.07 8.53 6.19  10.68  
1998 Dec. 4.93 4.41 1.65 10.57 7.55  13.10  
1999 Dec. 5.67 4.96 3.20 13.70 10.54  16.03  
2000 Dec. 6.20 5.47 3.22 15.68 12.45  17.91  
2001 Dec. 8.16 7.70 3.53 16.39 11.66 19.37  
2002 Mar. 8.78 8.28 3.77 17.88 12.69 21.15  
2002 Dec. 6.84 6.39 2.36 15.37 10.34 18.62  
2003 Dec. 5.00 4.57 1.51 13.29 6.91 17.57  
2004 Oct. 3.85 3.50 1.24 10.93 3.80 15.50  
Source: Financial Supervisory Commission, Taiwan, 2004  
*Include Trust and Investment Co.   
2.2 Encouragement of early success  
The other source of the DPP‟s overconfidence came from the encouragement of its 
initial success in dealing with a number of community financial institutions which 
were on the brink of insolvency. On 14 September 2001, under the command of the 
MOF, the Central Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC), which was mainly in 
charge the Financial Restructuring Fund, suddenly took over 29 CDFFAs and 7 credit 
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cooperatives. Then again in July 2002, the CDIC seized control of another seven 
CDFFAs. The plan was to use the Financial Restructuring Fund to cover the loss of 
these 43 community financial institutions and then put them into the market for sale 
through public auctions. So eventually, if everything went smoothly, these 43 
community financial institutions would be sold to the highest bidders
305
 and drop out 
the banking market permanently.  
It turned out that the DPP government did not run into too much difficulty and 
resistance in taking over these troubled institutions. The success was mainly based on 
the high legitimacy of the intervention as the 43 community financial institutions all 
had alarming NPL ratios, huge deficits and even negative net worth of their assets. 
Besides, as the crackdown was only confined to a relatively small part of the 
community financial institutions, opposition forces were not strong enough to derail 
the project. As a matter of fact, the move even strengthened the reputation of the DPP 
for its determination in pushing through a painful reform. Comments such as “It‟s 
definitely a step in the right direction, though it should have been done a long time 
ago”306 were widespread in the media. As a result, the DPP government‟s confidence 
to carry on its agenda of financial reform was significantly boosted. This was why 
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Chen Shui-bian could reject Lee Teng-hui‟s criticism of the reform on the CDFFAs so 
resolutely, quickly and confidently. In short, the early success not only reinforced the 
DPP‟s faith in its strong mandate to undertake financial reforms but also reassured 
itself about the correctness of its methods in tackling the challenge. This, however, 
only paved the way for the subsequent setback and policy U-turn. 
3. A fundamentally flawed reform project 
But overconfidence was not the fundamental root of the DPP‟s failure on reforming 
the rural credit unions. The deeper root was that the DPP chose a reform project 
whose assumption was fatally flawed. The project incorrectly assumed that the 
CDFFAs could be treated like commercial banks while in fact they were quite 
different except that they all took deposits and undertook loan business. As most 
farmers and fishermen were not in favour of this assumption in principle, the project 
was doomed to fail even before it was introduced. This was why those farmers and 
fishermen who were organized to be against the project refused to accept any 
compromise offered by the DPP government in negotiations before the policy U-turn, 
and insisted on going ahead with the planned protest even though the policy U-turn 
was already in place. Thus, in the following two sections, firstly I will explain why 
the assumption of the DPP‟s reform project was so problematic and unacceptable to 
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most farmers and fishermen; then I will elucidate why the DPP chose such a project 
without noticing its inherent flaws at all.  
3.1 The MOF project and its fundamental flaw    
The problems of the CDFFAs surged in the final years of the KMT rule before 2000. 
According to a study, between 1991 and 2001, 83 bank-runs occurred and 57 of them 
were related to the CDFFAs around Taiwan.
307
 Besides, the average ratios of NPLs 
of the CDFFAs were alarming. As noted earlier, while overall the whole banking 
sector suffered from surging NPLs from 1995 to 2000, the average NPL ratios of the 
CDFFAs were much higher than the other kinds of banking institutions (as Table 7.1 
shows). However, the KMT government never essentially fixed these problems. Its 
reluctance, in large part, stemmed from its close connections with agro-associations 
and local factions, which were a critical power base of the KMT. Thus, even though 
there were a variety of policy options proposed by the MOF and the COA from 1995 
to 2000 (see Table 7.2 for details) regarding how to reform the rural credit unions, few 
of them were acted upon. 
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Table 7.2: Reform proposals issued by the MOF and COA (1995-2000) 
Year MOF COA 
1995 Let credit departments become independent institutions 
of agricultural finance and no longer a part of the 
associations of farmers and fishermen. 
1. In order to facilitate 
capitalization of credit 
departments, the 
shareholder system 
should be restored. 
2. Enhance the 
qualifications for 
becoming members of 
board, auditors and 
executive directors of 
the associations of 
farmers or fishermen 
3. The COA will help 
to establish a national 
bank for agriculture, 
which will become a 
de facto “central bank” 
of all credit 
departments. Thus, the 
new bank can 
supervise and help all 
credit departments in a 
concerted way to deal 
with their management 
and NPL problems. 
1996 An executive director of an association of farmers or 
fishermen will not be allowed to be in charge of the 
credit department. Instead, a professional general 
manager will be recruited to manage it in of the hope of 
ending political interference. 
1997 Plan to establish regional agricultural banks which will 
be invested in and owned by the associations of farmers 
or fishermen in a specific region, and credit departments 
will become the branches of these newly established 
regional agricultural banks. 
1998 Encourage mergers between credit departments; 
commercial banks will take over the badly-managed 
ones. 
1999 Plan a budget of NT$ 30 billion to subsidize credit 
departments for assisting them to write off their bad 
loans, and consider allowing big state-run banks to take 
over those credit departments in trouble. 
2000 Suggest setting up a national agricultural bank to 
forcibly merge troubled credit departments and the 
government will provide public money to compensate 
the loss of the newly established bank. For those normal 
credit departments, they can invest either in the national 
agricultural bank or a new regional bank.         
Source: Central Deposit Insurance Corp (CDIC), Qianghua woguo wenti jinrong jigou chuli jizhi 
zhi yanjiu [A Study on How to Strengthen the Mechanism of Dealing with Troubled 
Financial Institutions in Taiwan], 429-431. 
The KMT‟s hesitation, somehow, in small part, was also related to the disagreements 
between the MOF and the COA in terms of the key principles and contents of their 
reform proposals. While the MOF and the COA did share some consensus, such as 
improving professionalism in running the CDFFAs, the biggest difference was that the 
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MOF did not think there was a need to maintain a dual banking system: one system 
based on commercial banks and the other one based on the CDFFAs, the so called 
“farm credit system.” The argument was that since the banking sector was already 
suffering from over-banking, a separate farm credit system only made the situation 
worse. Besides, the contribution made by the agricultural sector to Taiwan‟s GDP had 
declined to less than 2 per cent. Given this, why did Taiwan need a huge and separate 
farm credit system?
308
  
Using this logic, the MOF assumed that the CDFFAs were just like commercial banks. 
The rationale of its reform policies was simple. If some CDFFAs were poorly 
managed, they could only be merged or closed through the government‟s help and 
order. The MOF did not care whether there was an alternative financial institution 
available for a certain rural area once the original one exited the market. Neither did it 
care whether farmers had special financing needs which commercial banks would or 
could not provide from the perspective of making profits. In contrast, the COA tried to 
reform the CDFFAs with the assumption that agriculture was a unique industry and 
needed its own farm credit system. As a result, its reform policies were built upon 
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 In my interviews, the bankers with commercial banking background all expressed similar views 
about the farm credit system. In contrast, the agricultural economists and rural credit union staffs in my 
interviews all dismissed the “naive” (in their words) views about the farm credit system. This big gap 
of opinions between the two camps, to a large extent, accounts for the different approaches between the 
MOF and the COA in dealing with the rural credit unions.  
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how to establish a healthy farm credit system in which the CDFFAs were the basic 
units.   
The dispute came to an end after the DPP won the presidency in 2000 and decided to 
carry out the long-awaited reform with the MOF project. With the strong consensus 
inside the DPP, three waves of reforms targeting the community financial institutions 
were launched shortly after the DPP took power. The first two waves, noted earlier, 
successfully took over 43 community financial institutions (36 of them were the 
CDFFAs) and public opinion in general was supportive of the reforms. Despite 
disquiet in some rural areas, the DPP government was encouraged by the initial 
success and felt upbeat about the prospect of the reforms. Hence, the third wave of 
reforms, the boldest ever, followed in less than two months. On 22 August 2002, with 
an eye to enhancing the overall soundness of operations of the rural credit unions, the 
MOF announced the application of a three-tier system of risk-management to 
“punish” those CDFFAs with too many NPLs by limiting their scope of business. The 
details of the new measure were:  
1. Those CDFFAs with NPL ratios between 10 per cent and 15 per cent would be 
barred from accepting deposits from non-members, offering interest rates on 
savings that were higher than those of the Taiwan Cooperative Bank or granting 
unsecured loans or loans to their own board members.  
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2. Those with NPL ratios between 15 per cent and 25 per cent would be also 
forbidden from granting new loans of more than NT$ 3 million to those who 
invested in the association.  
3. Those with NPL ratios above 25 per cent would not be allowed to extend old 
loans or establish new branches and could only grant new loans up to NT$ 1 
million.
309
      
This time, in contrast to the previous reform measures, the new policy would have 
much bigger impacts as it immediately affected the operation of 124 CDFFAs. Out of 
the total 278 rural credit unions in Taiwan, this meant that more than 40 per cent of 
them would be forced to cut back their business unless they could reduce their NPL 
ratios to less than 10 per cent. With so many CDFFAs involved, the backlash against 
the reform was beyond the government‟s imagination. 
On 5 September 2002, in a meeting for all the general managers of the associations of 
farmers and fishermen, the participants soon formally organized a self-help group, 
Taiwan Agro-Fighters United (TAFU), and passed a resolution to ask the government 
to: 
1. Abolish the new policy.  
2. Return the 36 CDFFAs which were taken over by the CDIC to their original 
associations or let similar associations run them. 
3. Propose and enact the Agricultural Financial Act. 
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4. Establish a national bank specifically for agricultural finance and development. 
If the DPP government did not properly respond, they claimed, all the associations of 
farmers and fishermen would stop providing insurance services to farmers and 
fishermen for the government. In their eyes, the three-tier system of risk-management, 
in the name of reform, was actually aimed to eliminate their associations. Therefore, 
they would fight for their rights until the government accepted their requests. 
Obviously, what the TAFU asked for in principle was in line with the project that the 
COA proposed and advocated. If we make a comparison between the request list of 
the TAFU and the original policy proposal of the COA in Table 7.2, we can find that 
they are similar. This is not a coincidence. From the users‟ perspective, all the farmers 
and fishermen cared about was whether they could get good and convenient financial 
services. They were not opposed to reforms. But, it was absolutely unacceptable to 
them to replace credit unions with commercial banks or even nothing at all. 
Nevertheless, the DPP did not comprehend this simple expectation. It did not 
anticipate that the MOF project would raise so much resentment and opposition from 
the farmers and fishermen. It even thought the farmers and fishermen would 
appreciate its efforts to get rid of the “rotten apples” inside their associations for them. 
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Facing such a strong challenge from the TAFU plus the powerful support behind it 
from former president Lee Teng-hui and two main opposition parties, the KMT and 
PFP, the DPP government‟s first reaction was to pledge to stick to its guns and tended 
to regard all opposition opinions as just the backlashes from the invested interests and 
the political calculations of other political parties. Nevertheless, the DPP started to 
take a more conciliatory attitude toward the TAFU in the hope of a compromise 
which would not change the basic tone of the reform but could reduce the 
dissatisfaction of the angry farmers and fishermen at the same time. After all, the DPP 
understood the need to smooth the reform process through compromise and did not 
really want to be in confrontation with the farmers and fishermen considering their 
support to the DPP, especially in the south of Taiwan, over the last decade.  
Therefore, the DPP government proposed several more flexible projects to the farmers 
and fishermen in less than two months before the final policy U-turn: 
On September 25:  
The Executive Yuan decided to implement the risk management measures on the 
CDFFAs as scheduled, but would adjust the projects with supporting measures to 
make them less aggressive. The government would encourage those troubled 
CDFFAs to merger with more healthy ones to form a regional bank or national 
agricultural bank by a 10 per cent investment in the new unit, but their NPL ratios had 
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to be reduced below 10 per cent and the ill CDFFAs had to turn their negative net 
worth into positive first. 
In early October:  
The Executive Yuan announced its intention to enhance its investment to 20 per cent 
to assist the CDFFAs to establish a national agricultural bank. 
In mid October:  
After a meeting with the farmers‟ leaders in the south, Premier Yu remarked that a 
troubled credit union would be allowed to increase its loan business with an additional 
quota ranging from NT$ 0.5 to 1 million in each lending whenever it reduced three 
percentages of its NPL ratios. 
On November 14:  
The Executive Yuan agreed to relax its risk management measures against those 
CDFFAs (66 of them in total) whose NPL ratios were more than 25 per cent as long 
as they could propose their plans for management improvements. 
On November 16:  
The Executive Yuan reached an agreement that the authority for agricultural finance 
would be transferred from the MOF to the COA.
310
   
But none of these were accepted by the representatives of the TAFU. The key was that 
in the negotiation process for nearly two months the DPP government did not change 
the core of its reform project --- to separate the credit departments with their affiliated 
farmers‟ and fishermen‟s associations, and treat them as commercial banks.  
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With hindsight, the DPP government‟s efforts to try to strike a deal with the TAFU 
were futile due to its ignorance of the essential differences between rural credit unions 
and commercial banks. It made at least three main mistakes in this respect in its 
judgement in pushing through the reform. Firstly, it overestimated its leverage over 
the CDFFAs.  In dealing with the commercial banks, the government could use its 
shares in many commercial banks to pressure them to follow its financial policies, and 
the government had significant power in regulating the business scope in which a 
bank could operate. If a bank did not follow the government‟s policies, it would suffer 
administrative interventions in its business.
311
 By contrast, the government held no 
shares in the CDFFAs. In fact, a credit department did not operate on the concept of 
shares. It was just one of the departments in a farmers‟ or fishermen‟s association. It 
was only directly subject to those who control the association (i.e., the director or the 
general manager) and indirectly to the members of the association.
312
 In this case, 
though the government still had regulatory power over the CDFFAs, it had less 
substantial leverage over them.  
Secondly, the DPP overemphasized the power of market forces in disciplining the 
CDFFAs. Most commercial banks were publicly listed companies on the stock market. 
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If they maintained a high amount of NPLs, they would be punished by a fall in their 
share price. In addition, high NPLs would affect their operating performance in taking 
deposits and giving loans. Smart consumers would not want to risk losing their 
savings in a high NPL ratio bank. And, too many bad debts would make a bank 
vulnerable in risk management. In contrast, the credit departments were not purely 
profit-oriented. As long as their revenues were the main incomes for the operation of 
their affiliated associations and their members were in need of their financing services 
in the daily lives, they could sustain operations even when facing mounting NPLs. As 
such, they were relatively insulated from market forces.  
Thirdly and most importantly, the DPP government seriously underestimated the 
crucial role played by the agro-associations in the rural areas and the importance of a 
credit department to the function of its affiliated agro-association. There are three 
main agro-organizations in rural Taiwan. Apart from two single-purpose 
organizations, the irrigation associations and the fruit-marketing cooperatives, the 
farmers‟ associations coupled with the fishermen‟s association 313  are 
multi-functioned institutions based on a township unit basis. Consequently, the 
farmers‟ associations have comprehensive and crucial influence on almost every 
aspect of farmers‟ lives. There are four major departments in a farmers‟ association: 
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distribution, education, insurance and credit. The department of distribution is in 
charge of providing pesticides, fertilizers and agricultural machinery, shipping 
produce and livestock. The education department aims to transfer the latest 
agricultural technology to farmers and promote ideas about how to run farming 
business. The insurance department handles farmers‟ insurance, pensions, and 
national health insurance. The credit department deals with taking deposits from its 
farmer members and providing loans to them for financing their agricultural business. 
Briefly, it is not an exaggeration to say that farmers‟ associations are central to 
farmers‟ day to day life. But if we examine the operation of farmers‟ associations 
more carefully, we have to further emphasize that the credit departments are the hearts 
of these associations. For among the four chief departments, only the departments of 
credit and distribution can generate revenues to keep the whole association 
functioning, and in most cases the credit departments are accounting for more than 90 
per cent of those revenues. In other words, if the credit department goes wrong, the 
whole association will come to a halt owing to the shortage of funds.  
As a matter of fact, the reform measures towards the CDFFAs were also launched at a 
wrong time. The CDFFAs suffered dramatic difficulties over the 1990s after the 
government massively deregulated the banking sector and allowed 16 new private 
commercial banks to be established after 1991. The newcomers significantly eroded 
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the CDFFAs‟ market share and revenues. The CDFFAs‟ market share shrank from its 
peak at 8.17 per cent in 1995 to 4.41 per cent in 2000. Consequently, apart from the 
high NPL ratios mentioned earlier, the net revenues of all CDFFAs declined from 
NT$ 10.8 billion in 1996 to NT$ 0.14 billion in 2001.
314
 Meanwhile, due to Taiwan‟s 
bid to join the GATT/WTO, increasing competition from imported agricultural 
products further worsened farmers‟ business and as a result put the CDFFAs‟ loans at 
risk. The CDFFAs were suffering from their members‟ inability to pay back their 
loans and the plummeting value of the collateral securing these loans. 
Against this backdrop, many farmers‟ associations were already struggling to 
maintain their normal operations when the DPP came to power in 2000. But instead of 
assisting them to strengthen their credit departments, the DPP government made the 
farmers and fishermen feel that its reform project was like “a bullfighter who carried a 
sword to pierce a bull‟s heart.”315 The heart was the credit department and the bull 
was its affiliated association. That was why the farmers and fishermen kept saying 
that the DPP government wanted to abolish their associations in the name of 
reforming their credit departments. Consequently, since the government did not 
change the core of its reform projects for the CDFFAs, the TAFU rejected any 
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concessions, even when the Executive Yuan announced the immediate and total 
suspension of its three tier risk management system over the CDFFAs. The TAFU had 
very little confidence in the promises of the government and insisted on proceeding 
with its planned protest. 
This lack of confidence was confirmed by WANG Hsueh-hui, the President of Pan 
Chiao Farmers‟ Association in Taipei County. In response to the question why the 
TAFU still went ahead with the protest, she simply replied: “Judging from all signs, 
we just could not feel the sincerity of the MOF!” As the leader of one of the biggest 
farmers‟ associations in Taiwan, she felt: 
“There is obvious discrimination against the rural credit unions by the MOF.” … “We 
are not allowed to do many banking services that other community cooperatives can 
do.” … “The MOF just wanted to punish those bad CDFFAs but did not provide 
anything to reward the good ones at the same time.” … “The whole process to take 
over those 36 CDFFAs and implement the new risk management system was just too 
rough and reckless.” … “When there was no mutual trust between the two sides (the 
MOF and the TAFU), the protest was just unstoppable.”316 
CHEN Kun-sung, another chief of a farmers‟ association in Taichung County, also 
responded with resentment: 
                                                 
316
 The interview was made in late 2004 at Wang‟s office in Pan Chiao.  
  224 
“Why did the DPP government always like to associate us with „black gold politics‟ 
and local factions? We are just doing our job to provide service to our farmers. You 
must understand one thing: we can provide loans to those farmers who have troubles 
in getting a mortgage from other financial institutions for their farming investment. 
After all, we know better about those farmers and their special financial needs for 
farming than commercial banks.”317  
The large gap of perception between the DPP government and the TAFU, regarding 
the functions of farmer‟s associations and how to address their credit unions, could be 
easily recognized from these reactions from the two heads of farmers‟ associations. 
Perhaps, this was also why Chen Shui-bian blamed some government officials for the 
policy U-turn on the eve of the protest --- he accused them of not providing correct 
information about the CDFFAs to him, making him misled.
318
 Nevertheless, Fan 
Chen-tsung, the head of the COA, responded that he had warned Premier Yu not to 
misjudge the situation long time ago. “I found the strong opposition were not just 
from the farmers‟ associations but also among the general farmers.”319 This confirms 
again the assessment of the COA to the reform had been ignored or dismissed for a 
long time before the policy U-turn. 
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But, why did the DPP choose a problematic project in the first place and why was it 
so blind to the flaws of the project all the way? The answers, I argue, were related to 
the DPP‟s unfamiliarity with the farmers‟ and fishermen‟s associations on its way to 
power. This lack of understanding misled the DPP into selecting the MOF project and 
then sticking to it until the policy U-turn. The following section aims to elaborate the 
argument in details.  
3.2 A new ruling party unfamiliar with the farmers’ and fishermen’s 
associations 
When it comes to the associations of farmers or fishermen in Taiwan, many political 
scientists regarded them as grassroots institutions controlled by local factions to 
mobilize support for the KMT through vote-buying or other mechanisms during 
elections especially under the KMT rule before 2000.
320
 In order to ensure the 
political support of local factions, the KMT allowed them to run the grassroots 
institutions as a mechanism for economic feedback. In return, local factions would 
mobilize farmers and fishermen to vote for KMT candidates
321
 through the network 
of the associations they controlled. This again confirms a typical patron-client 
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relationship between the KMT and local factions, making the KMT‟s rural power 
base relatively stable.  
Democratisation and urbanization over the past two decades saw this special 
relationship wane but it remained significant. Its on-going importance could be 
inferred from the election outcomes in the local elections for city municipality 
mayors/township magistrates and county/city councillors in 2002. As the level of 
these elections was more community-oriented, local factions could maximize their 
influence through their interpersonal networks. In the elections of city municipality 
mayors/township magistrates, the KMT prevailed with 195 of the 319 seats. 
Independent candidates won 92. The DPP only got 28. In the elections of county/city 
councillors, the KMT was still dominant with 382 of 897 seats. The independents 
followed at second place with 316 and the DPP just got 147. If compared with the 
previous election outcomes, as Table 7.3 shows, the KMT had lost seats but still 
occupied the biggest share of seats in the local political landscape. In contrast, the 
DPP‟s seat gains were very limited even after it won the presidency in 2000.   
Of course, the KMT‟s success in these local elections cannot be only attributed to its 
close relationship with local factions, factors like the strength of the KMT election 
machines and its dominance in most local civil organisations and government 
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agencies due to its past corporatist control have to be considered as well. However, 
the large presence of the independents and the poor performance of the DPP all imply 
the nature of these local elections: to rely on the characteristics of individual 
candidates and their ability to mobilize support through their personal connections 
and networking, a nature that definitely favours the KMT and the local factions it 
cooperates with. 
Table 7.3: Change of seats among political parties 
in recent two local elections (1998/2002)  
elections for mayors/magistrates county/city councillors 
Year 1998 2002 1998 2002 
KMT 236 195 473 382 
Independents 55 92 235 309 
DPP 28 28 114 147 
Other parties 0 4 11 59 
Total 319 319 833 897 
Source: Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University,  
http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/cec/vote4.asp (accessed November 9, 2005). 
Thus, these local elections results go some way to showing that the DPP did not enjoy 
the same close relationship with grass roots organisations as the KMT. In fact, they 
also suggest that the rise of the DPP relied far more on its campaign strategy than 
institutional mobilization. Given this context, the DPP not only lacked a clear idea of 
how these agro-organizations were run, but also had very negative images of them. 
The stereotype from the DPP‟s perspective was that, corresponding to most political 
scientists‟ research findings and general media coverage, they were the hotbed of 
corruption and cronyism, as well as the roots of local factions and the KMT. 
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Furthermore, because the credit departments provided funding and interpersonal 
networks for their affiliated associations of farmers or fishermen to serve for local 
factions and the KMT, the DPP had every reason to think that a reform focusing on 
credit departments was the shortcut to restructure the agro-institutions behind them.  
In addition, if the reform succeeded, it could indirectly but significantly reduce the 
rural power base of the KMT. Now that public opinion was very concerned about the 
rapidly mounting NPLs of the CDFFAs, it had sufficient legitimacy to quickly impose 
reforms on them. It would be very difficult for the KMT and PFP to defend the 
CDFFAs considering the strong resentment of the public, so the DPP government had 
almost a free hand to implement its series of projects.  
In short, due to its unfamiliarity with the farmers‟ and fishermen‟s associations and 
their closeness with the KMT, the DPP had superficial understanding and strong 
negative impressions of the CDFFAs. In this context, it is not surprising that the DPP 
chose the MOF reform project, which was in line with its political goals and 
ideological preconceptions. 
Conclusion 
Instead of just summarizing the main finding of the chapter, this section is expanded 
to compare the current case with that of the NPL reform in the previous chapter. As 
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the two cases were the two major financial reforms during the DPP‟s first term in 
power from 2000 to 2004, the purpose of the comparison is to see whether the first 
change of ruling parties in 2000 has made a difference in strengthening the state‟s 
financial governance.    
Without doubt, the first transfer of power in 2000 was the high tide of Taiwan‟s 
democratisation since its inception in the late 1980s. It created a window of 
opportunity for a test: whether the first non-KMT ruling party, the DPP, in Taiwan‟s 
post-war history could enhance the performance of the state in governing. In terms of 
financial governance, the reforms on the NPLs and the CDFFAs have provided 
abundant materials for us to get some clues. Against the success of the former and the 
failure of the latter, a key question arises for our discussion: what has contributed to 
the huge difference as the DPP was deeply committed to both reforms at the same 
time? 
At the core of the question is concerning the strong mandate that the DPP had in both 
reforms. In the case of tackling the NPL crisis, as examined in the previous chapter, 
the strong mandate helped the DPP overcome its minority status in parliament and 
thus greatly facilitated the reform process. In contrast, as we have just seen in this 
chapter, the same mandate did not have the same effects on the CDFFAs reform. The 
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key to the difference, I contend, stems from one vital distinction: to have a strong 
mandate is one thing; to be able to effectively use the mandate and reach the targeted 
goals is another.  
In the case of the reform on the rural credit unions, actually, the DPP enjoyed not only 
the strong mandate but also the advantage of weaker links with local factions and their 
agro-associations. This was why it could swiftly undertake the reform without the 
hesitation of its predecessor the KMT. In the meantime, however, it also suffered 
from a lack of understanding about the rural credit unions and their associations. 
Owing to its unfamiliarity with the agro-associations on its way to power, the DPP in 
general had held a strong negative view against them for years. It saw them just as the 
breeding grounds of local factions and the power base of the KMT. Not surprisingly, 
once it took power and got the mandate to reform the rural credit unions, it rushed to 
start the reform and chose the MOF project that did not favour their operation and 
existence. In a word, the DPP‟s given bias against the CDFFAs led to its 
misjudgement and eventually cost its strong mandate and advantages on the reform.   
Based on the analysis, a few points can be made on the effects of democratisation and 
change of ruling parties on the state‟s financial governance after the DPP came to 
power at its first term. First, democratisation played a key role in offering an 
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alternative to the KMT‟s uninterrupted rule for decades. It brought a chance for a 
fundamental reform on the urgent financial issues including the NPL crisis and the 
deteriorating CDFFAs, which would have been less likely to happen if the KMT was 
still in power considering its close connections with the concerning parties involved in 
the reforms. Second, as a new ruling party without the majority in parliament in its 
first term, the DPP, desperate to boost its popularity and legitimacy, was highly 
motivated to rapidly build its credit of governing through a rush to engage in financial 
reforms. Under certain circumstances, this attitude was necessary and constructive to 
the success of a financial reform such as defusing the NPL crisis. But if there was no 
cautious preparation in advance, the attitude would result in the failure of a financial 
reform like the one on rural credit unions. The lesson is: a successful reform must be 
based on more than the will of political leaders or the good intention of reform of a 
political party. It is also very important to assess the context of the problem carefully 
and comprehensively before a reform project is instigated. Third, accordingly, the 
effects of the change of ruling parties should not be exaggerated. Things will not 
change overnight because of the transfer of power if the fundamental problems are not 
really addressed. Government agencies, policies and policy environments, to some 
extent, all have continuities. In the case of the CDFFAs reform, despite the DPP‟s 
strong commitment, it was unrealistic for the DPP to think it could start its rule free 
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from the structural constraints and institutional legacies. The DPP was not only 
conditioned by its own given perceptions about agro-associations but also by its 
ignorance to the importance of the credit unions in the rural area. As a result, it picked 
a problematic reform project and ended up facing the embarrassing policy U-turn.  
Finally, despite the policy U-turn on the CDFFAs reform, there is still room for us to 
stay positive on the function of Taiwan‟s developmental state in financial governance 
after 2000. Apart from new challenges, democratisation has also brought new 
opportunities for the developmental state at the same time. The future of the 
developmental state will depend on whether all main related actors can adapt to the 
changing political environment and reach new consensus about new policy goals as 
well as political norms and practices. The final news about the CDFFAs reform after 
the policy U-turn seems to confirm a positive view. The DPP government eventually 
reached several consensuses with the TAFU and the opposition parties. The 
Agricultural Financial Law was enacted in July 2003. Based on the law, the 
Agricultural Bank of Taiwan (ABT) has been established and begun to operate in May 
2005 under the supervision of the COA not the MOF.
322
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Chapter Eight 
Conclusion 
Many forms of Government have been tried and will be tried in this world of sin and 
woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said 
that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have 
been tried from time to time. 
Winston Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons, November 11, 1947 
*********************** 
After the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, many countries in the region were 
forced to implement the neo-liberal reform projects that advocated by the IMF and the 
West. While the results of those projects, dubbed by some as “Washington 
Consensus,”323 are controversial and mixed, the latest global financial meltdown of 
2008-2009 has delivered a fatal blow to the dominant status of the neo-liberal 
doctrines for economic and financial governance. In the meantime, the rapid rise of 
China as a political and economic powerhouse on the world stage over the recent two 
decades seems to provide an alternative for economic development to the developing 
countries in the rest of the world. The “Beijing Consensus,” coined by a westerner324 
and implicitly advocated by the Chinese government, puts much emphasis on constant 
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experimentation and diverse and practical ways for economic development. It has not 
only strongly appealed to some developing countries but also recalled the old magic 
of the developmental state in East Asia before the late 1990s. Under such 
circumstances, the search for the right answers of “good governance” or governing 
model for the East Asian countries is far from being easy. Is the East Asian model for 
economic development still working in contemporary world economy in the 21
st
 
century? Should it be all dismissed? Or maybe it just needs some adjustment? This 
case study on the process of Taiwan‟s financial reforms and governance changes from 
1988 to 2008 is an effort in helping answer those questions. After examining the four 
key issues in the process over the previous chapters, now I will first summarize the 
main findings and their implications. Then I will provide policy suggestions to 
revamp the developmental state in Taiwan in a democratic era on the basis of this 
study and the guidance of related research in existing literature. Finally, I will 
evaluate the prospects for the developmental state in Taiwan and East Asia. Also, 
judging from the progress of the research and its limitations, a brief discussion on 
what could be done to expand the research in the future is addressed at the end of the 
chapter. 
1. Main findings: Old governance machine vs. new political arena 
Over the preceding chapters, I have tried to address the core questions of the thesis: 
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What has accounted for the surge of financial turmoil since the second half of the 
1990s in Taiwan? How and why have most of the main reform measures proposed by 
the government been either seriously delayed or even totally failed since Taiwan 
began to undertake large-scale financial reforms in the late 1980s? What implications 
can we see from the reform process regarding the evolving status and prospect of the 
Taiwanese developmental state? Here is a summary of my findings to these questions 
from the previous case chapters.   
Concerning what led to the increasing financial turmoil in the late 1990s, i.e. runs on 
banks, NPLs and scandals of financial institutions, the study finds that the 
mishandling of financial reforms by the KMT government in the initial years of 
deregulating the banking sector was the original cause while the continued delay of 
necessary reforms as well as the lack of effective financial supervision in the later 
years added more fuel to financial instability. 
In the early years, as chapter five shows, the biggest mistake made by the KMT 
government was to allow too many new private banks to enter the banking sector at 
the same time, resulting in over-banking. The intensified competitions as a result of 
oversupply of lenders not only squeezed the originally disadvantaged small players 
but eroded the profits of normal or big players as they were competing against each 
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other in a cut-throat way for a limited domestic market. Another significant mistake 
made by the KMT government, as mentioned in chapter four, five and six, was lifting 
the ban on the entry of new private commercial banks before the SOB privatisation 
was finished.
325
 The sequence was problematic because it would have been better for 
the government to have figured out the proper room left for new private players after 
the end of SOB privatisation since most SOBs were major players in the given 
banking sector.  
In the later years, as chapter five, six and seven have all shown, despite all the rhetoric 
and plans announced by the government, persistent reoccurrence of incidents of 
financial disorder only exposed the limitations of progress and effort made by the 
KMT government on carrying out financial reforms and supervision. The lack of 
effective response made people even see the government itself as a main cause for the 
enduring disorder of the financial sector. The government, according to its critics, had 
acted too little and too late on overhauling the financial system. 
These explanations, however, are not complete. For we cannot help asking: How did 
the KMT government end up making those big mistakes in the initial years? Why did 
it run into difficulty in taking necessary measures to correct mistakes in time 
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afterwards? These questions require further explanations, which also have much to do 
with the second core question of the thesis - why did the government either delay or 
fail in most of its major financial reform measures?   
The study argues that the fundamental root to these questions is the impact of rapid 
political democratisation on the financial governance of the state since the martial law, 
imposed by the KMT government in 1949, was lifted in 1987. Based on the previous 
four case chapters, I find that political democratisation has affected the state‟s 
financial governance in the following aspects: 
1. The power of the central administration in pushing through its crucial policies of 
financial reform is more seriously constrained by other newly influential actors 
rising after democratisation in the political arena. Among which, the legislatures, 
opposition parties and local governments are chief challengers due to their surging 
autonomy and influence empowered by the public through regular elections. The 
concern of individual interest, reaction from constituencies and strong lobby by 
influential interest groups such as business groups often outweighed the 
instructions from the central authority in the democratic era. Consequently, major 
financial policies as well as other important public policies are subject more and 
more to the scrutiny of the forces outside the central administration. For example, 
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in the case of SOB privatisation during the KMT era before 2000, the biggest 
obstacle was not only from the rising opposition DPP but also from the inside of 
KMT itself. In appearance, the KMT seemed to be still in control of everything. 
But, in fact, it had serious troubles in convincing its own lawmakers in the 
Legislative Yuan, officials in the Taiwan Provincial Government, and councillors 
in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly to approve SOB privatisation until the late 
1990s. 
2. The KMT‟s constant attempts to survive in a new political environment, where 
winning elections was key to staying in power, had compromised the integrity and 
effectiveness of its measures for financial reform and supervision before it lost 
power in 2000. The KMT sought to win elections and consolidate its rule by 
giving away more political power and economic privileges to local factions and 
business groups, its main political partners since the authoritarian years, in 
exchange for their continued support. As many of these political partners were 
deeply involved in a great number of financial institutions, essential progress of 
financial reform or serious implementing of financial supervision became much 
more difficult for the KMT administration. The most evident case for this situation 
was the bad debt problems of some struggling financial institutions emerging in 
the late 1990s. The KMT government often intentionally “tolerated” and 
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“ignored” the problems out of concern that rushed reforms might “upset” its 
political partners and thus damage its relationships with them and its electoral 
prospects. 
3. The mass media and public opinion have played much more important roles in 
shaping public policies than they did before the democratic breakthrough in the 
late 1980s. The mass media has mushroomed ever since with surging influence as 
public opinions are affected, expressed and transmitted by it. Like their 
counterparts in the Western democracies, politicians and political parties in 
Taiwan are getting more conscious of the coverage of the mass media regarding 
their performance and paying more attention to public opinions as these are 
crucial for their public images and election results. In terms of financial reform, 
mass media and public opinions were so powerful to help a ruling party like the 
DPP overcome its minority in the parliament and push through timely measures to 
defuse the bad debt crisis from 2000 to 2004. At other times, they could also hold 
back controversial but perhaps vital reforms for consolidating the banking sector 
like merger and acquisition among banks. 
4. Democratisation has motivated political parties to propose and push financial 
reforms in an effort to mobilize the support of public opinion and win elections 
with the image as reformists. But, in the meantime, this attitude at times prevents 
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political parties from taking a patient, careful and thoughtful approach in 
launching financial reforms. This is most evidenced by the case of rural credit 
union reforms. Despite its strong mandate in the beginning, the DPP government‟s 
rush to overhaul the agro financial system ended up as a policy U-turn. It 
stumbled badly as a result of not recognizing that the power and economic 
structures in the rural area had not changed much even after years of 
democratisation. As old structures persist, swift and essential reforms towards the 
rural credit unions are almost impossible.  
5. As far as the prospect of financial reform in Taiwan is concerned, the most urgent 
issue is to forge a consensus on the role of the state in the financial system. Should 
the state need to continue to run financial institutions by itself? If yes, what is the 
proper market share of state-run financial institutions? Or, perhaps the state needs 
to completely withdraw from running financial institutions and only play the role 
as a regulator of financial markets? Due to the lack of consensus on these 
questions among the public and political elites, we have seen the swing of public 
opinion, making the state lose its directions and principles in pushing for financial 
reforms. From Taiwan‟s financial history over the past five decades and the 
public‟s reactions to recent controversies of financial reform, my prediction for the 
most likely answer to the questions above is that the state will continue to run 
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financial institutions with significant market shares, say around 20 per cent. The 
fundamental reason for this judgement is the continued threat of military invasion 
from China and Taiwan‟s exclusion from most of the important international 
organizations for financial rescue, like the IMF. The continued presence of 
state-controlled financial institutions is needed to reassure the public that the 
government could always efficiently restore financial stability even without any 
international aid if financial crises or turmoil break out. Nevertheless, the future 
performance of the state-controlled financial institutions will be still the concern 
of the public.  
In short, the old top-down approach used by the central administration in dictating 
financial policies during the authoritarian years has become history. Democratisation 
has created a new political environment where financial policies as well as other 
crucial public policies are made, reviewed and shaped in a more complicated way. It 
becomes increasingly difficult for the state to control the agenda of financial reforms 
and achieve policy outcomes as originally planned. While Taiwan has embraced 
liberal democracy of the West and the government‟s accountability has been greatly 
improved over democratisation, the delay, distortion and even complete failure of 
crucial measures relating to financial reform and governance are new challenges to 
the young democracy. Thus, how to upgrade the “old machine” for economic 
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governance to meet the demands and changes in a new and more complicated political 
arena will be a difficult and urgent task for Taiwan.       
Political democratisation aside, the impacts of economic globalisation on financial 
governance of the state are also slightly singled out by the study under certain 
circumstances. While its impacts are far less significant than democratisation in the 
four case chapters, economic globalisation, however, has imposed more constraints on 
what the state could do in controlling the movement of private capital and investment, 
which has devastating effects on the banking business environment. For instance, in 
the discussion of the origins of mounting NPLs among the banks in Taiwan in the late 
1990s, two factors are particularly linked to economic globalisation: capital flight and 
relocation of industries from Taiwan to China. Motivated by looking for cheaper land 
and labour as well as targeting the massive Chinese market in a global economy, 
Taiwan‟s enterprises have aggressively invested in China since the late 1980s despite 
the constant brakes put on by the Taiwanese government. The China-bound 
investments have significantly eroded the momentum of economic growth in Taiwan 
as they have reduced available funds for investing in the homeland. As a result, two 
negative side effects emerge. Firstly, demands for loans from banks significantly 
shrink, thus endangering the whole banking business. Secondly, the cases of “leave 
debt in Taiwan and invest in China” increased as the Taiwanese government has 
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difficulty in bringing economic outlaws who stay in China to justice due to the 
political standoff between Taiwan and China.  
Overall, we have to recognize the fact that Taiwan is situated in a dynamic and global 
economy, where the great powers like the US, EU and Japan are dictating the global 
rules of regulating financial industries. As a small and open economy, that is 
diplomatically isolated, Taiwan has little resistance to those financial norms and 
regulations set by those big players. In other words, with these outside constraints, 
what the Taiwanese state can mostly do is focusing on domestic reforms and getting 
itself ready for possible changes and challenges from the outside world.    
2. Implications: Searching for an effective state in a democratic era 
The findings above will not be new to those observers who are following Taiwan‟s 
politics and economic development as there are many similar symptoms pervasive in 
other policy areas. But a more fundamental question coming from the findings is 
whether the developmental state is compatible with democracy. Or, put the question in 
another way: if Taiwan is not going back to its authoritarian past, how can it still keep 
its economic prosperity in a democratic era with or without the developmental state? 
The question is not only important to Taiwan, but also many emerging democracies in 
East Asia as they are all encountering similar challenges and looking for their own 
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answers. Before proposing solutions, let‟s first briefly review the problems of 
economic governance and democracy in Taiwan over the recent two decades. 
In fact, overall, the assessment to economic governance and democracy in Taiwan of 
the 1990s was more positive than negative. For example, right after the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-1998, Hsiao and Cheng reflected on Taiwan‟s experience of a 
decade of democratisation in the 1990s and concluded: 
“…after a decade of democratization, the authoritarian party-state has been 
transformed into a liberal multi-party system.”…“In the path toward democratic 
consolidation, the government is going to play a less dominant role in the economy, 
and the ruling KMT no longer has the absolute power to control the economic sector 
that it did in the authoritarian era. Nevertheless, the government is still effective in 
governing and regulating economic activities, and the continuing consensus on the 
framework of the developmental state is reflected in the platforms of the different 
parties. ”…“The impact of the financial crisis of 1997 on Taiwan has not been as 
serious as on other countries of East and Southeast Asia. The government's various 
financial policies and measures in response to the crisis have been rather cautious, 
and have not become a political issue with the opposition parties. The economic 
bureaucracy is considered to be strong and capable of dealing with the sudden 
external shock.”326 
Wade also highlighted the achievement of economic governance of the state in Taiwan 
by the early 2000s. He praised as below: 
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“The case of Taiwan shows how governments can --- even in conditions of a 
globalized world economy and even when subject to real democratic accountability 
--- impart directional thrust to the economy in line with an exercise of foresight about 
the economy's future growth.”327 
Fell concurs on the issue with similar verdict: 
“Despite internal national identity divisions, its authoritarian past and the military 
threat from China, Taiwan went through a remarkably smooth and peaceful 
democratic transition.”…“Taiwan‟s democracy went beyond just conducting free and 
fair elections. Compared to other new democracies, it had strong and institutionalized 
political parties. Moreover, in the competitive multi-party system there was intensive 
electoral debate over political issues.”328 
Fell‟s own research on content analysis of Taiwan‟s election advertising in the 1990s 
also supports his verdict above.
329
 His research finding shows “the issue-rich nature 
of political communication” and “voters were highly knowledgeable about party 
positions on core issue cleavages.” “…electoral debate did force the government to 
address key policy areas of concern to the general public, such as creating a more 
equitable welfare system, tackling political corruption and working on environmental 
protection.” 330 In a word, to many observers and researchers including myself, it 
seemed that democracy in Taiwan was working and delivering in the 1990s.  
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However, such an upbeat tone about Taiwan democracy gradually waned after 2000. 
For example, Richard C. Bush III
331
, a senior expert on Taiwan, and his colleague 
Carlos Pascual expressed their assessment about Taiwan democracy in a newspaper 
article in 2007: “Formal democratic institutions may exist but they don't work 
well.”332 They contended that Taiwan‟s transition to democracy was successful “but it 
has not been followed by a full consolidation of democracy.”333 They elaborated 
further: 
“Taiwan's institutions --- semi-presidentialism, the legislature, the party system, the 
electoral system, and the mass media --- work together in a perverse way that rewards 
political gamesmanship over good policy. They reduce accountability, foster a 
zero-sum political psychology, promote policy deadlock, ensure suboptimal policy 
performance, and defer consensus on the rules of the game.”334   
These assessments, to get more evidence, are confirmed by empirical surveys. 
According to a survey conducted by East Asia Barometer in Taiwan in 2006, 41.2 per 
cent of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with how democracy was working in 
Taiwan while only 31.5 per cent held trust in the president, 21.6 per cent in parliament, 
and 17.6 per cent in political parties.
335
 In other words, “the backsliding in popular 
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support for democracy”336 in Taiwan is obvious. Some even worry about the rise of 
authoritarian nostalgia, which is generated from an exceedingly high expectation 
about the performance of the new democratic regime.
337
 
One of the main factors in dampening the people‟s confidence in the legitimacy of 
democracy is Taiwan‟s lackluster economic performance in the past decade. In 2001, 
people suffered from the worst economic recession since the first oil crisis of 1972-73 
as the economy contracted by 2.2 per cent in that year. Similar economic recessions 
happened again in 2008 and 2009 as Taiwan was under the shadow of the global 
financial meltdown. Economic growth rates were only 0.7 per cent and -1.9 per cent 
individually in those two years. The unemployment rates swung from the scale 
between the lowest 3.91 per cent in 2006 and 2007 and the highest 5.85 per cent in 
2009. Although these rates seem not too bad by the Western standards, they are the 
worst in Taiwan‟s history if compared with the same statistics in the 1980s and 1990s, 
not to mention that the social safety net is still rudimentary in Taiwan. Besides, the 
growth of salary for most employees has been almost stagnant from 2000 to 2010. 
The average monthly earnings only slightly increased from NT$41,861 (GBP₤905) in 
2000 to NT$44,430 (GBP₤960) in 2010.338 The increase, 6 per cent over ten years, 
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was near nothing. At the same time, income disparity continues to deteriorate. The 
Gini coefficient
339
 jumped from 0.326 to 0.345 from 2000 to 2009. With all the 
economic hardship behind these numbers over the past decade, people‟s growing 
frustration with the government and their politicians is no surprise. “Suddenly, in the 
public eyes Taiwan‟s political system lost much of its capacity in steering the national 
economy and delivering material security and prosperity, something the citizens had 
almost taken for granted.”340 
Actually, Hsiao and Cheng had sensed the coming challenge regarding economic 
governance and democracy in Taiwan as they predicted in the late 1990s: “ … it is 
inevitable that the government will face greater pressures and challenges from both 
opposition parties, politicians, capitalists, and various conflicting forces in civil 
society.”341 But they did not expect the KMT would be soon out of power from 2000 
to 2008. Nor did they expect the DPP administration would be so constrained, 
unstable and ineffective as a minority government. What was even more unlikely for 
them to see was that the KMT‟s return in power with decisive parliamentary and 
presidential election victories in 2008 did not boost the government‟s performance in 
governance as shown in the persistent low approval ratings of the Ma administration 
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over the past three years.
342
 Actually, in a more recent paper, Hsiao has implored that 
the KMT has wasted “a window of opportunity for the party to demonstrate that it had 
indeed reformed and that Taiwan‟s politics had matured and is ready to overcome the 
political gridlock that dominated the previous administration.”343 
Thus, why did Taiwan which was often touted as “a best-case scenario of 
democratization”344 in the 1990s suddenly strike a downbeat tone over the past 
decade? Some external factors in challenging the government‟s economic governance, 
like the two global economic downturns in 2001 and 2008-2009 and the surging 
influence of China over Taiwan, are all too obvious to ignore. But as these factors are 
universal to all countries in East Asia, especially the global economic downturns, we 
need more direct and powerful explanations.  
Based on the findings of this research, I argue the main challenge is from inside. To be 
more specific, Taiwan has not figured out how to set up a new state apparatus which is 
both capable in economic governance and complying democratic rules and norms. 
Basically, I agree with the analysis of Bush and Pascual that “the problems here are 
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mainly structural and systemic.”345 “One political camp or the other can be blamed 
for mistakes that each has made over the last decade to contribute to the current state 
of affairs. But political actors are acting within a structure that encourages these 
unfortunate types of behaviour. Until systemic reforms are devised to correct these 
systemic problems, the dysfunction will continue and politicians will continue to 
perform according to the cues that the system creates.”346 
Also, I contend that today‟s problems have their roots in the 1990s. Hsiao and Cheng 
and many observers including myself at the turn of the 21
st
 century obviously 
underestimated the negative effects of those “unfinished business of democratisation” 
that the KMT left in the 1990s despite all the signs they had seen. The change of 
ruling parties in 2000, in my view, only exposed the negative effects more clearly. My 
case study has shown that the surging influence of business groups over major 
financial policies commenced in the 1990s and went on being unchecked in the 2000s. 
The same applies to the KMT‟s business empire and massive party assets. Despite all 
the efforts of the DPP during its eight years in office from 2000 to 2008, the KMT is 
still rich and powerful in terms of the resources available for political competitions 
and elections with other major political parties in Taiwan. “Transitional justice” has 
not been fully realized to create a level playground. Thus, the KMT still has huge 
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advantages over other political parties, not to mention its long-term relationship with 
local factions around Taiwan. The list could extend to include money politics, the 
judicial system, corruption, constitutional reform and so forth. The point is that it is 
unlikely for the state to be effective in a democratic era when itself is penetrated, 
constrained or even captured by other new powerful players. 
3. Solutions: Retrofit the developmental state 
So, what can be done to improve democratic governance of the state in Taiwan? In 
spite of all those given problems just mentioned, Taiwan‟s has a good chance to turn 
the tables. After all, over the past two decades, democratic transition and 
consolidation has it merits and achievements --- a vigorous civil society and a mass of 
highly educated citizens have taken root in Taiwan. What is mostly needed now is a 
public deliberation on what and how to do with the reform plan of boosting 
democratic governance. In my opinion, the core of the plan is to extract and maintain 
the essential and constructive part of the developmental state from Taiwan‟s own 
experience and history and embed it in a democratic system. In other words, instead 
of completely dismissing its past success formula, Taiwan only needs to revamp its 
developmental state in a democratic era. Accordingly, the rest of this section is 
divided into two parts for more details: what to extract from the past and how to 
rebuild it in the new political environment. 
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3.1 State capacity matters 
Fukuyama is right by saying that “politics in the twentieth century were heavily 
shaped by the controversies over the appropriate size and strength of the state.”347 For 
most East Asian countries including Taiwan, they have followed, more or less, the 
neo-liberal doctrines to reduce the intervention of the state in the market by pursuing 
economic liberalization since the late 1980s. The trend had been reinforced after the 
Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 until the outbreak of the global financial meltdown 
of 2008-2009. Still, the voice for the reduction of the state‟s role in “governing the 
market”348 in the name of efficiency and profit is echoed all the time albeit with a less 
dominant tone. The road ahead for Taiwan in improving its democratic governance, to 
be honest, will never be easy, fast and clear. Douglass C. North, the co-winner of the 
1993 Nobel Prize in Economics, has reminded us from his study on economic history 
that: 
“It is the admixture of formal rules, informal norms, and enforcement characteristics 
that shapes economic performance.  While the rules may be changed overnight, the 
informal norms usually change only gradually.  Since it is the norms that provide 
„legitimacy‟ to a set of rules, revolutionary change is never as revolutionary as its 
supporters desire, and performance will be different than anticipated.”349 …  “Both 
institutions and belief systems must change for successful reform since it is the mental 
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models of the actors that will shape choices.”350 
With this in mind, plus if the theory of path dependence is right, the most likely and 
acceptable reform project will bear strong legacy from the past and take effect in a 
gradual way. Still, there is no guarantee of success for such an approach. After all, 
North has also warned us that:  
“It is adaptive rather than allocative efficiency which is the key to long-run 
growth.  Successful political/economic systems have evolved flexible institutional 
structures that can survive the shocks and changes that are a part of successful 
evolution.  But these systems have been a product of long gestation.  We do not know 
how to create adaptive efficiency in the short run.”351 
But, at least, we could try to grasp the way out from the past lessons, especially from 
those numerous trials and errors in practice and countless debates and discussions 
over the past decade.  
The most important lesson, from my point of view, is that strong state capacity 
matters for sound economic governance. State capacity, as well defined by Linda 
Weiss, is a “transformative capacity” referring to “the ability of a state to adapt to 
external shocks and pressures by generating ever-new means of governing the process 
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of industrial change.”352 Or, simply put it as “the ability of policy-making authorities 
to pursue domestic adjustment strategies that, in cooperation with organized economic 
groups, upgrade or transform the industrial economy.”353 However, Weiss rejects 
“the notion that the state‟s ability to impose its decisions is central to its 
transformative capacity.” Instead, her focus is about “the state‟s ability to use its 
autonomy to consult and to elicit consensus and cooperation from the private sector.” 
Weiss coins a term “governed interdependence” to refer to this negotiated relationship 
and calls this a special kind of infrastructural power of the state.
354
 Besides, she 
emphasizes that “when possessed of domestic adjustment capability, the state can 
provide a potentially more powerful locus for coordinating change.” “This is because 
the state‟s institutions can offer the most encompassing organizational complex for 
overcoming a number of widely recognized obstacles to change, including problems 
of collective action
355
, bounded rationality
356
 and short-term horizons, as well as 
unprecedented time compression in technological transformation.”357  
In fact, this kind of state capacity was exactly what the East Asian developmental 
states used to have in engineering their industrial catch-up with the advanced 
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economies. Indeed, a key of the economic success of East Asia in the past is the 
strength or capacity of their state institutions. This is also why a host of scholars like 
Polidano are often contending that “The [Asian financial] crisis should not blind us to 
the lessons, such as they are, of the last 40 years of economic growth in East Asia.”358 
Fukuyama and Marwah, in their comparative study on East Asia and Latin America, 
have also highlighted that “the reason for the superior performance of East Asia over 
the past forty years is likely due more to the superior quality of state institutions.”359 
Root is even more direct in pointing out that “The hard truth is that authoritarianism, 
whatever its sins, did foster well-developed organs of public administration.”360 In 
effect, in an essential part, the legacy of East Asian experience has contributed to the 
formation of “the new conventional wisdom”: institutions matter for an effective state 
to deliver economic development and reduce poverty with a special attention on the 
politics of transforming and building institutions, and local culture as well as 
history.
361
 
The problem now for Taiwan and other East Asian countries is what Fukuyama has 
warned to many developing countries --- “…in the process of reducing state scope 
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[over economic liberalisation] they either decreased state strength or generated 
demands for new types of state capabilities that were either weak or nonexistent.”362 
For example, “While privatization involves a reduction in the scope of state functions, 
it requires functioning markets and high degree of state capacity to implement.”363 
More importantly, as Polidano has emphasized, “…even if states opt for market 
liberalization, as did many developing countries in the 1980s and 90s, their ability to 
carry it through successfully will often depend on their ability to assert a degree of 
autonomy relative to domestic social interests. To become an agent of economic 
globalization a state needs more autonomy, not less.”364 As well argued by Rodrik, 
open markets succeed only when embedded within social, legal and political 
institutions that provide them legitimacy by ensuring that the benefits of capitalism 
are broadly shared.
365
 In this respect, the state is essential in its role in doing the 
balancing act all the time. In short, while “states needed to be cut back in certain area, 
they needed to be simultaneously strengthened in others.”366  
3.2 Institution building 
There is no question that this will be a huge and difficult task in overcoming the 
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challenge and revitalizing the capacity of the state. It will involve a comprehensive 
and sophisticated reform in improving the quality and function of the new democracy. 
But the bottom line is: “…there is no doubt in many citizens‟ mind that democracy is 
still considered a desirable and feasible form of government for Taiwan, in spite of all 
the recent threats and challenges faced for this new democratic system.”367 With 
people‟s general support for democracy, it should be more likely to strengthen the 
state capacity while simultaneously pushing further consolidation of democracy 
against the background of the strong legacy and legitimacy of state-led development 
in Taiwan. What is urgently needed now is fixing or building main target institutions 
to shore up and enhance state capacity. And, for this task to be implemented 
adequately and persistently, strong political entrepreneurship is indispensable. 
Actually, lists for the task of institution building or fixing for better democratic 
governance in Taiwan or East Asia are never in short supply. For example, Root has 
proposed a list of institutions for sound democratic governance to be sustained in East 
Asia: 
“They need institutions that will increase the costs to individuals of engaging in 
corruption. They need watchdog agencies and multiple layers of accountability that 
allow agencies of government to scrutinize one another and that allow the electorate 
and civil society to monitor the officials of the state. The judicial system must be able 
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to impose penalties without interference by money or influence. Citizens must be 
assured that public accounts will be subject to independent, systematic, and regular 
reviews. Legislators must have the tools to assess and design legislation. Voting 
procedures must be safeguarded by independent electoral commissions. Tax 
collection must be fair, predictable, and comprehensive, with proper legal processes 
and grievance procedures in place. The media must be credible, and independent and 
professional organizations must be able to ensure that their members derive their 
stature from the integrity with which they serve the public.”368  
Diamond has also followed similar lines by suggesting: 
 “…sustainable democracy and development require active „civic communities,‟ in 
which citizens trust one another and interact as political equals. In sustainable 
democracies, institutions of good governance --- such as impartial judicial systems 
and vigorous audit agencies --- induce, enforce, and reward civic behaviour. The 
tendency toward corrupt governance and the monopoly of power is checked by the 
rule of law (both culturally and institutionally) and a resourceful civil society.”369 … 
“…for democratic structures to endure --- and to be worthy of endurance --- they must 
listen to their citizens' voices, engage their participation, tolerate their protests, protect 
their freedoms, and respond to their needs.”370 
In general, the basic principle behind this kind of proposal, as Diamond has pointed 
out, is to “restructure and empower the institutions of accountability and bolster the 
rule of law. Changing the way government works means changing the way politics 
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and society work, and that, in turn, requires sustained attention to how public officials 
utilize their offices.”371 In this context, the proposal is linked to the view seeing 
democracy as an institution to promote growth and development. Through 
democratically organised public deliberation, development strategies and policy can 
be more in line with people‟s well-being and capabilities.372Thus, as Rodrik has 
argued, it is helpful to think of participatory political institutions as meta-institutions 
that elicit and aggregate local knowledge and thereby help build better institutions, 
which in turn promote high-quality growth.373 
While these general advices help us to get the right picture of reform directions and 
solid justification of reform agenda for the future, in a sense, they are too broad for 
application in Taiwan. To narrow the gap, we need to identify more specific problems 
of democratic challenges and ways to address them in the context of Taiwan. Fell has 
suggested that Taiwan need to undertake reform of the electoral system for the 
legislature and presidency to strengthen the legitimacy of Taiwan‟s democracy. He 
also proposes the need for Taiwan to revive political consensus through cross-party 
negotiation and compromise as it did in the 1990s. Besides, he highlights the 
importance of a diversified and strong party system which can deliver viable 
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alternatives for the public, and the need to tackle political corruption and create a fair 
judicial system.
374
  
Among so many crucial reforms needed ahead, in terms of priority, I would argue that 
the most critical issue is political reform. Diamond has made a point by arguing that 
“IT'S THE GOVERNMENT, STUPID.”375 “Without legal and political institutions to 
control corruption, punish cheating, and ensure a level economic and political playing 
field, pro-growth policies will be ineffective and their economic benefits will be 
overshadowed or erased.”376 Here I offer more details in this respect. 
The first issue for political reform is about the operation of the central government 
including the executive and legislative branches. A capable and efficient central 
government is the strong base of the state capacity. Before the KMT returned to power 
in May 2008, the paralysis of the Legislative Yuan was too obvious to ignore. It had 
seriously undermined the function and effectiveness of the government by blocking 
key budgets and bills. Now the problem seems to be resolved as the KMT controls 
both the Legislative Yuan and the presidency. Still, further political reforms are still 
desperately needed. Among them, the most urgent issue is to make institutional 
designs to reduce the standoff between the executive branch and the legislative branch 
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of the government. Even though now the possibility of the standoff has been 
significantly reduced under the KMT dominance in both branches, its resurgence is 
still very likely once the KMT loses its control of any one of them. Thus, the main 
point is to let the premier always need to get the backing of the majority in the 
Legislative Yuan. Currently, the president can appoint the premier without the 
approval of the Legislative Yuan, making divided government more likely.  
Secondly, in responding to Fell‟s suggestion of electoral system reform, the new 
electoral rules for electing legislators have to be revised. According to the results from 
a recent general election in January 2008, the main opposition party DPP is seriously 
underrepresented in the Legislative Yuan. The DPP only won 27 seats out of the total 
113. Namely, it occupies just 23.8 per cent of the all seats. But actually it got support 
from 41.8 per cent of votes from party lists and 36.1 per cent from districts. The 
disproportional nature of current system has not only obviously violated the basic 
principle of democracy (one vote one value) but also undermined the DPP‟s power in 
the Legislative Yuan. To improve, there is a need to increase the shares of seats from 
party lists.
377
 It is believed that this will strengthen the quality of approved bills as 
checks and balances are improved.  
Furthermore, the mechanism of direct democracy like referendum has to be greatly 
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improved to deal with the most controversial issues that the Legislative Yuan is not 
able to resolve. As this will help to reduce the paralysis of the legislature, it will be 
also helpful in forging national consensus regarding controversial issues.  
Fourth, a series of “sunshine bills” for clean politics and fair political competitions 
has to be revised or made.
378
 It is an attempt to minimize the damage brought by the 
so-called “black gold politics” to the function of the government, and restore the 
public‟s confidence in the government.  
Fifth, it is about the issue of “stop wealthy minorities from distorting public policy to 
serve their own ends.”379 My case study has shown how the business groups have 
affected the outcome of financial policies through their surging influence over politics 
during Taiwan‟s democratic transition and consolidation. The power base of the 
wealthy comes from their financial support to politicians and political parties. As 
politicians and political parties need to raise enough money to win in regular elections, 
they are forced to appease the wealthy. “As a result, governments that once enjoyed 
unchallenged authority have become hostage to corporate elites….Aspiring leaders 
cannot get elected if they pledge to reform failed economic policies because the 
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beneficiaries of those policies hold the purse strings.”380 Therefore, reforms regarding 
electoral financing are also crucial for sound democratic governance. If elections 
could be less costly and other sources of financing like public funds from the 
government are available, then the influence of the wealthy could be significantly 
reduced and checked and diverse and different voices could be easier to come out and 
be heard. 
Six, political entrepreneurship is indispensable. As well argued by Ngo, agential 
capacity does not derive automatically and exclusively from organizational 
characteristics; political entrepreneurship is instrumental in the creation of effective 
agency.
381
 The prospect of effective political reform, actually, also relies on the 
existence of political entrepreneurship. It is not just because “Political stars are 
needed to find new cross-cutting issues to campaign on where the main parties have 
failed” as Fell suggests.382 It is also because strong leadership are needed to 1) get the 
right vision for reform, 2) actively integrate different reform opinions through 
negotiation and compromise, and 3) effectively carry out reform projects. 
For all the proposals above to happen, to make a short conclusion, the presence of a 
strong civil society is fundamental. For political reforms only become likely when the 
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general public is willing to express their opinions, organize citizens for change, and 
monitor their governments and politicians all the time. While a sense of pessimism 
over Taiwan‟s democracy is emerging in recent years, there are also increasing signs 
that Taiwan‟s civil society is engaging in the push for change and reform. The recent 
policy U-turn of the Ma administration on the issue of establishing a Petrochemical 
Park near the coastline in central Taiwan is a good example for reference. Through 
countless campaigns, protests and struggles, which are organized by local civil groups, 
university professors and college students and joined by many citizens, the civil 
society has significantly shaped the outcome of a controversial public policy. The late 
U.S. president John F. Kennedy used to say that “The Chinese use two brush strokes 
to write the word 'crisis.' One brush stroke stands for danger; the other for opportunity. 
In a crisis, be aware of the danger - but recognize the opportunity.”383 From this 
perspective, a glimmer of hope for improving democratic governance in Taiwan is 
rising with the newly awakening civil society. However, sudden and massive changes 
are almost unlikely. In Huntington‟s words, “Political reform succeeds best if it 
occurs incrementally, in the spirit of „one soul at a time‟.”384 
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4. Towards a regulatory state? 
Judging from the findings of the thesis, I contend that it is too early to make a 
conclusive judgement about either the status or outlook of the developmental state in 
Taiwan. On the one hand, I agree with the view that the developmental state in Taiwan 
has declined after demonstrating how it become less dominant and capable in 
overhauling the financial system and delivering effective financial governance. 
Nevertheless, on the other hand, there is no denying that somehow it has also made a 
big difference in effectively relieving the damage of financial turmoil and restoring 
financial stability, albeit at a high price.
385
  Therefore, in my view, it is better to see 
the developmental state in Taiwan as an unsettled entity. Notwithstanding those signs 
of decline, the state is also restructuring itself in a new political and economic 
environment. Its future will depend on how well the restructuring process will 
progress. If the strength of a developmental state, as the given literature have 
emphasized, lies in its ability to coordinate the cooperation between the public and 
private sector, the greatest challenge to the state in Taiwan is to recreate this ability 
within the context of a new political economy as just discussed in the previous 
section. 
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That being said, we need to pay more attention to some emerging signs regarding the 
prospect of the developmental state both in Taiwan and other East Asian countries. 
Among them, one of the most salient signs regarding the role the state is the rise of 
independent government agencies. In terms of the focus of this study, government 
governance on the financial sector, a regional trend in East Asia to follow the example 
of UK Financial Services Authority (UKFSA) by establishing single and independent 
financial supervisory agencies is rising.
386
 For example, Japan‟s Financial 
Supervisory Agency was established in 1998 and later was restructured as Financial 
Services Agency (JFSA) in 2001 due to the reorganization of central government 
ministries. JFSA is an external organ of the Cabinet Office and assumes responsibility 
for inspection and supervision of private sector financial institutions and the 
surveillance of securities transactions as well as the disposition of failed financial 
institutions. During the same period of time, South Korea also established its 
Financial Supervisory Commission in 1998 and then the organisation was rearranged 
as Financial Services Commission (KFSC) under the current Lee administration. The 
KFSC is South Korean government's top financial regulator. It has taken over the 
policy-making authority from the Ministry of Finance with the duties similar to JFSA. 
Taiwan followed suit when its Financial Supervisory Commission (TFSC) was 
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established in 2004. The goal of the TFSC is to promote integrated financial 
supervision, consolidate the supervision of banking, securities and insurance sectors, 
and to act as a single regulator for all of these industries.
387
 
While each country has its unique background regarding the rise of its independent 
financial regulator, there are common features behind the trend. First, these new 
institution were all established right after a series of severe banking failures and 
financial crises. Second, these countries all aim to strengthen their financial 
supervision through the integration of their formerly divided supervisory frameworks. 
Third, these countries also want to enhance the competitiveness of their financial 
service industry through tightening and streamlining financial regulation and 
oversight. Overall, behind these common features, there is a profound message. It 
seems that these countries are all consciously following “the diffusion of independent 
regulatory agencies in Western Europe.”388 If this is the case, does this imply a 
transition of development regimes from developmental states to regulatory states in 
East Asia?  
Let‟s first look at the case in the West. The rise of the regulatory state or regulatory 
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capitalism, according to Levi-Faur, is best captured by reference to 1) a new division 
of labour between state and society (e.g., privatization), 2) an increase in delegation, 3) 
proliferation of new technologies of regulation, 4) formalization of interinstitutional 
and intrainstitutional arrangements of regulation, and 5) growth in the influence of 
experts in general, and of international networks of experts in particular.
389
 He 
contends that “Regulation, though not necessarily directly by the state, seems to be on 
the increase despite efforts to redraw the boundaries between state and society.”390 
Gilardi provides a further analysis on the surge of independent regulatory agencies in 
Europe by the end of the twentieth century. According to him, one of the main causes 
of the rise is “an attempt to improve credible commitment capacity when liberalizing 
and privatizing utilities and to alleviate the political uncertainty problem, namely, the 
risk to a government that its policies will be changed when it loses power.” 391 
While similar rationale is showing behind the recent establishment of independent 
regulatory agencies in East Asia, I still see some differences. As Wada has found, 
behind policy diffusion of regulatory state, “each national government chooses the 
feature of regulatory organization independently from other nation‟s decisions.”392 
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For East Asian countries, their adoption of independent regulatory agencies, apart 
from the purpose of quality supervision and efficiency, is still mainly for boosting 
national competitiveness. In other words, independent regulatory agencies for them 
are means to better international competition advantage --- a mindset from the 
perspective of the developmental state. In short, the developmental state is still “very 
much an on-going entity” in East Asia. Lee and Han have a vivid observation about 
the case in South Korea: 
 “…although Korea, Inc. may have been vanquished for the most part, Korea's 
developmental state is very much an on-going entity. The transformation of Korea's 
developmental state has the appearance of inevitability, but such a notion would be 
misleading. In spite of all the changes in the past several years, by all measures and 
accounts, Korea remains far from the kind of open economy and liberal society seen 
in the West. Daily economic life in Korea (e.g. running a small business) continues to 
be heavily influenced by government policies, though to a much lesser degree than in 
the early days of development. The state still matters, a lot. More to the point, Korea's 
developmental state goes on because its goal remains the same: economic growth. 
And economic growth remains the single most important national objective because it 
is seen as a matter of survival, the best way to avoid all the crises it barely escaped 
time and again throughout its history. Rather than being an unavoidable consequence 
of a financial crisis, the transformation of the developmental state toward openness to 
foreign investment and participation was a necessary one.
393
 
Wade also observed similar situation in Taiwan: 
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“…the state in Taiwan continuing to act more as a developmental state than as an 
Anglo-American liberal market state. The state in Taiwan continues to exercise 
foresight about the future evolution of the economy and acts to pave the way; it takes 
a view about what industries are important for the economy's future growth, and has 
the legitimacy and the instruments to help shape the economy in line with this 
view.”394 
Indeed, despite its recent decline of state capacity, Taiwan‟s President Ma Ying-jeou 
has launched his “i-Taiwan 12 Projects” --- an investment of NT$3.99 trillion 
within eight years on twelve key public construction projects. His government 
believes that the gradual completion of these projects will not only 
significantly upgrade Taiwan‟s infrastructure, but also create enormous 
employment opportunities, provide a new force to drive economic 
development, and boost Taiwan‟s competitiveness. 395 Also, President Ma 
took the initiative to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cross-Straits 
Banking Supervision Cooperation with China and accomplished the objective in late 
2009. With the MOU, Taiwan‟s banking industry now is allowed to open their 
branches in China and have joint adventures with local financial institutions there. 
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President Ma believes that Taiwan‟s financial institutions will make more profit and 
become more competitive through their business expansion in China. While the 
effects of these plans are still not clear now, what the state in Taiwan is doing now is 
definitely beyond the role as a pure regulator.  
Hence, my assessment of the prospects of the developmental state in Taiwan and other 
East Asian countries in the foreseeable future is that it will have an outlook similar to 
a regulatory state while maintaining its essence as a governing regime which is 
continuingly dedicated to economic growth and national competitiveness and 
survival.
396
 The bottom line is: there is no sign of retreat of economic nationalism, 
the base and legitimacy of the developmental state, in Taiwan and other major 
countries in East Asia.
397
  
5. Research in the future 
Since the regional financial meltdown in 1997-98, Taiwan has received significant 
attention from those scholars who are concerned with the development and outlook of 
the East Asian model with the developmental state as its core. This dissertation is 
organized for a better understanding about what has happened to Taiwan‟s 
developmental state and its consequences over the past two decades by focusing on 
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the issue of financial reform and governance pursued and pushed by the Taiwan 
government. It is the first comprehensive study covering almost all the most important 
issues of banking reform in Taiwan over the last twenty years from the angle of a 
shifting political economy. Also, it is a significant complement to the current 
researches on financial reform and governance in Taiwan, in which they either tend to 
turn a blind eye to the political dimension or only focus on a single event. Overall, it 
has added more empirical research results into the debate on the prospects of the East 
Asian developmental states from the perspective of Taiwan‟s recent experience of 
financial reform and governance.  
Still, for the research results of the dissertation to have more contributions and 
implications, the research in the future could be improved by the following three 
directions. The first is to look beyond financial governance. As economic governance 
involves broader consideration and more policies, to expand the scope of the research 
by covering diverse policy areas will make it more complete and convincing. 
Secondly, further comparative studies with other developmental states in East Asia 
will be needed. The goal will be to discover the common patterns and key factors in 
shaping the process of economic governance among the East Asian developmental 
states. It is expected that, by doing so, the whole debate on the future of East Asian 
developmental states could be more solid. Thirdly, the analytical framework will be 
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needed to expand to consider the impacts of external factors like globalisation, 
international rules and organisations, foreign powerful players. Also, the influence of 
ideology or other cognitive dimensions on policy choice is too important to ignore. 
Overall, with the expansion of analytical framework and special attention to the 
dynamic process among the interactions of key variables, the analysis will be more 
comprehensive. An inspiring case for reference is Dent‟s comparison study on foreign 
economic policies (FRP) of Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore.
398
 His focus 
on "network dynamics" with the consideration of various interactive functions that 
co-exist dynamically within wider “environment” and “development' contexts” is a 
breakthrough for the methodology on comparative political economy.  
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Appendix A: List of Interview Cases 
Serial 
Numbers 
Names Titles or professional 
backgrounds 
Dates of 
Interviews 
1 HUANG Tien-lin   National Policy Advisor to 
President Chen Shui-bian; Former 
Chairman of the First Commercial 
Bank. 
July 2003 
2 CHIEN Ming-ren    Chairman, First Financial Assets 
Management Co., Ltd. 
July 2003 
3 HUANG Cheng Former Chairman of the Seventh 
Credit Co-operative of Taipei 
July 2003 
4 Johnson CHEN  President of Central Deposit 
Insurance Corp (CDIC) 
November 
2003 
5 LIN Chin-lung       Director General of Department of 
Banking, Central Bank of the 
Republic of China (Taiwan) 
November 
2003 
6 Joyce HUANG  Business reporter of Taipei Times March 
2004 
7 CHEN Po-chih   Professor, Department of 
Economics, National Taiwan 
University; Former Chairperson of 
Council for Economic Planning and 
Development (CEPD) 
July 2004 
8 KO Chen-en     Professor, Department of 
Accounting, National Taiwan 
University; Member of Task Force 
on Financial Reform of the 
Executive Yuan 
July 2004 
9 CHANG Jung-feng   Vice President, Chung-Hua 
Institution for Economic Research 
(CIER); Former Deputy 
Secretary-General of National 
Security Council 
July 2004 
10 TU Wen-chang Senior Vice President & General 
Manager, Credit Dept. Head Office, 
First Commercial Bank 
July 2004 
  275 
11 WANG Jiuun-chih  Executive Vice President, China 
Development Industrial Bank 
July 2004 
12 TSENG Chao-ming  Secretary, Office of the 
Chairperson, Council for Economic 
Planning and Development (CEPD) 
August 
2004 
13 YANG, Ya-hwei      Research Fellow, Chung-Hua 
Institution for Economic Research 
(CIER) 
August 
2004 
14 CHANG Chao-shun Chairman, Bank of Overseas 
Chinese 
August 
2004 
15 CHANG Jing-Sen Vice Chairman, Council for 
Economic Planning and 
Development (CEPD) 
September 
2004 
16 WANG Hsueh-hui President, Pan Chiao Farmers‟ 
Association, Taipei County  
November 
2004 
17 CHEN Kun-sung     President, Da-an Farmers‟ 
Association, Taichung County 
November 
2004 
18 Stanley LIN  Deputy Director General, Bureau of 
Agricultural Finance, Council of 
Agriculture 
November 
2004 
19 LAI Der-Liang Former Deputy Director of 
Financial Supervision Bureau, 
Central Bank of the Republic of 
China (Taiwan) 
November 
2004 
20 GUO Jiann-jong Executive Officer, Taiwan 
Thinktank 
November 
2004 
21 SUNG Chun-te       President, London Branch, First 
Commercial Bank 
May 2005 
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Appendix B: Chronology of Key Political and Financial Events 
 in Taiwan (1895-2008) 
Year Political Event Financial event 
1895 
- 
1945 
 According to Treaty of 
Shimonoseki, China cedes 
Taiwan to Japan in 1895. 
 Japan maintains its colonial rule 
over Taiwan until 1945.   
Japan builds modern financial 
institutions in Taiwan and lays the 
major foundation for Taiwan‟s 
banking industry.   
1945  Japan is defeated at the end of the 
Second World War.  
 Taiwan reverts to the control of 
China, which is under the KMT 
government of General Chiang 
Kai-shek.  
 Taiwan is dragged into the Chinese 
civil war between the CCP and the 
KMT from1945-1949.  
 Taiwan‟s economy breaks down 
fast and financial order is 
dismantled as a result.    
1947 The “228 incident” breaks out as the 
KMT government launches a brutal 
crackdown on dissidents and 
protesters who rallied against 
government corruption and 
incompetence.  
1949 
 
 The CCP takes control of China 
and Chiang Kai-shek and his 
KMT flee to Taiwan with 1.5 
million refugees. 
 To claim to represent all China, 
the KMT regime transfers all the 
institutions of mainland China 
government to Taiwan, including 
the Legislative Yuan and National 
Assembly with representatives 
for all mainland China provinces. 
 A decree imposing perpetual 
martial law is issued. Chiang's 
government imposes harsh 
restrictions on civil and political 
liberties, jailing or executing 
thousands of opponents and 
 The KMT regime relocates the 
main state financial institutions to 
Taiwan. Coupled with those it took 
over from the Japanese colonial 
regime, these financial institutions 
become the backbone of Taiwan‟s 
financial industry. 
 A state-dominant financial industry 
is formed.   
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clamping down on the 
development of local culture and 
languages.  
1950 The outbreak of the Korean War 
makes U.S. government decide to 
block impending Chinese invasion 
of Taiwan. 
 The substantial and lasting military 
and economic aid from the US 
stabilize Taiwan‟s economy and 
financial order. 
 Taiwan implements successful land 
and economic reform programs.   
1950-
1970s 
Taiwan as “Free China” joins the 
US in its effort to contain the 
expansion of communist influence 
in East Asia during the Cold War. 
1971 With international favour shifting to 
Beijing, Taipei loses possession of 
China's seat in the UN. 
 
1975 Chiang Kai-shek dies.   
1978 Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang 
Kai-shek, takes the presidency. 
 
1979 Opposition groups organise a protest 
rally in the southern city of 
Kaohsiung to mark International 
Human Rights Day. The rally is 
crushed by the KMT regime and 
several important opposition leaders 
are jailed. The event is the so called 
“Kaohsiung Incident” or “Formosa 
Incident.”  
 
1980s The continued one-party rule under 
the KMT regime draws growing 
criticism at home and abroad.   
A series of financial scandals rock the 
KMT government. Among them, the 
Taipei Tenth Credit Cooperative 
Incident in 1985 is the most serious.     
1986 In defiance of ban on new parties, 
the opposition forces formally 
establish their own party, the 
Democratic Progressive Party.  
 
1987 The KMT regime lifts martial law.  
1988 Chiang Ching-kuo dies and Lee 
Teng-hui assumes the presidency as 
the first native-born president. 
 
1989 Taiwan holds its first elections in 
which parties other than the KMT 
 A significant revision of the 
banking law lifts the ban on entry 
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are legally allowed to stand. of new private commercial banks. 
 Taiwan Provincial Assembly passes 
a resolution to block the 
privatisation of TPG-own banks.  
1990   
1991 The surviving members of 
parliament representing provinces 
on mainland China are forced to 
retire, ending Taipei's claim to be 
the government of all China. 
 
1992 The first parliament whose MPs are 
fully elected by Taiwanese citizens 
is born. 
15 new private banks open. 
1994  Runs on banks surge since 1994.  
1996  The first popular presidential 
election is held. Lee Teng-hui 
becomes Taiwan‟s first 
democratically elected president. 
 The National Development 
Conference takes place. 
1997  The Asian financial crisis breaks out 
1998 Taiwan Provincial Government and 
its Assembly are dismantled.   
 The key TPGA-controlled banks 
are privatised. 
 A series of financial troubles 
emerge among listed companies 
and financial institutions. NPLs 
begin to pile up significantly in the 
banking sector. 
2000 Chen Shui-bian of the DPP wins the 
presidential elections and the KMT 
loses power for the first time since 
1945.  
 
2001 The KMT loses its parliamentary 
majority for the first time. But 
together with its allies, the pan-blue 
seats are still slightly more than the 
pan-green ones.   
 The DPP government formally 
launches financial reform to deal 
with the looming banking crisis. 
The reform is called “258 financial 
reform,” whose target is to lower 
non-performing loan ratios to 
below 5 per cent and raise capital 
adequacy rates to 8 per cent of 
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domestic banks within two years.  
 President Chen takes the initiative 
to summon the Economic 
Development Advisory Conference 
in seeking national consensus on 
economic and financial reforms.   
2002  The DPP government fails its reform 
on rural credit unions. 
2003   
2004 Chen Shui-bian wins a second term 
by a slender margin.  
 “The second stage of financial 
reform” is launched. It aims to  
- half the number of government-run 
banks to six by 2005 and the number 
of financial holding companies to 
seven by 2006, 
- increase the market shares of three 
domestic banks to above 10 percent,  
- encourage one financial institution to 
be taken over by a foreign counterpart 
or listed in overseas markets. 
2005 Opposition KMT triumphs in 
municipal elections. The result is 
interpreted as a mid-term vote of no 
confidence in Chen Shui-bian. 
 
2006 Chen Shui-bian survives an attempt 
by parliament to force a referendum 
on his rule - the second in four 
months. His opponents and 
supporters take to the streets. 
The DPP government announces 
abandoning the original reform 
timetable of the second stage of 
financial reform. 
2007   
2008 Opposition KMT wins landslide 
victories in both parliamentary and 
presidential elections. Ma Ying-jeou 
is elected as president. 
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